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The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or 
more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of inter-
national politics and international relations. The aim is to promote 
greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and 
trends and help prompt public debate.
A non-prot organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, 
its rst director.
The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics 
through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, disse-
mination of knowledge and education in the eld of foreign policy.
IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; 
Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationa-
lisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; 
defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations. 
The book shows that the overcoming of the negative imbalances in the 
current accounts of the large majority of peripheral Member States in the 
euro area is mainly due to a recession-driven decrease in import, a monetary 
wage compression, and below average rates of ination. This re-equilibrating  
process thus leads to short-term adjustments, in the sense that it is unable to 
structurally ll the competitive gaps accumulated inside the euro area during 
the rst decade of its life (1999-2007), owing to the inecient allocation of 
the nancial ows coming from the European central countries and invested 
in the European peripheral countries. Contrary to the predictions of the 
standard macroeconomic models based on the “catching up” mechanism, 
these nancial ows did not adequately foster the productivity of lagged 
Member States in the euro area.
Our proposal is to replace the “invisible hand” of the market with the “visible 
hand” of a European policy project. We argue that an eective policy initiative 
would have to combine a programme of European public and private 
investments with “contractual arrangements” aimed at implementing crucial 
national reforms. This strategy might provide a short term positive demand 
shock as well as the long term strengthening of the structural 
competitiveness of the peripheral Member States without involving direct 
nancial transfers but allowing an intergovernmental co-operation and a 
trust-building process under the control of the European institutions.
MARCELLO MESSORI is Professor of Economics at the Department of Political 
Science, LUISS Guido Carli (Rome) and Director of the LUISS School of 
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Introduction 
1. This book aims to show that during the last five years there has been a 
significant re-equilibration of the negative imbalances in the current ac-
counts of the large majority of peripheral Member States inside the euro 
area. This process has been successful in the short term; however, ac-
cording to our interpretation of the empirical evidence, it will not be de-
cisive in the long term since the re-adjustment was mainly due to factors 
which did not improve the structural competitiveness of peripheral 
Member States. 
The structural competitiveness of an economic system depends on 
the dynamics of its different forms of productivity; and these dynamics 
depend, in turn, on factors such as the technical and organisational in-
novations of the firms, the macroeconomic level and composition of 
productive investments, and the efficient re-allocation of the economic 
and institutional resources. On the other hand, the recent reversal of the 
negative current account imbalances of several peripheral Member 
States was mainly based on three contingent factors: (a) a deep reces-
sion which dramatically decreased the total amount and the total value 
of imports; (b) the monetary wage compression towards the rest of the 
euro area which had an impact similar to the devaluation of the former 
national currencies; and (c) an absolute and relative deflation or – at 
least – an internal rate of inflation below the already low inflation rate 
of the euro area. 
According to our thesis, factors (a)-(c) imply that peripheral Member 
States of the euro area were able to overcome their current account im-
balances in the short term thanks to an internal general compression 
which did not improve their structural competitiveness. In any case, in-
teracting with the growing positive imbalances of Germany and other 
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“central” countries, this trend led to the historical peak of the current 
account surplus of the euro area as a whole towards the rest of the 
world. The other side of the coin is that the adjustments in the “periph-
eral” Member States had dramatic social and economic costs in the short 
term as well as in the long term. 
Let us refer to a few examples. The long recessions determined and 
are still determining important decreases in investments and employ-
ment rates in all the southern countries and in some of the central coun-
tries of the euro area; as a consequence, the potential for innovation and 
economic growth of these same countries went down. Moreover, the in-
crease of non-employed and the compression of relative wages nega-
tively affected the quality of human capital available to domestic activi-
ties. Together with the worsening of the growth potential, the deteriora-
tion of the stock of fixed and human capital had a negative impact on la-
bour and total factors productivity; which in turn, drove down con-
sumption and domestic aggregate demand. Hence, factors (a) and (b) 
created a vicious circle between the lack of growth, the disequilibria in 
the labour market, and the formation of fixed and human capital. It fol-
lows that, in the current situation of peripheral Member States, firms do 
not have sufficient incentives to increase investments and households 
do not have an adequate purchasing power to increase consumption; 
and these negative consequences are also involving the central Member 
States (Germany included). Deflation (see factor (c) above) is strength-
ening these negative factors. 
Thus, it will be difficult to restart an equilibrating process of economic 
growth in the euro area without a positive European shock on the de-
mand side and a parallel credible commitment to reform the economies 
in the peripheral Member States and – at least, partially – in a number of 
central Member States. Even if the former were able to exit from their re-
cession/stagnation and to begin a growth process without having de-
signed and implemented structural changes for innovation, they would 
experience new increases in their negative current account imbalances 
due to the competitiveness gap relative to the better performing Member 
States. We elaborate this “rational” forecast in Chapter 4 of the book. 
This first conclusion does not mean that the reactions of the periph-
eral Member States to their current account imbalances (as well as to 
INTRODUCTION 
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other disequilibria) did not have and will not have any long term impact 
on their economies. Due to the deep and repeated recessions, the pro-
ductive systems of these countries underwent processes of “creative de-
struction” that improved their economic efficiency and thus weakened 
the intensity of the direct links between their rates of macroeconomic 
growth and of net imports. Moreover, some European peripheral coun-
tries improved the dynamics of their labour productivity since they 
were hit by very high unemployment rates. In any case, all these mixed 
elements would appear to be insufficient to guarantee current account 
equilibria inside the euro area, if the latter restarted to have a robust 
rate of growth. 
 
2. Our previous analysis has important theoretical implications. The 
standard models, centred on the assumption that the “catching up” pro-
cess will progressively reduce competitive gaps and will thus overcome 
imbalances between countries of the same monetary area, did not and 
do not work. These models (see for example: Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2002) are based on the faulty belief that market mechanisms are always 
efficient, that is, that they are not subject to systematic failures. Indeed 
markets are often inefficient, that is, subject to failures, so that they re-
quire frequent adjustment processes and the support of efficient gov-
ernance and regulatory institutions. 
As we emphasise in Chapter 3 of this work, the standard models as-
sume that market mechanisms would be sufficient to overcome the 
competitiveness gaps of the peripheral Member States of the euro area 
and to adjust their negative imbalances due to the corresponding posi-
tive imbalances of the central Member States of this same area and the 
lack of domestic investment opportunities for their consequent excess 
of liquidity. At the launch of the euro area and in the first seven years of 
the new century, the empirical evidence seemed to support these theo-
retical statements: the current account balance of the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a whole was roughly in equilibri-
um, and the amount of savings exceeded the amount of investments in 
Germany and in a number of other central countries. From the theoreti-
cal point of view this implies that the financial and capital outflows from 
central countries are the consequence of the investment deficits in these 
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same countries, whereas the financial and capital inflows to peripheral 
countries weaken their adjustment constraints and can strengthen their 
productive investments. The point is that the allocation of these flows 
has to be freely decided by the foreign investors who live in the central 
countries of EMU; thus, this allocation is aimed at maximising the ex-
pected wealth of financial intermediaries and households of the latter 
countries and not necessarily the growth potential of the receiver pe-
ripheral countries. The standard models seem to neglect this point. They 
maintain that the allocation of the financial and capital flows to periph-
eral countries always improve the efficiency and hence the competitive-
ness of these countries. 
The narrative relating to the first period of life of the euro area, 
shows that the wonderful world depicted by the standard models does 
not fit with the actual working of the markets. As it will be stressed sev-
eral times in the book, from 1999 to 2007 peripheral Member States 
were unable to utilise a sufficient portion of their financial inflows in 
productive and innovative investments; then, between 2008 and 2012, 
the various crises determined a flight to quality which inverted the di-
rection of these flows and worsened the position of peripheral coun-
tries. The latter had to over-adjust their negative current account imbal-
ances, which were no longer compensated by capital and financial flows 
anymore but were worsened by massive private financial outflows. This 
narrative can be summed up by telling again the three main descriptive 
and analytical results obtained in the first four chapters of our work: 
imbalances in the current accounts of different Member States of the eu-
ro area are not definitively solved; to overcome these imbalances even 
in the long run, it would be necessary to reduce the structural competi-
tiveness gaps between the peripheral and the central Member States; 
there is not an efficient market- or self-adjustment process able to re-
duce the competitiveness gaps inside the area. 
These implications show the limits of the market as a self-adjusting 
mechanism and leave room for policy interventions at the European and 
national levels. Obviously, it would be a mistake to change from one po-
sition to the opposite. Here we do not suggest a traditional distortionary 
planning aimed at entrusting to the European institutions the decision 
and the allocation of the private capital and financial flows directed to 
INTRODUCTION 
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peripheral Member States. The crucial questions which stay at the heart 
of the final chapter of this work, are thus two. First: Is it possible to 
overcome the market failures, and thus to get the supposed but non-
realistic performance of the Smithian “invisible hand” by means of a 
complementary European “visible hand”, that is by means of policy in-
terventions implemented by European institutions? Second: Which are 
the European policies able to support and to regulate the working of the 
markets, and at the same time able to stimulate the peripheral Member 
States to implement the reforms needed to improve their structural 
competitiveness? 
 
3. In the last chapter of our book (Chapter 5), we start by emphasising 
that the current alert mechanisms and MIP procedures are not sufficient 
to solve the previous two questions. These new regulatory tools can play 
a positive role, avoiding that imbalances reach irreversible levels and that 
these levels become persistent. However, it is not their task to reduce the 
competitiveness gap between different Member States. On the other hand, 
the recent revisal of the European governance proposed the introduction 
of two new institutions which appear more promising: the so-called “con-
tractual arrangements” centred on national reforms in exchange for Eu-
ropean stimuli to growth, and the “Growth Compact” centred on a pro-
gramme of European public and private investments. It is apparent that 
these two possible initiatives would be strictly linked and could positively 
interact. Moreover, they would have the merit of combining positive 
shocks on the demand side (short term) and reforms to improve the 
structural competitiveness of the EMU countries (long term). 
Let us start by assuming that each of the peripheral and central 
Member States of the euro area sign a “contractual arrangement” with 
the European Commission in order to implement a set of national and 
well defined structural reforms. Specifically in the case of peripheral 
Member States, these reforms would have to be devoted to increase the 
degree of structural competitiveness of these same countries. Neverthe-
less, a number of economic reforms require or can be helped by addi-
tional investments at the European as well as at the national level. How-
ever, there is still not a detailed plan for European investments financed 
by the public and by the private sector; and the national investments 
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can be hardly financed by the single peripheral Member States due to 
the severe and binding European fiscal constraints. Hence investments 
which are part of – or are strictly linked to – the reforms defined in each 
contractual arrangement, could be financed either at the European level 
or by easing European governance. 
In this respect, the “Growth Compact” could represent the right solu-
tion for the investments at the European level. This pact would have to fi-
nance big European projects in strategic activities such as digital innova-
tions, infrastructure, and telecommunications. At the moment, the sources 
of financing and the room for the private initiatives are not well defined; 
moreover, the European institutions did not yet try to specify a general 
investment programme and to re-allocate the large number of their het-
erogeneous and often catatonic initiatives (industrial compact, youth un-
employment, and so on) in the new framework. A possible but not exclu-
sive financial partner of these initiatives could be the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB), which has the right to issue projects bonds at a large 
scale; from the technical point of view, the EIB could finance European in-
vestment plans by implementing and strengthening the existing European 
Project Bond Initiative. Moreover, in principle, the European project 
bonds could be subscribed by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and, on the secondary market, by the European Central Bank itself. 
On the other hand, the national investments that are based on the cor-
responding contractual arrangements but which cannot be – directly or 
indirectly – linked to the “Growth Compact” initiatives, could be partially 
financed by reallocating the structural funds and by relaxing the Europe-
an requirement of national co-financing for the utilization of these same 
funds. Moreover, these investments could be directly financed by the na-
tional governments, if the relative cash outlays were not included in the 
Eurostat determination of the public deficits and public debts. In these 
cases, in order to avoid an improper use of contractual arrangements and 
to keep “moral hazard” under control, the single Member States would 
have to ex ante agree to share the implementation and the monitoring of 
these investments with the European Commission. 
The procedures just described mimic the market process illustrated 
by the standard models, but either replace or combine the working of 
the markets with that of the European institutions. Financial and capital 
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aggregate inflows, recorded by the peripheral countries in the first years 
of euro life on the European financial market, are here partially replaced 
with financial flows covered by the European institutions. Then the allo-
cation and the specific utilisation of these financial flows, which in the 
standard models were – respectively – in the hands of private interme-
diaries and foreign households and in the hands of national firms being 
typical market transactions, are here largely decided at the European 
level by means of the European investment plan or by means of the sin-
gle contractual arrangements. We believe that these new initiatives 
might provide a right balance in a double perspective: between the 
short term positive shocks on the demand side and the need for reforms 
to improve structural competitiveness of weaker Member States on the 
long term side; and between the objective-functions of European pe-
ripheral countries which need additional means to stimulate growth, 
and those of the central countries which refuse any type of European 
cooperation without a European control. 
 
4. The book is divided in five chapters. The first chapter provides a de-
tailed analysis of the evolution of the current account imbalances and 
their components since the beginning of the euro area and for each 
Member State. Particular attention is devoted to the description of ex-
port performance in terms of market shares, and to the connection be-
tween external imbalances and the contribution of domestic demand 
and investment to GDP growth. The main message is that some EMU 
countries had imbalances in their current accounts even before the in-
troduction of the single currency. However, the launch of the euro area 
implied a dramatic increase in the surpluses of a large number of central 
countries and a corresponding worsening in the deficits of a large num-
ber of peripheral ones, coupled with market share losses in the most 
important countries of the set. We also show that the recent rebalance 
in the current accounts of peripheral Member States has been mainly 
driven by a depressed domestic demand, both in terms of consumption 
and investment. 
The second chapter completes the analysis of the external perfor-
mance of each of the EMU Member States by looking at the evolution of 
their financial account’s components and their resulting net international 
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investment positions. We show that peripheral countries financed their 
current account deficits mainly by means of the inflows of portfolio and 
other investments coming from central European countries; the compo-
nents of these inflows mostly included debt and equity related instru-
ments. This massive recourse to financial instruments instead of foreign 
direct investments (FDI) reflected the distortionary growth model which 
characterised countries such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. The 
related distortions are partly responsible for the problematic adjust-
ments imposed to a large sub-set of these countries since 2010. 
In the third chapter we look closely at the literature investigating the 
causes and consequences of current account imbalances. After a critical 
discussion of the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) model, we look at the 
theoretical explanations of the failures in the self-equilibrating mecha-
nisms which are at the core of that model. The most interesting models 
point to three factors: (i) the too rapid banking and financial integration 
among euro area countries, which generated credit booms to finance 
consumption and asset bubbles in the non-tradable sectors; (ii) the di-
vergence in the dynamics of the unit labour costs, also due to the wage 
moderation policy implemented in Germany after the unification; (iii) 
the growing competitive pressure of EMU surplus countries on the rest 
of the area, strengthened by the asymmetric trade shock due to the 
competition of non-EMU emerging countries in the European internal 
market. All these factors ask for policy actions, both at the national level 
and at the Euro-wide level. One of the shared conclusions is that these 
policy actions are necessary to rebalance the European economy. 
The analyses in the fourth chapter provide some empirical evidence 
on the determinants of current account imbalances and their reduction 
in the post 2009-2010 period. This empirical evidence largely confirms 
the importance of the three main explanations proposed by the theoreti-
cal literature that criticises the standard models. It also shows that the 
net imports of a large number of European southern countries are strict-
ly connected with financial flows coming from European northern coun-
tries. Moreover, the foreign-owned capital inflows to the former were 
used to a large extent for investment in non-tradable sectors, which in 
turn fuelled investment and market bubbles. In this scenario, which de-
veloped mainly during the period 2003-2007, the competitive gaps 
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among the euro area countries were strengthened, thus reducing the ex-
port potential and increasing the propensity to import of the Member 
States already in deficit. This latter phenomenon worsened the disequi-
librium effects due to investment and market bubbles. The empirical evi-
dence provided by this same chapter then shows that the partial recov-
ery of competitiveness in most of the peripheral countries has been 
mainly driven by the effect of wage moderation, which was caused, in its 
turn, by the restrictive policy measures. In our reading this confirms that 
such improvement has no structural features so that imbalances might 
show up again once peripheral countries come out of the recession. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter we review the main policy actions taken 
by the European institutions in order to correct macroeconomic imbal-
ances and we suggest some new policy actions. First of all, we argue that 
the logic underlying the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) 
and the “Two Pack” is still based on an asymmetric burden on the EMU 
countries in deficit, which have to adjust their current account disequi-
libria without having recourse to a coordinated approach. This empha-
sises the lack of adequate policy tools in the EMU and does not enhance 
the effectiveness of the poor existing policy measures. In these condi-
tions, it becomes really hard to implement a virtuous and structural re-
balancing. The latter can take place only by improving the structural 
competitiveness of troubled countries, which would need the support of 
a European growth policy. This explains why we conclude the chapter 
by proposing to finance asymmetric investments in the peripheral 
Member States of the euro area. This policy action can be implemented 
by combining the contractual arrangements and the Growth Compact. 
 

23 
1. 
The Current Account Imbalances 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the introduction of the euro at the beginning of January 1999 to 
the starting of the European crises there has been a divergent trend in 
the external position of a large number of European Member States, 
with southern European countries experiencing a deterioration in their 
trade and current account balances and northern European countries 
(especially Germany and the Netherlands) improving their correspond-
ent balances. To better understand, let us distinguish different subsets 
of countries according to their entry date in the euro area. 
As is well known, the founding Member States of the euro area have 
been: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Although both trade and 
current account imbalances already characterised these founding coun-
tries at the end of the Eighties and during the first half of the Nineties 
(see Tables 1.3 and 1.5), most of them enlarged the correspondent sur-
pluses (for instance: Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands) or deficits 
(for instance: Spain), kept the latter extremely large (Portugal) or 
changed the sign of their imbalances (for instance: France) before the 
start of the European sovereign debt and banking crises (2010). The 
same applies to Greece which joined the euro area two years later (1 
January 2001) and worsened its large deficits from 2005 to 2007; and a 
similar trend also characterises three out of four other countries that 
adopted the euro at a later stage but before the beginning of the Euro-
pean crises (that is, Slovenia at 1 January 2007, and Cyprus and Malta at 
1 January 2008). 
Systematic adjustments in external imbalances of the countries in defi-
cit (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) started at the 
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beginning of the crisis of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). These adjustments derive more from the compression of the na-
tional inflation rates under the low and decreasing EMU’s average, the cut 
of real wages, and the collapse of investment and intermediate consump-
tion in the peripheral countries of the EMU,1 than from a re-adjustment in 
structural competitiveness based either on more innovation and more 
systemic efficiency in these same countries or on an increase in real wag-
es and aggregate demand of the central countries. In other words, we do 
not observe a re-composition toward a more sustainable growth model 
inside the EMU. To the contrary, the temporary adjustment effects of the 
economic depression risk to further weaken the future competitiveness of 
the peripheral countries since they go along with the reproduction of 
their high public debt/GDP ratio, the bankruptcies of vital parts of their 
productive apparatus, the weaknesses of their financial system, and the 
transformation of external imbalances in internal social disequilibria. As a 
consequence, if the European peripheral countries were able to follow an 
economic recovery path in the future, the deficits in their trade balances 
and current accounts could worsen again. 
In December 2011 the European Commission established a new sur-
veillance mechanism called Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP), which is based on a set of indicators and aimed at monitoring, 
preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances (see also Chapter 
5). Firstly, MIP takes into account both internal and external imbalances 
and sets threshold values working as an alert mechanism. Then, it de-
velops an in-depth review of those countries that showed imbalances by 
the previous alert mechanism report. Finally, MIP activates a preventive 
intervention in countries whose balances are still not harmful, and a 
corrective intervention in countries with excessive imbalances.2 If the 
                                                
1 Under this label we include Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. However it must be recalled that Estonia joined the euro 
area just in 2011, and that Italy and Slovakia followed different paths. Let us also add 
that we do not analyse the last comer to the euro area, that is Latvia, which joined at 1 
January of 2014. 
2 See European Commission (2011). These three steps are specified in two regula-
tions of the so called “Six Pact”. 
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latter countries were unable to implement the needed corrections in the 
short term, MIP would flow into an excessive imbalance procedure.3 
Given the situation described above as well as the accounting rules and 
the framework set by the MIP, in this first chapter we analyse external 
imbalances in the euro area by looking at the current account (CA) which 
includes non-financial current transactions and is equal to the sum of 
trade balance, net income balance and unrequired transfers. Let us add 
that, even if the next sections of Chapter 1 are referred to the CA balance, 
we will dedicate special attention to the trade balance and its sub-
components. The current account imbalances are a well-known and wide-
ly explored indicator of disequilibrium and possible strain in the econom-
ic literature. However, especially in a monetary union, trade flows imbal-
ances point out the comparative advantages of each given country of the 
area without any superimposition with other transfers, which are less re-
lated to its competitive position. Given the importance of trade flows in 
goods and services, in the following sections we also look at the export 
market share in order to better understand the ability of EMU’s countries 
to compete against emerging as well as other advanced economies. 
The remaining part of the current chapter is structured as follows. In 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 we analyse the external performance of the EMU’s 
Member States in terms of changes in net exports and market shares, 
and then in Section 1.4 we describe the evolution of the corresponding 
current account balances. In Section 1.5 we sketch out the complex in-
teraction between these imbalances and the macroeconomic dynamics 
of different countries. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 BALANCE OF GOODS’ TRADE 
The most important components of the current account are represented 
by trade flows in goods and services. The balance of trade of a given 
                                                
3 It is worth noting that one of the two additional regulations labelled “Two Pack”, 
which was launched at November 2011 and implemented at May 2013, introduces further 
monitoring of EMU’s Member States which are under excessive imbalances procedure. 
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country or a given area is a first indicator of its competitiveness, as it 
shows the ability of this country (or area) to place its goods and services 
in the international markets as well as its dependence on imported 
goods and services. In Table 1.1 we show the goods’ trade balance from 
1988 onward for the euro area countries and for the EMU as a whole. 
In this respect, the traditional position of the euro area as a whole in 
the international market has been relatively favourable, registering a 
surplus in goods’ trade around 1% of GDP since mid-1990s. This pattern 
continued in the first years of the following decade, while slowing down 
afterwards and in particular with the explosion of the global financial 
crisis (mid 2008). Leaving aside 2008, the aggregate trade balance of 
goods of this same area remained positive but its surplus was reduced 
to less than 0.5%. After the light increase in 2010 which went along with 
the short-term macroeconomic recovery, this surplus was cancelled in 
2011 (balance equal to 0) despite the moderate trend in imports due to 
the negative dynamics of the internal demand. Then in 2012 the balance 
started to improve significantly, and in 2013 the slight recovery of EMU 
went along with an historical peak in the surplus of its trade balance of 
goods (1.8% of GDP). 
Among the initial twelve euro Member States (the eleven founders 
and Greece), there has always been significant differences in goods 
trade balances due to different economic conditions and growth models. 
The structural problems of the Portuguese and Greek economies and 
their consequent strong dependence on imports implied highly negative 
goods trade balances since the beginning of the Nineties (1993): -8.6% 
and -10.1%, respectively. However, these two negative patterns sped up 
when it became rational to have the expectation that both countries 
were entering in the euro area. This happened in the second half of the 
Nineties for Portugal and at the end of the Nineties for Greece.4 The neg-
ative trend continued during the first eight years of the new century. In 
2008, the net goods trade of Portugal reached -13.4% whereas that of 
Greece -18.9%. These two imbalances decreased dramatically in the fol-
                                                
4 It must be noted that the situation of Greece worsened since the end of the 1980s. 
However, the increases in Greek imbalances in goods trade reached their peaks in the 
sub-period between 1999 and 2001. 
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lowing years as a result of the contraction in domestic demand. In 2012 
Portugal registered a deficit of -5.4%, that is a deficit 3.2 percentage 
points lower and equal to that in 1993; in 2013 the deficit further 
shrank by 0.6% in Greece and 1.1% in Portugal. 
The Spanish goods trade balance too has been negative long before 
the introduction of the euro. This can be explained by the fact that the 
country, after the end of its long autarchy period due to Franco’s dicta-
torship, started a process of catching up fostered by massive imports of 
capital and equipment goods and by the delocalisation of assembling ac-
tivities from the more advanced European partners. At the beginning of 
the Nineties, this catching up process seemed to approach a new equi-
librium: Spanish goods trade and total trade imbalances were not so 
negative. However, both these imbalances worsened during the decade 
1998-2007: the convergence of interest rates after the introduction of 
the euro caused an investment boom in the Spanish housing sector, 
while the export capacity of the country suffered the competition of the 
new Member States (NMS) of the European Union (EU). Overall, the 
combination of these forces pushed the Spanish trade balance further 
down until 2007. From then on the Spanish goods trade and total trade 
negative imbalances decreased so that, in 2012 and 2013, the goods def-
icits were reduced – respectively – to -2.7 and -1.1 of GDP whereas the 
total trade balances, as shown in Table 1.3, became positive (respective-
ly, 0.9 and 2.9 of GDP). 
Other European countries had and/or still have deficits in their 
goods or total trade balances. Luxembourg has a huge goods trade defi-
cit but, as we will see below, this is the result of both its small size and 
its specialisation in financial services. Also the Austrian goods trade bal-
ance was negative at the beginning of the Nineties (-4.6%); however, 
over time, the country managed to increase its net exports thanks espe-
cially to its integration with the neighbouring Eastern European coun-
tries, and in the last ten years its deficits have not raised any concern 
(even if it has been growing in the four years preceding 2013). Finally, 
we have to take into consideration the French and Italian cases. After an 
increase in the net exports of goods due to a currency devaluation in 
1992-1993, France and Italy started to suffer decreasing positive imbal-
ances and – then – negative imbalances, when the final parity with the 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
28 
euro was introduced in 1999. For Italy, the contribution of goods’ net 
export to GDP growth turned negative at the peak of the global financial 
crisis (2008); for France, whose rate of growth has been less dependent 
on exports, the turning point was in 2005. In any case, the French exter-
nal imbalances have been larger than the Italian ones since 2005. More-
over, the speed of reduction of French external deficits have been rather 
disappointing: only 0.1% between 2008 and 2013, and 0.5% between 
2012 and 2013 in terms of goods trade balances; 0.9% and 0.6%, in the 
corresponding two periods – respectively, in terms of total trade bal-
ances. In these same years and due also to the import reduction, Italy 
recorded a largely better performance (but in 2010) which flowed into 
increasing surpluses (+1.1,% in 2012, and around +2.5% in 2013). 
Turning to the surplus countries, the Netherlands have long been re-
cording positive goods and total trade balances, also thanks to the high 
contribution of natural gas export. Its external surpluses have increased 
fairly constantly (except in 2009) from 1999 on, with peaks of 8.4% in 
the goods trade balance and of 10.6% in the total trade balance in the 
last year (2013). Germany too recorded and is still recording very large 
surpluses. After the reunification shock which pushed down the net ex-
port of goods due to the strong demand from the ex-GDR (just 2% in 
1993), the country turned back towards its historical levels already at 
the end of the 1990s (3.3% in 1999). With the introduction of the euro, 
German net exports of goods started to increase at unprecedented rates, 
reaching the peak of 8.2 of GDP in 2007; then, the international financial 
and “real” crises and the worsening of the European crisis had a nega-
tive impact on Germany’s net balance of goods trade. The latter restart-
ed to increase in 2012, reaching 6.7% (6.2% in terms of total trade sur-
plus) at the end of 2013. The most recent figures of Germany and the 
Netherlands are so high that the European Commission (2014b) devel-
oped an in-depth review to conclude that: German surpluses, even if 
they are not “excessive”, require monitoring and policy action; whereas 
the Netherlands, which are also affected by a private sector debt above 
another MIP’s threshold and by a consequent deleveraging, have sur-
pluses which must be “followed” by the Commission “in the context of 
the European Semester”. 
Belgium was also in goods trade balance surplus until 2007; then, 
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since 2008, the international and the European crises determined the 
country’s deficit which has stabilised around -2.8% of GDP in 2011 and 
2012. In 2013, this deficit dropped to -1.2%; moreover, Belgium did not 
record continual total trade deficits (+0.2% in 2013). In Ireland net ex-
port of goods has usually been highly positive since the beginning of 
1990s (peak of 25.9% in 2001). This feature is mainly due to the richness 
of Irish zinc mines and natural gas, but also to the role played by manufac-
turing, especially in the pharmaceutical and computer industries, which 
attracted many multinationals. Nevertheless this Irish surplus shrank 
from 24.5% in 1999 to 10.4% in 2007. Only the deep restructuring of the 
economic system and public balance sheet, caused by the crisis of the do-
mestic banking sector, allowed the goods’ net export of the country to go 
back to 22-23% between 2010 and 2012; and in any case, the surplus in 
goods trade restarted to fall by 2.6 percentage points in 2013. 
The new Member States of Eastern Europe were net importers of 
goods during the 1990s because they were still completing their transi-
tion processes; however, their deficits were much lower than those of 
Malta and Cyprus (around 20% of GDP). With the introduction of the 
euro, goods’ net exports deteriorated in Slovenia for two years (with a 
peak of -5.8% in 2008); then the international crisis caused an adjust-
ment which flowed into a surplus in 2013 (+1.8%). Slovakia, Cyprus, 
and Malta entered into the euro area during the crisis. The first became 
immediately a net exporter of goods, and reached large surpluses in 
2012 and 2013 (5.0% and 5.9%, respectively). At the opposite, Cyprus 
and Malta experienced a peak in their goods trade deficits during the en-
try year in the euro area (-32.4% and -20.7%, respectively); then, their 
kept these deficits more or less stable between 2009 and 2011 and im-
plemented significant adjustments in the last two years. However, their 
goods trade imbalances remain quite large: -17.8% for Cyprus, and  
-13.7% for Malta. 
The previous figures show that, during the global financial crisis and 
the European one, there have been significant changes in the goods 
trade imbalances. In particular, Greece and Portugal have experienced 
strong improvements in their position, reducing their deficit by 50% 
and 68%, respectively. Spain has done even better by bringing its deficit 
to the limited figure of -1.1% in 2013. This has been mainly the result of 
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the long depression in Greece and Portugal which spread to other pe-
ripheral countries such as Italy and Spain. The internal devaluation in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain largely based on the compression of real 
wages, deleveraging processes, high rates of unemployment and infla-
tion rates below the European average, have led to negative trends in 
consumption and to the collapse of the housing bubbles (Spain). Hence 
these countries have reduced dramatically the demand for imported 
goods. The case of Italy is quite peculiar in the sub-set of the peripheral 
Member States of EMU. After five years of total trade deficits but just 
two years of goods trade deficits, in 2012 Italy was able to turn positive 
its net export of goods as well as its total net trade: the negative growth 
of GDP had the effect to determine an import fall (with a positive impact 
of GDP equal to 2.2%) more than an export recovery (with a contribu-
tion to GDP equal to 0.6%). This path continued, although with lower in-
tensity, in 2013. 
Other countries have not changed their position much. As already 
noted, despite the unfavourable economic conditions in the euro area, 
the surplus of the Netherlands has continued to increase, while Germa-
ny recorded a small contraction in the period 2008-2011 and then a re-
covery in 2012 and 2013. The slow but persistent deterioration of the 
French position continued during the European crises; and the im-
provement has been very limited even in the last two years. 
1.3 SERVICES, TOTAL TRADE BALANCE AND EXPORT 
MARKET SHARES 
As to trade in services, the picture is roughly the mirror image of the 
goods trade since most of the deficit countries in goods trade have rec-
orded surpluses in services’ trade (see Table 1.2). In the aggregate, the 
net export of services has been positive in the euro area since 2003. The 
main net exporters have been (i) Luxembourg, which passed from 
25.5% of GDP in 1999 to over 50% at the end of the last decade, with 
further increases in 2012 and a slight adjustment during the last year, 
due to its competitive advantages in the supply of financial services; (ii) 
Malta which improved its position after the entry in the EMU (in the last 
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three years over 20% of GDP); (iii) Greece, with values above 6% after 
the entry in the euro area and two peaks in 2005 (8%) and in 2013 
(9.8%), in particular thanks to tourism and related service activities and 
to maritime transports; (iv) Portugal whose surpluses increased in 
2007, remained stable for three years, and then recorded a further im-
provement reaching 6% in 2013; (v) Austria, which recovered in the last 
six years the surplus position (around 5% of GDP) that it had had before 
the construction of the euro area, and Slovenia which slowly improved 
its net positive position after its entry in the EMU, reaching a surplus 
above 5% both in 2012 and 2013; (vi) and finally Spain, whose surplus-
es increased immediately after the construction of the euro area (1999-
2003), remained stable (around 2% of GDP) from 2005 to 2009, and in-
creased in the last four years until the 4% of GDP in 2013. 
Cyprus too was one of the main net exporters of the EMU as to trade 
in services. Its preexisting surpluses (around 20% of GDP) have been 
slightly affected by the participation to the euro area until the beginning 
of 2013. During the last year the country went through a severe banking 
crisis which flowed into a “bail-in” process towards banks’ shareholders, 
bondholders, and depositors (over 100,000 euro).5 Nevertheless, until 
the end of 2013, Cyprus’ net position in services’ trade has been practi-
cally unaffected. 
With the exception of Ireland, whose deficit in services trade was 
above 11% of GDP in 1999 and 2001 and has recently turned into a sig-
nificant surplus (2% of GDP in 2012, and 3.7% in 2013), and partially of 
Germany, the other surplus or deficit countries showed values of ser-
vices’ balance below or around 1%. The Irish case is peculiar. Its previ-
ous massive services deficit was mainly due to the insurance and finan-
cial activities, which were (and still largely are) at the core of Irish eco-
nomic specialisation but which were not accounted as domestically cre-
ated services since they belong to multinational companies enjoying 
                                                
5 The structural determinants of this crisis were the foreign overinvestment in the 
financial assets (particularly, in deposits) issued by the Cypriot banking system. In its 
turn, this overinvestment was due to the very high interest rates paid on banks’ depos-
its, and to the low corporate taxation on the financial returns (often based on specific 
bilateral agreements, such as the fiscal treaty with Russia). 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
32 
specific fiscal arrangements; recently the collapse and the related “bail 
out” of the Irish banking sector, its restructuring and the consequent re-
action of the multinational financial companies implied the just men-
tioned severe adjustment in Irish services’ imbalances. At a minor scale 
and for different reasons, also the German case is peculiar. In the mid-
Nineties Germany was a net importer of services and its deficit position 
increased after the construction of the euro area. However, during the 
years 2001-2010, Germany reduced its deficit in services balance by 
more than 2 percentage points bringing it to 0.5% of GDP; and from 
then on this deficit has remained stable. 
These figures show that, leaving aside the Irish case, services balanc-
es have not changed a lot during and after the crises. 
Table 1.3 synthesizes the figures of Tables 1.1 and 1.2 by reporting 
the aggregate balances of goods and services for each Member State of 
the EMU. As we already stressed, the opposite signs of goods and ser-
vices balances mitigate trade imbalances inside the euro area. In partic-
ular, it must be noted that in the recent years the structural deficit posi-
tions of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Malta marked a significant 
improvement. Despite a deficit in goods’ balance still around 10% of 
GDP, in 2012 and 2013 Greece reduced its negative balance to -2.3% 
and -0.2% respectively; and despite a deficit in goods’ balance around 
5%, Portugal got a substantial equilibrium in its total trade in 2012 and 
it reached a positive total balance in 2013. An analogous change in the 
sign of the total balance of trade has been obtained by Cyprus. On the 
other hand, Malta and Spain carried out a positive total balance since 
2010 and 2012, respectively: in 2012 Malta’s surplus had a peak of 7.3% 
of GDP, and in 2013 Spain’s surplus was very close to 3% of GDP. 
In Austria the overall net trade is positive thanks to the services sec-
tor, while in Germany and the Netherlands the overall balance is mainly 
the reflection of trade in goods. In any case, due to the fact that the ser-
vices balances did not change so much during the recent crises, Table 1.3 
supports the main result reached by analysing the figures of Table 1.1: 
the severe economic recession, which has mainly affected the peripheral 
Member States in the EMU during the last four/five years, has forced a 
significant adjustment in the trade imbalances inside the euro area. 
To complete the analysis of total trade performances, Table 1.4 
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shows the evolution of EMU’s export shares in the international market. 
On average, almost all the EMU countries have lost importance in the in-
ternational market because of the rising contribution of emerging econ-
omies – with China and India on top – in world trade. However, there 
were significant differences in the performances of the various Member 
States. As far as the three biggest countries of the euro area (that is 
Germany, France, and Italy) are concerned, the decline started in mid-
Nineties. During the period 1994-1999, Italy had the worst performance 
after Austria in the monetary area under construction; but also France 
and Germany experienced a decrease in their shares. At the opposite, 
some small countries (such as Ireland and Greece) carried out a strong 
increase in their shares. Then, in the first period after the introduction 
of the euro (that is, between 1999 and 2007), France and Italy suffered 
the highest losses: the former passed from 5.4% to 4% and the latter 
from 4.2% to 3.5% in terms of international market share. Also Portugal, 
the Netherlands, and partly Finland experienced a decrease in their 
shares. Over the same period the Spanish and Irish shares kept substan-
tially constant; on the other hand, Germany increased its market share 
by 0.3 percentage points and approached its market position of the mid-
Nineties, whereas other small Member States (such as Luxembourg and 
Greece) recorded significant improvements. 
Since the international financial and real crises, almost all the EMU’s 
countries have seen their contribution to world export substantially re-
duced, with the only exception of Estonia (see Figure 1.11).6 The fall of 
the remaining sixteen countries was, in many cases, far below the 
threshold set by the MIP (see Chapter 5 for more details). Luxembourg, 
Spain, and Portugal suffered the lowest losses (above 6% but below 
7.5% of GDP); and Germany, the Netherlands and France experienced a 
decrease in their market shares below 10%. At the opposite, the highest 
falls were recorded by Finland (-29.9%), Greece (27.3%), Cyprus  
(-27.2%), Italy (-17.8%), and Austria (-17.1%). 
                                                
6 This applies also to Slovakia which entered in the euro area since 2009. However, it 
must be noted that this country recorded an outstanding improvement (118% of GDP) 
in its export shares in the international market during the period preceding its entry in 
the euro area and suffered a slight decrease (2.2%) in the period that follows. 
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1.4 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
The increases in trade disequilibria inside the euro area, experienced 
from the introduction of the common currency to 2007, are a signal that 
the “catching up” process and the related convergence between central 
and peripheral Member States did not work during a “normal” macroe-
conomic period. On the other hand, the negative performances which 
were recorded by the euro area in the last six years in terms of shares in 
the international market, and which are an evident result of the global 
and European crises affecting the whole set of Member States – and not 
only the southern European countries – are a signal that this area is too 
fragile towards external systemic shocks. Hence, these figures seem to 
suggest that, in order to overcome European imbalances within a pro-
cess of growth, it would not be sufficient to improve the competitiveness 
of Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France. It is also necessary 
to introduce changes in the working of central Member States and in the 
working of the euro area as a whole. In other words, we believe that the 
fundamental need to improve competitiveness in the weakest Member 
States would have to be supported by a different role played by the 
strongest Member States inside a re-organization of the EMU’s area. 
This conclusion risks to fall into the sterile debate between the indict-
ors of the austerity measures, supported by Germany and its satellites 
and implemented by the European institutions, and the indictors of the 
“free lunches” and the “free riding” pursued by the Mediterranean coun-
tries and responsible for the sovereign debt crisis. To avoid this risk, it is 
necessary to improve and specify our preliminary and descriptive empiri-
cal evidence and to elaborate some of its implications. In this perspective, 
we would have first to complete our descriptive empirical analysis by tak-
ing into account the European figures on national current accounts, by 
specifying their different components, and by analysing the net financial 
flows; this step will be done in the remaining two sections of the current 
Chapter and in Chapter 2. Then we would have to utilize the resulting de-
scriptive macro- and micro-economic picture, filtered by the main issues 
raised in the theoretical debate on European imbalances (see Chapter 3), 
to perform three more robust empirical steps. First, we would have to 
compare the EMU performance with that of the United States in order to 
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elaborate an indicator able to assess the relative competitiveness of the 
former area as a whole. Secondly, we would have to calculate the losses of 
each European country relatively to the average losses of the euro area in 
order to use the same indicator independently of the euro’s reaction to 
wide shocks. Finally, we would have to calculate the evolution of internal 
imbalances of each of the euro countries, that is their imbalances inside 
the single market. These three steps will be done in Chapter 4. 
Let us complete here and in the following Chapter the descriptive 
part of our analysis. The most traditional tool to test for the presence of 
macroeconomic imbalances is the current account balance which, in ad-
dition to the trade balance in goods and services, includes net current 
transfers and net income transfers due to the remuneration of produc-
tion inputs. The latter is particularly important as it includes the repat-
riation of earnings from foreign direct investments (FDI) and other 
forms of investment. 
Table 1.5 shows that the current account position of the euro area as 
a whole has been always in slight surplus or substantially balanced ex-
cept in 2008 (that is at the peak of the international financial crisis, 
when this position recorded a deficit of -1.5% of GDP). Comparing Ta-
bles 1.1 and 1.3 with Table 1.5, we can however deduce that (i) net cur-
rent and income transfers have been negative in the large majority of 
EMU countries, worsening by consequence the overall balance with re-
spect to that in goods and services; (ii) hence a number of European 
countries had some negative current account imbalances already in 
1999; (iii) these negative imbalances worsened after the introduction of 
the euro and before the explosion of the international crises for the 
large majority of the countries with a structural deficit in goods trade.7 
In any case, total trade balances of EMU Member States give most of 
the contribution to the overall current account. At their entry date in the 
euro Portugal, Greece, and Spain were the countries with the highest 
                                                
7 The exceptions are Austria and Luxembourg. It must also be noted that the worsen-
ing in the negative account imbalances after the introduction of the euro and before mid-
2007 affected some countries without structural deficit in goods trade (for example: Ire-
land and Italy). In the case of France, the switch to negative imbalances in goods’ trade 
and in the current account was contemporary. For further comments, see below. 
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deficits also in the current account balance. Moreover, considering the 
thresholds imposed by the MIP in the recent years, the first two coun-
tries were immediately below of the negative thresholds, while in Spain 
the situation deteriorated since 2005. In Spain, net current and income 
transfers worsened its negative imbalances since the beginning of the 
Nineties; the same applies to Portugal and Greece since mid-2000s be-
cause of the massive repatriation of earnings from capital investments 
made by foreigners. 
Generally speaking, net current and income transfers had a negative 
impact on the imbalances of the large majority of the remaining Member 
States of EMU. In Ireland the deficits in net current and income transfers 
were so high as to more than offset the positive trade surpluses and 
caused the country to fall below the more recent MIP threshold in 2007 
and 2008; since 2010, despite negative net current and income transfers 
still accounted for 15% of GDP, the reduction of the deficit in services 
trade improved the overall situation. In Italy, the current account bal-
ance started to become negative in 2003 despite a surplus in total trade 
balance: the declining surplus in net exports was not sufficient to com-
pensate for the deficit in net current and income transfers. The negative 
imbalances in Italian current accounts worsened from 2007 to 2011 
(with peaks of -2.9%, -3.4%, and -3.0% in 2008, 2010, and 2011 respec-
tively), when also the trade balances were in increasing deficit (-0.7%, -
1.8%, -1.5%, respectively). The contribution of net current and income 
transfers to the negative position of Italy’s current account balance re-
mained important in 2012, when the trade surplus of 1.1% of the GDP 
turned into a current account deficit of -0.3%; then, in 2013 the Italian 
current account balance went back to the positive value of 1999 but re-
mained 1.6 percentage point lower than the surplus in total trade. 
Opposite conclusions hold for France, and partially for Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium. In France, from 2005 to 2011, the deficits in 
trade balances were offset or partially compensated by the positive po-
sition in net current and income transfers;8 this does not apply to 2012 
                                                
8 The French positive position in net current and income transfers strengthened its 
surpluses in current account with respect its surpluses in total trade balances immedi-
ately after the introduction of the euro (1999-2001). 
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and it may be due to the recent difficulties of France to meet the EMU’s 
rules. In Germany these same transfers became positive since the very 
beginning of the international crises (2007) until today; as a result, dur-
ing the same period (with the exception of 2009), Germany has not sat-
isfied the more recent MIP threshold in terms of surpluses in current ac-
count balance (6%). In the Netherlands, the net current and income 
transfers turned to surplus during the peak (2011-2012) of the Europe-
an crisis; and, applying the more recent MIP standards, the Netherlands 
recorded surpluses in its current account balance above MIP’s threshold 
since 2010 (but also in 2005-2007). Finally, Belgium recorded persis-
tent surpluses in the net current and income transfers from the intro-
duction of euro to the international financial crisis. 
Luxembourg’s current account has always been always highly posi-
tive due to its leadership position in the export of financial services, but 
net transfers have been always highly negative. The latter mitigated 
Luxembourg’s position, which otherwise would have been extremely 
unbalanced compared to the rest of the area. In any case, applying the 
2011 MIP’s new rule, this Member State recorded surpluses in its cur-
rent account balance above MIP’s threshold from 2009 to 2011 (and al-
so from 1999 to 2007). Concerning the Member States which entered in 
the euro area after mid-2000s, imbalances were not particularly serious 
if we exclude some exceptionally negative or positive years. With the 
temporary exception of Malta in 2009 and 2010 possibly explained by 
the massive negative transfers due to its entry in the euro area in 2008, 
all these countries experienced negative transfers between 3% and 6% 
of GDP. In some cases these transfers brought their negative current ac-
count balances below the more recent MIP threshold (Cyprus since 
2008 to 2010 and in 2012; and Malta in 2008); however, the recovery in 
external trade helped to reduce deficits in the last year (2013) or even 
in 2012. In another case (Slovenia), the same negative transfers were 
not sufficient to hinder a strong readjustment process which flowed into 
a surplus of the current account balance above MIP’s threshold of 6%. 
With the end of the world crisis and the beginning of the European 
debt crisis, imbalances were shrinking. The end of the housing bubble in 
Spain had its main effect in the reduction of imports, with the total trade 
deficit falling below 2% of GDP since 2009 and turning positive since 
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2012; as a result the Spanish current account balance recorded a deficit 
below 2% in 2012 and became positive in 2013. A similar trend holds for 
Ireland, although its bubble was of a different nature: Irish current ac-
count balance turned positive since 2010 and reached a value above 
MIP’s threshold of 6% in 2013 (6.6% of GDP). The recession and the con-
sequent stabilisation programs in Portugal brought its current account 
balance to a safe territory (-2%) in 2012 and – similarly to Spain – to a 
surplus (0.5%) in 2013. On the other hand, the position of surplus coun-
tries kept relatively stable, even if for the Netherlands and Germany the 
positive imbalances of their current account are continuing to increase. 
Figure 1.2 synthesizes the current account imbalances of the euro ar-
ea Member States in the years which matter for MIP’s new rule. As al-
ready specified (see Section 1.1; see also Chapter 5), this rule became 
operative in 2012 and states that the three years moving average of the 
current account balance cannot exceed, respectively, the +6% and the -
4% of GDP. According to the figures of Table 1.5, in the most recent pe-
riod (2010-2013), there are three countries with current account defi-
cits below the threshold of -4% and other three countries with a surplus 
above the threshold of +6%. The former group is composed by Cyprus, 
Greece, and Portugal; the latter is composed by the Netherlands, Ger-
many, and Luxembourg. 
1.5 CURRENT ACCOUNT DECOMPOSITION  
AND GROWTH ACCOUNTING 
More information on the macro- and micro-economic impact of current 
account imbalances can be obtained by analysing its typical decomposi-
tion. In fact, we can define the current account balance (CA) as the dif-
ference between national disposable income and domestic absorption.9 
Formally: 
 
CA = Y + IB + TR – A   (1) 
                                                
9 See, for example, European Commission 2012a. 
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where the symbols indicate: Y the gross domestic product, IB the net in-
come balance, TR the net unrequired transfers from abroad and A the 
domestic aggregate demand absorption. 
 
Y and A can be defined, in their turn, as: 
 
Y = A + (X - M)   (2) 
 
A = C + G + I    (3) 
 
where C and G denote private and public consumption – respectively, I 
denotes the total sum of private and public investments, X the exports of 
goods and services and M the imports of goods and services. 
 
From (1) and (2) we obtain: 
 
CA = (X - M) + IB + TR  (4) 
 
In other words, CA is equal to the sum of net exports, net income bal-
ance and unrequired transfer. Furthermore, we can define the private 
saving (Sp) and the public saving (Sg) as: 
 
Sp = (Y + IB + TR) - C – T  (5) 
 
Sg = T – G    (6) 
 
where T denotes taxes. 
 
From (1), (3), (5) and (6), it follows that 
 
CA = Sp + T - G - I = Sp+ Sg - I = S – I (7) 
 
where S = Sp+ Sg. 
 
In other words, CA equals the difference between domestic saving (S) 
and investment. This difference can also be interpreted as net capital 
outflows/inflows (NKF), that is: 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
40 
Sp+ Sg - I = NKF   (8)   
 
Finally, by combining (7) and (8), we obtain that the current account 
balance equals net capital outflows/inflows: 
 
CA = NKF    (9) 
 
According to (9), a positive current account imbalance indicates that 
there is an excess of savings over investments so that the unallocated 
capital flows out from the country. This means that, if the CA is positive 
(negative), a country is exporting (importing) capital in order to com-
pensate (finance) the lack (excess) of investment over domestic savings. 
Thanks to this decomposition, it becomes possible to underline 
which were the main drivers of CA surpluses/deficits in the euro area 
countries during the last twenty years. 
Among the six countries that showed relevant surpluses in their CA 
for – at least – six years from 1999 to 2007 (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), Germany and the 
Netherlands were mainly characterized by high corporate savings and 
fewer investments (see also Figures A1-A6 in Appendix).10 During the 
same period Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands also experienced 
high public saving. After the 2007-2009 financial crisis, only Germany 
and the Netherlands were able to keep stable or even to improve their 
pre-crisis shares of CA surpluses thanks to a persistent and high corpo-
rate savings. The other four countries with CA surpluses had to face a 
reducing path of corporate savings, often associated with negative pub-
lic savings. The consequent trend in total savings was not compensated 
by a corresponding decline in investment in Finland and Belgium, so 
                                                
10 As remarked by Gros (2012), the excess savings in the northern countries of the 
euro area are intermediated by the banking system and other highly regulated interme-
diaries (insurance companies, pension funds, etc.). These banking and non-banking in-
termediaries have a strong bias towards investing inside the euro area (an enlarged 
“home bias”). This explains why, before the international financial crisis, the excess sav-
ings in the central countries of the euro area were largely invested in the peripheral 
countries. 
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that these two countries experienced negative CA imbalances in the last 
three years (2011-2013). From 1999 to 2007 France and Italy recorded 
a deterioration in their positive CA, which flowed into negative imbal-
ances since 2005 and 2003, respectively. Both countries worsened these 
CA deficits after the financial crisis also as a consequence of growing 
public debts, which implied negative public savings (see also Figures 
A7-A8). Italy substantially reabsorbed its negative imbalances in CA in 
2012 and obtained a significant surplus in 2013; at the opposite, France 
was just able to reduce its CA deficit in 2013. 
As far as the structural deficit countries are concerned, it must be 
noted that these countries followed two different paths in reproducing 
their CA negative imbalances after the introduction of the euro. Some 
countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, and Spain mainly carried out increas-
es in investment;11 on the other hand, countries such as Greece and Por-
tugal mainly experienced a decrease in household savings (Figures A9-
A13 and A14-A17, respectively).12 However, all these countries were 
able to implement severe readjustment processes of their CA negative 
imbalances which started immediately after the international financial 
crisis. These processes were based on a common ground: a reduction in 
the negative values of public saving, an increase in the private savings 
and a severe decrease of investment. 
Taking into account the overall euro area (17 countries), we find that 
the CA was close to zero from 1999 to 2007 (see also Figure A18). After 
the financial crisis, we observe a decline in public savings, which was 
gradually compensated by higher corporate savings and lower invest-
ment. Then, in 2011 and 2012, the aggregate CA of the euro area became 
positive mainly due to the decrease in investment. 
Additional insights can be gathered from the contribution of the dif-
ferent components to GDP growth. As already stated (see equation 7 
above), if the CA of a given country has negative balance, it will follow 
that its domestic demand for consumption and capital goods must be 
                                                
11 The same applies to Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus itself for the years preceding 
their entry into the euro area. 
12 The same applies to Slovakia and Malta for the years preceding their entry into the 
euro area. 
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partially satisfied by borrowing capital from abroad; it will also follow 
that exports of this country do not give a substantial contribution to its 
growth. In Tables 1.6 and 1.7 we show the contribution to growth of-
fered by domestic demand components and trade flow, respectively, in 
the six years before the creation of the euro area, in the first phase of the 
euro life preceding the international financial crisis, and during this cri-
sis and the related European crises. 
Private consumption was the main driver of GDP growth in the euro 
area as a whole until the global financial crisis, with an average contri-
bution around 1.0% for the set of seventeen countries. Private consump-
tion thus contributed to 50% of total GDP growth, both in the 1990s and 
in the first nine years of the euro; at the opposite, this component of the 
total demand remained basically stagnant during the crisis. Investment 
was the second driver of GDP growth, since its contribution increased 
from 22% in the 1990s to 28% after the introduction of the euro; on the 
other hand, this demand component accounted for most of the negative 
growth in the period from 2008 on. The contribution of the external sec-
tor to GDP growth of the euro area was always modest in the aggregate, 
but it further deteriorated during the first period of the euro life. On the 
contrary, since 2008 the slowdown in imports and a relatively positive 
export dynamics, due in particular to the demand from emerging mar-
kets, boosted the contribution of net exports The latter more than offset 
the negative output dynamics for the euro area as a whole. 
Among Member States, during the first and the second periods the 
highest growth of domestic demand was recorded by Ireland and by the 
large majority of NMS which were involved in a catching up process. In 
particular, during the six central years of the Nineties the domestic de-
mand offered a contribution above 6% to the Irish GDP growth. In this 
same period, the latter economy had also a higher contribution from net 
exports (1.9%) after Malta (3.5%). Net export played a positive role also 
in the case of Finland (1.3%) and Italy (0.7%). For the other main econ-
omies of the area (that is Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands), 
the contribution of the external sectors was positive but below 0.5 
(0.1% for Germany). This same contribution was negative for the two 
lagging behind countries (Greece and Portugal), where the positive GDP 
growth was highly dependent on the contribution of domestic demand. 
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During the first years of the euro, the contribution of private con-
sumption and investment – mainly in real estate and constructions (see 
Figure 1.3) – increased strongly in Spain and Greece, and remained im-
portant but less outstanding in Ireland. With the exception of France, It-
aly and Finland, in all other euro countries the weight of total consump-
tion declined or remained stable; at the opposite, with the exception of 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland, that of investment increased. As 
to the external sector, net export contributed negatively to GDP growth 
in countries like Spain, Greece, and Portugal but also in France and Italy. 
For the latter country, this change has been particularly harmful given 
that its past growth was mainly export-led. On the other hand, Germany 
increased the average contribution of net exports to its growth from 
0.1% to 0.9%; a smaller but significant increase was also recorded by 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
With the global financial crisis (2008), things changed dramatically 
among euro area countries. The contribution of both private consump-
tion and investment became strongly negative for the large part of the 
peripheral Member States, with gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
experiencing the highest losses. In this subset of countries, public con-
sumption too gave often a negative contribution to GDP: stimulus 
measures, implemented immediately after the beginning of the crisis, 
were short-lived since they were replaced by austerity measures aimed 
at adjusting public finances. At the opposite, in Germany the contribu-
tion to GDP from private and public consumption increased, whereas in 
Belgium, France, Austria, and Finland it remained positive. However, al-
so in these countries the investment dynamics became flat or even nega-
tive. As to net exports, in many cases the import collapse, the wage com-
pression, and the decrease in relative inflation determined a net positive 
contribution to GDP growth. This was the case for the peripheral coun-
tries (Spain, Ireland, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and Por-
tugal). Italy represented a partial exception: the net effect was positive 
but smaller due to the fact that exports still have not returned to pre-
crisis levels. The faster macroeconomic recovery experienced by coun-
tries such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands implied that both 
imports and exports increased between 2008 and 2013. 
Let us add that in a large number of peripheral countries the dynam-
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ics of different forms of productivity was practically flat during the three 
periods examined. This factor explains, as we will see in more detail in 
Chapter 4, the increasing loss of competitiveness which has character-
ized the peripheral Member States towards the central Member States in 
the euro area. A significant example is offered by the comparison of the 
different trend in total factor productivity (TFP) in various countries.13 
Between 1999 and 2007 the growth rate of TFP was below the average 
of euro area by approximately 4.5% in Spain, Italy, Portugal and France, 
10% in Ireland and 17% in Greece (see Figure 1.4). The global financial 
crisis worsened this picture as TFP dropped everywhere, but the fall was 
particularly severe in the majority of peripheral countries. All in all, this 
means that investment did not improve the macroeconomic fundamen-
tals in these countries since they were mainly driven by the high profit 
opportunities in the financial and real estate sectors. After a partial re-
covery in 2010 and in the first part of 2011, TFP fell again everywhere, 
with the exception of Spain. For the Spanish economy however, the re-
covery in TFP came with huge costs in terms of employment losses. 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The previous analysis shows that, from the point of view of the current 
account and its components, imbalances appear to be not entirely the 
result of the EMU creation. Greece and Portugal were already having 
troubles in the 1990s. The novelty introduced with the euro is the 
strong rise in surpluses of central countries like Germany and the Neth-
erlands, and the increased deficit caused by the housing and other bub-
bles in Spain and Ireland respectively. For the latter two countries, the 
situation improved after the crisis, although at the cost of suffering a se-
vere recession and a deep banking crisis and having to accept the assis-
                                                
13 TFP can be interpreted as an indicator of the internal and external efficiency or in-
efficiency which characterize the activity of a given firm. Hence, the dynamics of TFP 
measures the degree of organization and innovation of this firm as well as the quality of 
the institutional and social setting, in which this same firm has to operate. 
1. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES 
45 
tance from European institutions.14 The permanent character of such 
improvements depends upon the countries’ ability to change their 
growth model which was based, in the period before the financial crisis, 
on speculative investments in the construction sector (Spain and Ire-
land) or on excessive levels of domestic consumption (Greece and Por-
tugal). These changes are strongly correlated with the labour cost dy-
namics (Gros 2012). For the moment, too little effort has been made, 
particularly in peripheral countries, to increase productivity, as the dy-
namic of the TFP shows. 
Italy and France have seen their position deteriorate after the crisis, 
despite their CA deficits being always above the threshold and have 
been overcome or reduced in 2012 and 2013. The recent temporary im-
provement was mainly due to the demand collapse caused by the reces-
sion. Hence, without a structural increase in competitiveness, the Italian 
and French situation could worsen in the coming years, leading to a fur-
ther divergence between Germany and other the two main economies of 
the euro area. 
The analysis of growth accounting indicated that, up to the global fi-
nancial crisis, the GDP dynamics was everywhere driven by the increase 
in private consumption and capital formation. However, while in some 
countries – like Germany – this process was coupled with net capital out-
flows and positive net exports, in other countries – like Spain and Greece 
– both consumption and investment needs were financed by borrowing 
from the rest of the world. A similar argument applies to Portugal, alt-
hough its growth performance was quite modest, and to Italy, where the 
disappearance of the external surplus was coupled with a higher need to 
finance public and private consumption. After the crisis, the external sec-
                                                
14 The reference is to the European aid program centered on the EFSF’s and – then – 
on the ESM’s intervention. The aim of this program, which was launched in 2010, is to 
allow the Member States in difficulty to temporary finance their public debt by means of 
the European institutional loans, that is without issuing new bonds on the market. How-
ever, the countries under aid program had to pay high interest rates and to accept a re-
covery plan, designed and monitored by two European institutions (the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank) and by the International Monetary Fund. 
Let us add that Spain had recourse to a lighter aid program than Greece, Ireland, Portu-
gal, and Cyprus. 
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tor has brought about a positive contribution to the recovery of GDP and 
domestic demand appears to play a higher role in countries like Germa-
ny, Austria and Finland. In a large subset of the peripheral Member 
States the positive contribution of net export is the mirror image of the 
depressed domestic demand, both in terms of consumption and invest-
ment. This pattern suggests that although imbalances declined after the 
crisis, the composition of expenditure has not changed. Indeed, deficit 
countries are mainly suffering from the necessity to consolidate their 
public finances. This means that in the future the recovery of the whole 
area could bring about a reprisal of external imbalances. 
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Figure 1.1. Percentage Change in Export Market Shares (2013 vs 2008) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat data. Note: the horizontal line indicates the MIP threshold 
of -6%. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Current Account Balance in % of GDP (2010-2013 average) 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat data. 
1. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES 
55 
Figure 1.3. Average Contribution of Construction Investment to GDP Growth 
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Source: Own elaboration on AMECO. 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Index of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 1999=100 
 
 
Source: AMECO. 
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APPENDIX - STATISTICAL ANNEX 
Figure A1 
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Figure A2 
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Figure A3 
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Figure A4 
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Figure A5 
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2. 
The Capital and Financial Account 
Imbalances 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been a synchrony between the worsening of the current ac-
count imbalances of many peripheral Member States (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain) and the predominant and fulfilled expectations of 
the imminent introduction of the single currency. This synchrony has 
been fuelled by the impact of the euro on the peculiar “catching up” pro-
cesses set up in the area. During the first eight years of the euro the ma-
jority of peripheral countries showed higher rates of growth with re-
spect to the rest of the area (see Figure 2.1). These differences can be 
explained by at least two factors: the large financial flows from the cen-
tre to the periphery of the area and the consequent convergence of the 
national interest rates to the German benchmark (see Figure 2.2); the 
dramatic increases of speculative or short-term investments (mainly in 
the real estate and construction sectors) in Spain and Ireland, and the 
rise of consumption in Portugal and Greece. Hence, as Section 1.5 has 
shown, growth in many peripheral countries between 1999 and 2007 
was mainly driven by a recurrent positive excess of demand or equiva-
lently by increases in their output gaps (see Figure 2.3). 
This evidence does not perfectly fit with the standard theoretical mod-
els, according to which the construction of a monetary area fosters the 
“catching up” processes of the late-comers creating current account im-
balances in the short-term which should be reabsorbed in the medium-
term by the efficient working of the markets (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2002; see also Chapter 3). As the first chapter has shown and highlighted 
using the previous few data, the “catching up” processes can reproduce 
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imbalances in the medium-term. This failure in the convergence process 
is due to various determinants. However, a relevant explanation is that 
adjustment of a few macroeconomic indicators does not imply an in-
creased competitiveness of the late-comers. This is particularly evident if 
a higher GDP growth in the late-comers is not sustained by a significant 
improvement in their different measures of productivity. 
Despite the criticism raised by Gros (2012; see also Chapter 3), our 
analysis maintains that the latter case applies to the peripheral Member 
States in the euro area until the arrival of the European banking and 
sovereign debt crises. GDP growth in Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
was mainly driven by investments in the real estate and construction 
sector and/or by private consumption. These investments, whose 
weight in the four countries under examination was far above the euro 
area average (see Figure 2.4), were often based on short-term specula-
tive perspectives and financed by foreign capital flows. The fast increase 
of private consumption was relying on imports, largely contributing to 
the deterioration of the current account balance of these same countries 
and hence increasing their financial debts. As a consequence, the four 
peripheral countries also absorbed a large amount of financial flows 
from the central Member States. On the other hand, these countries have 
not been able to attract a large amount of net foreign direct investments 
(FDI). Hence, it is not surprising that the catching up processes of these 
peripheral countries in the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) did not improve their macroeconomic fundamentals relative to 
those of central countries in the same area. 
The international financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused an explosion 
of disequilibria, generating risks for the stability of the global economic 
system and worsening the imbalances and asymmetries inside the euro 
area. Then, after a partial recovery in the last quarter of 2009 and in the 
first half of 2010, EMU was characterised by the explosion of the sover-
eign debt and banking crises. These crises were determined and, at the 
same time, were strengthened by an inversion in the direction of the fi-
nancial flows inside the euro area: the financial intermediaries and the 
private wealth holders of the central countries cut their transfers to-
wards the European peripheral economic systems, and at the same time 
as the financial intermediaries and the private wealth holders of the pe-
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ripheral countries increased their financial investments in the central 
economic systems. Hence, the private financial investments suddenly 
stopped compensating for the current account imbalances within the 
euro area. These imbalances thus became unbearable. European institu-
tions reacted by placing Greece, Ireland and Portugal under severe aus-
terity measures. The result of these policies was to push the three coun-
tries into a deep depression without avoiding the contagion to Italy and 
Spain (since May 2011). The consequent worsening of the European cri-
sis led to a severe recession in the whole euro area, which stopped just 
in the second term of 2013 and was still under way for a few of periph-
eral countries (in particular, Italy) at the beginning of 2014 of 2014. 
In this chapter we describe the process which inverted the direction 
of net financial flows inside the euro area. Special attention is devoted to 
the capital account (KA), which records capital transfers, and to the fi-
nancial account (FA), which embraces transactions in financial assets. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the evo-
lution of the KA balance and of the FA balance in the EMU’s Member 
States. Then, in Section 2.3, we analyse the different components of the 
FA which have the main impact on the balance of payments of different 
European countries. This leads us to analyse, in Section 2.4, the net in-
ternational investment position (NIIP). Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
The capital account includes two main categories (IMF 1993): 
 
1) capital transfers, which consist of capital repatriation/ expatria-
tion and public/private unilateral transfers of capital, such as 
those from the EU budget; 
2) acquisition or disposal of non-produced, nonfinancial assets, i.e., 
those transactions associated with tangible assets that may be 
used or are necessary for production of goods and services but 
are not actually produced (e.g., land), and transactions associat-
ed with non-produced, intangible assets (e.g., patents, copy-
rights, trademarks, franchises). 
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These categories are of minor importance in the European setting. In 
fact, as shown in Table 2.1, net capital account balances have been neg-
ligible for the large majority of the countries which belong to the oldest 
circle of the EMU. In the first stage of the euro (before the beginning of 
the financial crisis), the only exceptions were the surpluses of Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, and – for few years – Belgium. Moreover, since 
2007 the net capital account surpluses were ranging between 1% and 
2% of GDP for Portugal and Greece and reached a deficit of -1.3 % of 
GDP – but just in 2012 – for Ireland. Among the NMS, Slovakia, Malta 
and Estonia recorded important inflows. The Baltic state in particular, 
due to its deep recession during the global financial crisis, received im-
portant inflows of capital with a peak of 4.1% of GDP in 2011. 
On the other side, the financial account records the amount of net fi-
nancial assets (bonds, loans, equities and other debt instruments) that 
the residents have bought from the rest of the world. By definition, there 
is a net accumulation of foreign assets (liabilities) when the sum of cur-
rent and capital account is in surplus (deficit). The financial account can 
be written as:1 
 
CA + KA + FA = 0  (10) 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of data does not allow a complete analysis of the 
positions at country and aggregate level in the pre-euro decade. What is 
clear is that the overall balance for the euro area had been close to zero 
since the end of the Nineties to the peak of the European crisis, while it 
became substantially negative in the last two years here analysed (2012 
and 2013) due to the current account surplus and the negligible impact 
of the capital account of this same area. At the opposite, single countries’ 
positions show again relevant differences representing the mirror image 
of their specific current account positions (Table 2.2). 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands showed increasing or very 
                                                
1 In practice, however, the accounts frequently do not balance due to the bias in the 
estimates of the different items of the balance of payments derived from heterogeneous 
sources. In order to equalise the balance of payments, net errors and omissions are in-
cluded in the accounts. 
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high deficits in their financial account balances between 1999 and 2007, 
as a result of loans and the financial investments that these countries car-
ried out into southern European markets.2 After severe reductions during 
the international financial crisis, the deficits in the financial accounts bal-
ance of these same countries again to be very high until 2013 (Germany 
and the Netherlands) or until 2011 (Luxembourg). It must also be noted 
that, during the international financial crisis, Austria recorded a dramatic 
increase in the deficits of its financial account balance, which went down 
since 2010. In addition, as reported by the European Commission 
(2012a), during the whole period Germany played the role of euro area 
door for investment flows coming from outside the area. 
Southern European countries systematically increased their demand 
for foreign financial investments in order to finance public and trade 
deficits, since 1999 to 2007 (Spain) or 2008 (Greece, Ireland, and Por-
tugal);3 at the same time, these foreign financial investments were stim-
ulated by the lack of devaluation risks and by the downward conver-
gence of interest rates after the euro introduction. In the case of Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain the surpluses in the financial account balances re-
mained high but decreasing from 2009 to 2011; in the case of Ireland 
instead, the dynamics of this balance became more erratic during the 
same period. In any case, all these peripheral countries turned to deficits 
their financial account balances in the last two years (Ireland and Por-
tugal) or in the last year (Spain and Greece) here analysed.4 
For other countries, like Italy and France, surpluses in the financial 
account balance had been moderate during the first decade of the euro, 
but in Italy they increased up to 5.5% of GDP during the European crisis, 
because of both the public debt increase and the higher long-term inter-
                                                
2 The capital outflows from North to South Europe also involved the northern banks’ 
large purchase of government bonds issued by peripheral Member States. This was also 
a consequence of Basel II regulation. According to the latter, government bonds of in-
vestment grade (such as those issued in the euro area) have zero capital requirements 
(see Abad et al. 2013). 
3 It must be noted that Portugal recorded a high surplus already in 1999. 
4 In the view of Gros (2012), the expansion in domestic demand financed by the capi-
tal inflows mainly explains why southern euro area countries were able to reproduce 
their lack of competitiveness towards northern countries. 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
80 
est rates. Between 2011 and 2013, Italy’s balance fell rapidly below zero 
as result of the country’s deep recession. At the opposite, France’s bal-
ance increased until 3.7% of GDP in 2012 and remained slightly positive 
in 2013. Finally, Finland started to have surpluses in its financial ac-
count balance during the international financial crisis; then, these sur-
pluses increased up to 8.8% of GDP at the peak of the European crisis 
but became negative in the last year here analysed (2013). 
The conclusion is that the European crisis determined a dramatic de-
crease in the financial transfers from the central to the peripheral Mem-
ber States of the EMU. The former did not cancel the significant deficits 
in their financial accounts, due to the need to compensate their current 
accounts surpluses towards the rest of the world; the latter had to re-
equilibrate their current account balances due to the impossibility to 
reproduce the previous surpluses in their financial balances. These new 
unstable equilibria could have had negative effects for structurally cred-
itors countries, due to the higher risks which characterised the interna-
tional markets with respect to the European internal market; and they 
certainly had recessionary impacts on the structural debtors countries 
which have been forced to adjust their current account disequilibria in 
the short run. These effects have been partially buffered by the TAR-
GET2 payment system.5 However, as pointed out by Abad et al. (2012), 
the shock-absorption function of TARGET2 allows to postpone, but can’t 
eliminate, the necessity of reforms useful to structurally adjust current 
account imbalances in the euro area. 
2.3 THE COMPONENTS OF THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
The financial account (as part of the balance of payments) is divided in-
to FDI,6 portfolio investment, other investment, net flows of derivatives 
and changes in the amount of official reserves. 
                                                
5 TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Trans-
fer system) is the real-time interbank payment system of cross-border transfers 
throughout the European Union. 
6 FDI denotes the foreign direct investments, that is those investments which reach 
at least the 10% of the shares of a given foreign company. 
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The FDI balance, as Table 2.3 shows, was negative until the explosion 
of the international financial and “real” crises (2008) for the whole euro 
area as is typical for its position in terms of economic development. This 
is confirmed by the fact that most of the EMU countries recorded nega-
tive balances, denoting that they invested more abroad than other coun-
tries invested in their economies. This pattern was widespread in the 
group of twelve original euro countries (Greece included), with the par-
tial exception of Portugal, Greece, Finland, and Belgium. Among the 
main countries, France had deficits which reached the peaks of -5.5% 
and -3.2% (in 1999 and 2008, respectively) and Germany’s correspond-
ent peaks have been of -2.5% and -2.7% (in 1999 and 2007, respective-
ly). Similar values were recorded by Italy in 2007 and 2008 (-2.5% and -
3.4%, respectively); however it must be noted that, differently from 
France and Germany, Italy was typically characterized by a poor attrac-
tiveness of direct investment from abroad. Smaller countries (such as 
the Netherlands and Ireland) followed more erratic paths, whereas Lux-
embourg recorded the highest deficits (with a peak of -146% in 2007) 
due to its financial power. 
The FDI balance of the euro area reduced dramatically its deficits af-
ter 2008, and reached the equilibrium in 2012 and 2013. This was cer-
tainly due to the entry of the NMS which are highly dependent on FDI, 
and hence recorded structural and significant surpluses (with the par-
tial exception of Slovenia). In particular, FDI’s surpluses represented the 
major component of the financial account balance for Cyprus and Malta. 
However, in the last five years even the large majority of the older 
Member States of the euro area either recorded surpluses or reduced 
their deficits. Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal had surpluses 
in four out of five years. The low rate of corporation tax played a key 
role for Luxembourg and Ireland: the FDI balance surpluses of the for-
mer reached peaks just below 74% in 2012 and above 66% in 2011, 
those of the latter reached a peak of 10.9% in 2011. Similarly, Belgium 
showed two peaks above 11% in 2010 and 2011 while Portugal record-
ed a peak of 4.4% in 2010. Greece and Spain reported slight surpluses 
after the peak of the international crisis and again during the last two 
years. France, which kept important deficits since 2009 to 2012, record-
ed a surplus in 2013 (0.3%). Finally, Germany and Italy reduced their 
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deficits (respectively to -0.8% and -0.7% in 2013). The other euro area 
countries, which recorded systematic deficits in the FDI balance during 
the last five years, were Austria and Finland. 
These trends confirm that the European peripheral Member States 
were unable to attract a sufficient net positive amount of FDI from the 
rest of the euro area when they had growth rates above the average and 
would have had to implement a catching up process in terms of struc-
tural competitiveness. At the opposite, they started to have positive 
FDI’s balances when they had to face a deep financial and “real” crisis 
and their economies were in recession. 
The portfolio investment balance includes those foreign investments 
in equity, which are below the 10% of the shares of a given foreign com-
pany and thus cannot be classified as direct investments (see Table 2.6), 
as well as foreign investments in debt securities. In the euro area this 
balance has recorded systematic surpluses with the exception of 2001 
(Table 2.4). In particular, in this area net inflows reached a peak at the 
start (3.8% in 1999) and approximated this peak during the worst 
phase of the European crises (3.4% in 2011) and during the interna-
tional crisis (2.7% in 2008 and 2009). Then, in the two most recent 
years these surpluses have fallen almost to zero. In order to better in-
terpret this dynamics, it is necessary to refer to the specific countries. 
Leaving aside the year 2009, Luxembourg represented the main Eu-
ropean attractor of portfolio investments; this was largely due to its fis-
cal incentives. Also France, Greece and Portugal obtained surpluses in 
their portfolio investment balances for various years; however, France 
recorded deficits in the first period of the euro life (from 1999 to 2005), 
whereas Greece’s and Portugal’s positive balances were affected by the 
sudden reversion of net flows after 2010. The Greek and Portuguese 
evolution, which was partially followed also by Spain (2011 and 2012) 
and Italy (2010 and 2011), was probably due to the sovereign debt 
problem and the related speculative attacks against all southern Euro-
pean countries. The other traditional peripheral country (that is Ire-
land) paid instead for the bursting of the ICT bubble and of the begin-
ning of the international crisis. However it remains true that, after hav-
ing recorded important surpluses in its portfolio investment balances 
between 2009 and 2011 (with a peak of more than 54% in 2010), Ire-
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land suffered deficits in the last two years here analysed. Finally, the po-
sition of NMS was mainly affected by the troubles of Cyprus (2008-
2010) and Malta (2009-today), while the portfolio investment net bal-
ances of Slovakia were not so high (but for the important surpluses in 
the last two years) and those of Slovenia were largely positive (with 
peaks of 13.1% and 10% in 2009 and 2013, respectively). 
Other investments include trade credits, loans, currency transfers 
and deposits, loans from the IMF, and so on. Table 2.5 displays that, at 
the starting of the euro area (in 1999), the European countries showed 
small imbalances with respect to these instruments, with the only ex-
ceptions of Portugal, Austria and Spain which were characterised by 
significant surpluses. In the following years, Spain increased its surplus 
in other investment balances until 2008 (with a peak of almost 10%) 
and kept an important positive balance also in 2011, but recorded a high 
deficit in 2013 (-8.7%). Portugal too recorded continuous surpluses un-
til 2012 and switched to a negative balance in the last year here ana-
lysed. However, its trend was less regular than that of Spain: Portugal 
reached a peak in 2010 (10.5%), kept high surpluses in the following 
two years, and recorded a small deficit in 2013. The other countries 
with systematic prevailing surpluses in the other investment balances 
during the first fourteen years of the new century were Greece, Finland, 
Slovakia, Malta, Italy, and partially Cyprus. In particular, Malta has had 
regular and important surpluses since 2009; Finland, and especially 
Greece, recorded recurrent surpluses since 2005, with peaks of almost 
20% (in 2010 and 2011) and of 56.9% (in 2012) in the Greek case. Slo-
vakia too recorded continuous surpluses even before its entry in the eu-
ro area; however, it recorded significant deficits in the last two years. 
Italy recorded modest surpluses, with three peaks (4.3% in 2007, 9.7% 
in 2010, and 5.3% in 2011), and a small deficit in 2013. Finally, Cyprus 
recorded two huge surpluses in 2008 and 2009 (just below 100%) but 
also important and growing deficits in the last three years. 
At the opposite, in the new century Luxembourg recorded huge defi-
cits in its balances of other investments (often around -200% and with a 
peak of -500% in 2012), but during the international financial and “real” 
crises (2008 and 2009), as usual, these negative imbalances were main-
ly due to the competitive fiscal conditions offered by this country. Even 
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if with largely smaller percentages than Luxembourg, Germany too rec-
orded systematic deficits in its balances of other investments and, with 
the exceptions of two years, the same applied to Austria and the Nether-
lands. France and Belgium followed more erratic paths with a preva-
lence of years with deficit balances. The main variance was recorded by 
the Irish balances with peaks of both deficit (2010) and surplus (2008) 
around 50%. 
Despite the just examined different trends which characterized its 
various Member States, the euro area as a whole had a balanced position 
until 2010 while it recorded significant deficits in the last three years. As 
pointed out by some authors (Schmitz and von Hagen 2011, Schnabl and 
Freitag 2012), the rough compensation of imbalances at the European 
level could be the result of higher financial integration among Member 
States after the introduction of euro, with a consequent increase in the 
level of cross-border banking loans. From this point of view, it is inter-
esting to recall that Germany, Luxembourg and other “central” countries 
were systematic net lenders while inflows exceeded outflows in the 
large majority of the peripheral countries, in particular with the out-
break of the international financial crisis. Then, the credit crunch and 
the reduced propensity to invest, implied by the explosion of the debt 
crisis and of the banking crisis – first – in Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
and – then – in Spain and Italy, led to a segmentation of the European 
financial markets with dissimilar impacts at country level. Due to the 
different problems of the national banking systems and to the fact that 
other investments include transactions in some government assets, the 
imbalances of the single peripheral countries and of other European 
countries in difficulties were affected by the specificities in the restruc-
turing of public finances and of financial systems. 
Before analysing the two remaining components of the financial ac-
counts (that is, the net flows of derivatives and the variation of official 
reserves) which do not have a significant aggregate impact, it is conven-
ient to offer a general comment on the empirical evidence collected until 
now. Both portfolio and other investments seem to confirm the view 
that the majority of the EMU “central” countries, and in particular Ger-
many and Luxembourg, have been the main financers of public and pri-
vate debt of the EMU peripheral countries until the recent years. This 
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role of financers have been facilitated by the fact that Germany, France 
and Luxembourg played also the role of intermediating capital inflows 
from non-euro area countries (European Commission 2012a). 
Let us now turn to the two remaining components of the financial ac-
counts. Net flows of derivatives (Table 2.6) as well as changes in official 
reserves (Table 2.7) are negligible for almost all European countries. As 
far as derivatives are concerned, the only systematic exception is repre-
sented by Luxembourg which recorded recurrent and important posi-
tive imbalances and a few years of high deficits.7 Erratic negative imbal-
ances also affected Germany (-3.5% in 2007), Cyprus (-4.9% and -3.8% 
in 2012 and 2008, respectively) and the Netherlands (-2.8% and -2 in 
2008 and 2010, respectively), whereas erratic positive imbalances af-
fected France (2.2% in 2007) and again the Netherlands (3.5% and 
2.3% in 2008 and 2013, respectively) and Cyprus (3.1% in 2009). For 
what concerns official reserves, there were just significant positive vari-
ations in Spain and Greece at their entry into the euro area, and im-
portant negative variations in most of the NMS before their entry into 
the euro area. In any case, all these imbalances were not so significant to 
change the impact in the European trends of the financial accounts. 
2.4 NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 
Let us recall equation (10) (see above, Section 2.2): CA + KA + FA = 0. 
On the basis of this equation, the progressive accumulation of external 
financial assets (liabilities) must offset the progressive accumulation of 
total surpluses (deficits) in the current and capital accounts. This im-
plies that, due to the minor importance of capital accounts in the Euro-
pean setting, positive (negative) changes in the difference between the 
stock of external financial assets and that of external financial liabilities 
of a given country must be roughly equal to the current account sur-
pluses (deficits) of this same country. 
                                                
7 Ireland had serious problems with derivatives during the international crisis. How-
ever, due to the lack of data, we cannot offer a satisfying interpretation of the imbalances 
which characterised this country. 
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We can better understand the implications of this conclusion, by de-
fining the net international investment position (NIIP) of a specific 
country in a given period as the difference between the stock of its ex-
ternal financial assets and that of its external financial liabilities. Accord-
ingly, with few passages, the NIIP of this same country in period (t) can 
be expressed as: 
 
NIIPt = NIIPt-1 + FA + VAL + OTH (11) 
 
where (VAL) indicates the current (positive or negative) revaluation ef-
fects due to changes in prices and in exchange rates, and (OTH) indi-
cates other unexpected (positive or negative) changes in the amount of 
assets (e.g. due to catastrophic losses). 
It follows that changes in the NIIP of a given country between two 
periods are mainly determined by the imbalances in its financial ac-
counts. Hence, equations (10) and (11) imply that changes in the NIIP of 
a given country must also be roughly equal to the imbalances in the cur-
rent account position: 
 
NIIPt - NIIPt-1 ≈ CA   (12) 
 
Equation (12) offers an important key to interpret the NIIP positions of 
the EMU Member States. The evidence available for the early 1990s (see 
Table 2.8) confirms the role of systematic net investors played by Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and Belgium in terms of stocks and for several years 
also in terms of flows. Instead the Netherlands and Finland became sys-
tematic net investors since 2008 and 2009, respectively; but it must be 
noted that the latter recorded huge negative NIIP positions (with a peak 
of -175.4%) from 1999 to 2005. At the opposite, a systematic depend-
ence on foreign investments was denounced by Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland and Cyprus in terms of both stocks and flows, and by the other 
NMSs (with the exception of Malta) in terms of stock only. To a lesser 
extent, also Italy and France had the role of systematic net debtors. 
These data indicate once again that investments in southern Europe 
were largely financed by debt liabilities contracted with European 
northern countries. They also show that, despite the recent improve-
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ments in the current account imbalances of all European peripheral 
countries, a number of EMU Member States still record a worrying posi-
tion in terms of stocks. According to the recent literature,8 once coun-
tries’ net stock of foreign liabilities rises above 40% of GDP, the risk of 
unbearable imbalances accelerates. This explains why the European MIP 
includes a maximum NIIP threshold of -35% in terms of GDP (see Chap-
ter 1 and Chapter 5). 
Figure 2.5 shows that several euro area countries exceeded the MIP 
threshold in 2012. In this case too, there is a divergent dynamic pattern 
in the net financial position between northern and southern European 
countries. The NIIP’s imbalance involved the whole subset of old pe-
ripheral Member States but Italy, and all the NMS but Malta. Further-
more only the Netherlands, Germany, Malta, Finland, and Austria im-
proved their NIIPs position with respect to the year 1999. Finally, only 
Finland was able to pass from a theoretical NIIP’s imbalance in 1999 
(when the rule was not operative) to a net investor position in 2012; at 
the opposite Ireland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, and Portugal were able 
to meet the theoretical threshold in 1999 but not the actual threshold 
in 2012. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
At the aggregate level, the financial account represents the mirror im-
age of the current account: it reflects the fact that the countries experi-
encing trade and current account deficits must be financed by capital 
inflows through the selling of financial instruments. As we discussed in 
the previous sections of this chapter and in Chapter 1, this was particu-
larly the case of Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece as well as of the 
large majority of NMS in the euro area. These countries were largely fi-
nanced by the EMU “central” countries, and in particular by Germany, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. However, a difference be-
tween the old peripheral Member States can be emphasized. The intro-
                                                
8 This result is mainly due to Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2013). 
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duction of the euro worsened the financial imbalances in the cases of 
Spain, Greece and Ireland; it did not have a large negative impact in the 
cases of Portugal and NMSs. 
The previous descriptive analysis also allowed to specify the impact 
of the different components of the financial account. Net derivatives and 
changes in official reserves played a minor role at the EMU level as well 
as for the large majority of the different countries. FDI flows had a major 
impact on the aggregate but did not appear to have a great importance 
to explain the intra-European imbalances. This was probably one of the 
reasons why peripheral Member States were unable to implement a 
catching up process in terms of competitiveness before the explosion of 
the international and European crises. More important were the portfo-
lio and other investment, in particular, the debt and equity related in-
struments. The countries’ trends of both these components reflected the 
distortionary growth model which characterised Spain, Ireland, Portu-
gal, and Greece; after 2009, these same trends allowed the partial re-
production of imbalances in the public balance sheets and in the current 
accounts of the peripheral Member States, but also imposed their diffi-
cult adjustments. The evolution in the NIIPs positions confirmed this 
analysis. The rise in the net foreign liabilities of the southern European 
countries has been balanced by the expansion of the net foreign assets 
in a growing number of northern countries. It suffices to note that only 
the latter were able to increase their net international investment posi-
tions after the EMU creation. 
As we will see in the next chapter, the temporary presence of imbal-
ances was not an unexpected consequence of the creation of the euro 
area. According to many authors (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; 
Schmitz and von Hagen 2011; European Commission 2012; Schnabl and 
Freitag 2012; Chen et al. 2013), the launch of the euro area would have 
improved the financial integration between Member States and would 
have led to the reduction of real interest rates in southern Europe. The-
se positive shocks would have increased the potential rate of growth of 
many peripheral countries, and asked for an amount of national invest-
ments above the disposable internal savings. However, the consequent 
initial imbalances would have had to be reabsorbed by means of a pro-
gressive reduction in the competiveness gaps inside the euro area. The 
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point is that something went wrong in this expected process as there is 
no evidence of overall convergence in national productivities even be-
fore the international crisis. Contrary to the predictions of the standard 
economic theory, the economic growth in peripheral countries implied 
increased structural imbalances inside the euro area and these imbal-
ances became an important component of the European crises.  
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Figure 2.1. GDP Rate of Growth of Peripheral and Central Countries in the Euro Area 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Standard Deviation of Interest Rates in the Euro Area (12 countries) 
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Figure 2.4. Investments in the Construction Sector (in % of GDP) of Euro Area 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on AMECO. 
 
Figure 2.5. NIIPs Transition (2012 vs 1999) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat data. 
Note: Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg are not represented in the graph due to missing values 
in 1999. 
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3. 
European Macroeconomic Imbalances: 
The Models 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we review the main theoretical and empirical literature 
on the current account and on the related financial account imbalances 
in the euro area. The results of the two previous chapters give us a 
number of hints which are not easy to reconcile with the theoretical 
frameworks developed in the main economic contributions of the last 
two decades. First of all, the presence of some trade and current account 
imbalances already in the 1990s – especially in Greece and Portugal – 
suggests that structural differences between the original twelve coun-
tries were probably hard to shrink from the beginning of the euro area. 
Secondly, the increase in current account imbalances during the first 
decade of euro’s life (1999-2008) has been the result of investment 
bubbles – driven by the reduction of interest rates – and of the strong 
growth in private consumption in the peripheral Member States, which 
were mainly fuelled through external net financial flows and through 
the related imports of goods and services. Furthermore, the reduction of 
current account imbalances in the last years can be partially ascribed to 
the positive export performances of the most troubled members, but it 
is mainly the result of the recession and the austerity measures which 
depressed internal consumptions and investments as well as relative 
prices, and – hence – imports, and partly the value of exports, in periph-
eral countries. 
As we will see, before the international financial crisis increasing 
current account imbalances in the euro area were not a matter of con-
cern. According to the standard view, imbalances were seen as one of 
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the unavoidable but temporary outcomes of the introduction of the sin-
gle currency and of the related catching up processes. This was the main 
message of the model built by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), which 
represented for a long time the benchmark to understand changes in the 
external position of the euro area countries. As a consequence of the 
global financial crisis and the explosion of current account deficits and 
public debt in a large number of EMU peripheral Member States, a grow-
ing body of research has been devoted to analyse the structural deter-
minants of imbalances in the euro area and their possible distortionary 
effects. This new strand of research raised criticisms towards the basic 
assumptions of the Blanchard and Giavazzi model, and opened to alter-
native explanations of European disequilibria. 
The majority of the new contributions question the standard thesis 
that imbalances represent a temporary feature of the optimal function-
ing of the European Monetary Union; and even the models compatible 
with the analytical approach proposed by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002) emphasise that the actual quality of growth in the European pe-
ripheral countries in the first years of the euro area (1999-2007) in-
volved negative aspects which hindered the absorption of the competi-
tiveness gaps towards the European “central” countries (Schmitz and 
von Hagen 2011, European Commission 2012a). In any case, the various 
criticisms to the standard explanation largely agree on the structural na-
ture of the European current account imbalances but differ in selecting 
the main determinants of these imbalances. Many contributions find the 
trigger in the financial markets which allowed an unconstrained accu-
mulation of disequilibria, others point to the low competitiveness of the 
“real” sector of peripheral countries which led to a vicious circle be-
tween the growth paths and the increase in current account imbalances 
of these same countries, with the result of an increased vulnerability 
towards the emerging economies. 
According to the existing literature, we can identify three broad and 
partially complementary sets of factors which are the main responsible 
for the European imbalances: 
 
1) the too rapid banking and financial integration among euro area 
countries which activated abundant financial flows from “cen-
tral” Member States to the peripheral ones, and hence allowed 
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the reproduction and the consequent strengthening of the dif-
ferences in the macroeconomic structure of these two types of 
countries; 
2) the divergence in the dynamics of the unit labour costs, which 
characterised the productive sectors of the “central” and periph-
eral Member States before the international financial crisis and 
which implied a further fall in the competitiveness of the latter 
inside the euro area; 
3) the growing competitive pressure of EMU surplus countries and 
of non EMU emerging countries in the European internal market, 
which made imports more convenient in the EMU peripheral 
countries and allowed the latter to implement actual rates of 
growth above their potentials. 
 
In this chapter we will review the main theoretical contributions which 
address points (1)-(3) to analyse the evolutions of current and financial 
account imbalances in the euro area. The aim is to give a consistent ex-
planation of the trends described in the two previous chapters. In Sec-
tion 3.2, we present the Blanchard-Giavazzi model and the main weak-
nesses of it; in order to show that this model does not fit with the empir-
ical evidence of the euro area even before the international crises. In 
Section 3.3, we review the main literature focusing on the financial inte-
gration among euro area countries and on the related role of financial 
flows. Then, in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we analyse the main contributions 
which focus on the role played by changes in the unit labour costs, in the 
competitiveness and in the external trade with reference to the different 
Member States of the euro area. Section 3.6 provides some considera-
tions about the adjustment processes of the current account imbalances 
after the European crises. Section 3.7 compares the empirical descrip-
tive evidence provided in the first two chapters with the interpretations 
offered by the existing literature, in order to identify the points which 
require further investigation. 
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3.2 THE BLANCHARD-GIAVAZZI MODEL  
AND ITS CRITICISMS 
During the 1990s and 2000s the main explanation of the current ac-
count imbalances among European countries was based on the neoclas-
sical convergence model. This model emphasises two channels, through 
which the poorer economies in an integrated area have to temporarily 
run current account deficits. However, these same channels should have 
led to a gradual reduction in the competiveness gaps of the poorer 
economies, and hence to a final optimal equilibrium without significant 
imbalances. 
The first channel can be labeled “conditional convergence”. Financial 
market integration and, in particular, a monetary union reduce the cost 
of capital and eliminate the currency risk, thus stimulating both import 
of goods and services and investment flows from richer to poorer coun-
tries. In this respect, Ingram (1973:15) points out that under monetary 
integration “the traditional concept of a deficit or surplus in a member 
nation’s balance of payments becomes blurred.” The second channel can 
be labeled “productivity catch-up”. Stronger economic discipline due to 
the increased competitive pressure and capital inflows due to the work-
ing of the first channel improve the domestic total factor productivity of 
poorer countries, and thus increase their potential rates of growth. In 
the short run, the expectations of higher real incomes imply lower sav-
ing rates and higher consumption levels in the poorer countries; and 
these increases in consumption are fuelled mainly via imports. Howev-
er, due to the first channel, poor countries do not have to suffer a de-
crease in investments since the latter are financed by external financial 
flows. Hence, the increased potential rates of growth flow into an in-
crease in the actual rates of growth. Moreover, in the medium run the 
consequent disequilibria in the current account balances of poorer 
countries tends to be automatically adjusted by the increase in their to-
tal factor productivity dynamics and the related gains in competitive-
ness relatively to richer and surplus countries. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) formalise the neoclassical conver-
gence model in an intertemporal structure where each country produc-
es a single good and households have the same preferences and con-
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sume the same composite good throughout the area. Given these as-
sumptions, the two authors obtain the following relation: 
 
                     (3.1) 
 
where CA denotes the ratio between current account balance and 
national income, x represents the differential between the world 
consumption interest rate and the rate at which a country can borrow, g 
is the rate of growth of domestic output, g* is the world rate of output 
growth, σ  is the elasticity of substitution among goods which is 
supposed to be greater than one in order to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner 
condition.1 
In order to insert equation (3.1) in the intertemporal structure of the 
model, it must be noted that three factors can affect a country’s optimal 
external borrowing: 
 
1) expected output growth: the higher the expected output in the 
next period relatively to the actual output of the current period, 
the higher the optimal amount of external borrowing; 
2) interest rate: the higher the interest rate, or – better saying – the 
greater the differential between the country and the world in-
terest rates, the higher the cost of borrowing abroad and thus 
the smaller the optimal amount of external borrowing; 
3) expected rate of change in the terms of trade: the larger the ex-
pected fall in the price of domestic goods, the lower the expected 
revenues will be; and, in their turn, lower expected revenues will 
increase the cost of external borrowing and will, thus, reduce its 
optimal amount. 
 
                                                
1 Formally, the condition states that a currency devaluation has a positive impact on 
trade balance, if the sum of price elasticity of exports and imports (in absolute value) is 
greater than 1. If exported goods are elastic to prices, their demanded quantity will in-
crease proportionately more than the decrease in prices, and the total export revenue 
will increase. Similarly, if imported goods are elastic, total import expenditure will de-
crease. Both results lead to an improvement in the current account balance. 
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On the basis of equation (3.1) and of the determinants of external bor-
rowing, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) can state that a process of eco-
nomic integration leads to higher current account deficits for poorer 
countries. This process implies that the latter are characterised by high-
er growth prospects, higher expected revenues and lower interest rates 
relatively to the other countries of the integrated area. The first two fac-
tors increase the propensity to invest and reduce the current saving 
rates of poorer countries, thus generating deficits in their current ac-
count balances. At the same time, due to points (1)-(3), all the three fac-
tors just mentioned increase the optimal amount of external borrowing 
for the poorer countries. Symmetrically, the richer countries of the inte-
grated area run larger current account surpluses, and thus are ready to 
transfer additional financial flows to poorer countries. The latter can 
thus satisfy their propensity to increase external borrowing and can re-
produce the positive difference between their investments and their in-
ternal savings, that is their imbalances. According to Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, these compensatory mechanisms would be strengthened if the 
process of economic integration was accompanied (as it is often the 
case) by a process of financial liberalization in the domestic markets of 
poorer countries. The elimination of capital controls and of other re-
strictions to financial flows reduces regulatory uncertainty and im-
proves transparency,2 enhancing capital flows from richer countries. As 
a consequence, poorer countries can run higher current account deficits. 
The conclusion of Blanchard and Giavazzi is that, in highly integrated 
regions like the euro area, the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle – i.e. the high 
correlation between investment and saving rates both across time and 
across countries (Feldstein and Horioka 1980), no longer holds. Moreo-
ver, the two authors maintain that market mechanisms will gradually 
adjust the consequent imbalances and lead to a new and more efficient 
medium-long term equilibrium. In fact, as soon as the poorer European 
countries catch up the productivity of the richer ones, thanks to the 
growing amount of productive investments financed by these latter, the 
                                                
2 Gourinchas (2002) does not exclude that they are the consequence of improve-
ments in the efficiency of the domestic financial sector, thanks to financial integration. 
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increased competitiveness of the former will lead to an increase in their 
exports and, hence, to a self-reduction of their current account deficits. 
The model of Blanchard and Giavazzi leads to the conclusion that the 
single European current account deficits, recorded in the first phase of 
the monetary union, were not distortionary since these imbalances were 
an unavoidable and temporary step to reach a final optimal equilibrium 
in the medium term. As a consequence, it would have been inappropri-
ate to apply corrective policy interventions at the national or European 
level during the first years of the new century: the laissez-faire policy 
had to be preferred. In other words, the so-called “Lawson doctrine”, 
named after Nigel Lawson – the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer during 
the 1980s and the Thatcher era –, should have to be applied: to the ex-
tent that expectations are rational and current account deficits reflect 
private savings and private investment decisions, there are no distor-
tions and then there are no reasons for the government to intervene 
(Clarida 2007, Blanchard 2007). 
However the descriptive evidence, offered in Chapters 1 and 2, shows 
that the catching-up processes of the EMU peripheral Member States 
during the first part of 2000s was characterised by bubbles in invest-
ments, mainly in the construction sector, and by excessive increases in 
private consumptions which imply excessive decreases in savings (Jau-
motte and Sodsriwiboon 2010). This same evidence also shows that the 
current account imbalances inside the EMU were far bigger in the period 
2003-2008, when – according to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) – the 
convergence mechanisms should have had to operate most powerfully 
(Lane 2013), than during the years immediately following the launch of 
the euro. Moreover, as proved by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), this 
outcome cannot be explained by shifts in fundamentals. 
The failure of the Blanchard and Giavazzi model to foresee the evolu-
tion of the euro area imbalances can be ascribed to its excessive confi-
dence in the beneficial effects of financial integration and in the self-
adjusting power of market mechanisms. In the first respect, Gourinchas 
and Jeanne (2002) maintain that small open economies reap quite poor 
gains from financial integration and liberalisation; in fact, as the recent 
experience of the euro area has shown, both these factors are unlikely to 
remove per se domestic distortions or inefficiencies. In the second re-
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spect, a more recent paper (Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010; see also 
Holinski et al. 2012) shows that, by reducing private savings, financial 
integration and liberalisations in the euro area allowed peripheral coun-
tries to implement an excessive amount of investments which led to an 
internal overcapacity not adjusted by market mechanisms.3 
It is possible to be just a bit more precise on the determinants and 
consequences of market failures in a new monetary union such as the 
euro area. The easier access to international capital markets for the EMU 
poorer members and the consequent euphoria about their positive eco-
nomic prospects had the effect of postponing those structural reforms in 
the tradable and non-tradable sectors, which would be required to ad-
just imbalances.4 As acknowledged by Blanchard himself (2007), when 
countries run high current account deficits, the short term impact is the 
expansion of their non-tradable sectors and the relative contraction of 
their tradable sectors. Hence, to adjust these deficits in the medium 
term, it would be essential to launch an opposite process: a relative con-
traction of the non-tradable sectors and an expansion of the tradable 
sectors. This rebalancing did not happen in the peripheral countries of 
the euro area before the international crises due to the possibility to fi-
nance their prolonged imbalances by means of abundant external capi-
tal flows. The consequent reproduction of current account deficits and 
the related postponement of structural reforms had a negative impact 
on the learning-by-doing mechanisms and on the productivity of trada-
ble sectors of European peripheral countries (Krugman 1987). The 
combination of high external deficits and stagnant productivity implied 
that these countries suffered an appreciation in their implicit real ex-
change rates and a fall in their competitiveness. Hence, these same 
                                                
3 Financial liberalization has implied relaxation of capital controls, entry barriers, 
and quantitative credit controls. On the other side, it has improved financial supervision; 
but supervisory failures did not allow an effective substitution between less control and 
more regulation. 
4 Lane and Pels (2012) show that countries with more optimistic growth forecasts 
ran larger and persistent current account deficits during the pre-crisis period. The two 
authors attribute the result to a decline in the risk aversion of the policy makers and 
agents, who belonged to these countries. Hence the latter did not have the right incen-
tives to adopt sufficiently-countercyclical prudential policies. 
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countries became extremely vulnerable to negative external shocks, and 
the investors of central Member States became worried about their pos-
sible growth performances (Gourinchas 2002). 
This conclusion, which clearly describes what happened in the euro 
area with the global financial crisis, also clarifies why the Blanchard and 
Giavazzi model is unable to explain the actual evolution of the European 
current account imbalances. This model is too confident in the self-
adjusting power of market mechanisms. Hence, it overestimates the 
benefits of financial integration and expected growth, while it overlooks 
the risk of excessive investment and consumption. 
3.3 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL FLOWS 
As we have seen in the previous section, monetary and financial integra-
tion does not necessarily foster the catching up process of peripheral 
countries towards “central” ones. The European evidence shows, at the 
opposite, that this integration can have a major role in the emergence 
and persistency of current and financial account imbalances; and the lat-
ter can hinder the implementation of convergent equilibria in the medi-
um-long term. In this section, we review the main contributions in the 
recent economic literature which stress the importance of financial 
flows to start, strengthen and reproduce current account imbalances in-
side a monetary area. 
In order to do that, it is necessary to start with an empirical as well as 
a theoretical specification. From the empirical point of view, it must be 
noted that this literature recently gained large room due to the growing 
size and the related growing importance of financial flows. In the 1970s, 
gross financial flows were smaller than trade flows; at the opposite, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, the former were already large enough to 
dominate the quantitative flows in the balances of payment of all devel-
oped countries. In the following years, the economic evolution implied 
that financial flows became a large multiple of “real” flows and that the 
international financial markets became more and more integrated. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the creation of the EMU represented a 
dramatic shock for the euro area countries: the elimination of the cur-
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rency risks implied that even low yield differentials were sufficient to 
determine massive transfers of capital flows. In this situation, EMU pe-
ripheral Member States did not have any problem to finance their cur-
rent account deficits and their public debts. Spain, Greece and Italy were 
able to allocate a growing amount of bonds in the European financial 
market without binding constraints; Portugal and Slovenia obtained 
large flows of foreign loans; Cyprus and Malta received increasing 
amounts of FDI (Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010). 
From a theoretical point of view, it must be noted that there are two 
opposite approaches with respect to the impact of increasing financial 
flows on the working of the economic systems (Obstfeld 2012). The first 
approach maintains that financial markets are efficient markets because 
they are a good approximation of complete Arrow-Debreu markets. This 
implies that financial flows tend to be optimally allocated since idiosyn-
cratic risks can be diversified through well-functioning contingent secu-
rities. The second approach maintains instead that financial markets 
represent the typical case of market imperfections. There are a number 
of variables which hinder the well-functioning of these markets and in-
crease the probability of their repeated failures: information asymme-
tries, incompleteness of contracts, skewed expectations and incentives, 
tax avoidance or evasion, regulatory arbitrage, implicit government 
guarantees, and so on. These variables lead to inefficient allocations and 
reinforce systemic risks. In this context, debt or debt-like instruments 
are potentially worrisome because they allow financial players to lever-
age themselves.5 
In line with the first approach, Ahearne et al. (2008) and Schmitz and 
von Hagen (2011) point out that capital flows are in principle efficiently 
allocated; hence, the massive transfer of financial flows from the “cen-
tral” to the “peripheral” Member States in the euro area before the fi-
nancial crisis was compatible with the convergence hypothesis. Never-
                                                
5 As remarked by Bernanke et al. (2011), Europe significantly leveraged up its inter-
national balance sheet, issuing sovereign debt and bank debt and using the proceeds to 
buy substantial amounts of highly rated US mortgage-backed securities and other fixed-
income products (see also Obstfeld 2012). US subprime crisis mainly propagated to Eu-
rope through this channel. 
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theless, given the impact of the international financial and European cri-
ses, Schmitz and von Hagen (2011) acknowledge that possibly the de-
velopment of peripheral countries was also negatively affected by large 
capital inflows. The latter facilitated the violation of market discipline in 
the European peripheral countries. Hence, the favourable financial con-
ditions should have been associated with more prudent macroeconomic 
management. 
The contributions which follow the second approach and do not 
share these conclusions, can be divided in different strands. One of them 
focuses on the impact of credit booms in emerging and developed coun-
tries. Credit booms represent one of the main drivers of financial insta-
bility (Jordà et al. 2011). Using a sample of 19 advanced and 28 emerg-
ing market economies over the years 1960-2010, IMF (2011) finds that 
financial inflows can be used as predictors of credit booms. Gourinchas 
and Obstfeld (2012) attribute the resilience of many emerging countries 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in part to their preventive 
actions against credit booms; and they add that this was not the case for 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Borio et al. (2011) 
find that credit booms were reinforced by international credit flows that 
bypassed the domestic banking system through direct cross-border 
lending to customers and purchases of domestic bonds by non-
residents. Reis (2013) points to credit frictions in the financial system 
as a factor that produces capital misallocation. In fact, incumbent non-
productive firms, while holding collateral assets, can survive through in-
creasing leverage and crowding out to more productive firms. Since 
non-productive firms operate typically in the non-traded sector, this fi-
nancial mechanism implies losses of productivity in tradable sectors. 
Recent works investigate the role of financial flows in the euro area 
imbalances (Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010, Schnabl and Freitag 2012, Col-
lignon 2013). Collignon (2013) sees the excessive lending from north-
ern to southern countries as one of the factors facilitating the increase in 
imbalances. Schnabl and Freitag (2012) suggest that the combination of 
the inability of European peripheral countries to sterilise the huge capi-
tal inflows arising from the process of financial integration and the ex-
ogenous shock of the German unification is likely to have played an im-
portant role up to the present. In contrast, external factors, namely the 
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change in saving and investment behaviour of key trading partners, es-
pecially the United States (US), have been the main cause of surpluses in 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) argue that financial flows could have 
direct effects on the domestic economic activity to the extent that for-
eign capitals go into the production of non-traded and non-tradable 
goods, like dwellings, or finance higher levels of consumption and public 
deficits rather than to finance productivity-enhancing projects in the 
traded sector (see also Eichengreen 2010). The result is a low produc-
tivity dynamics, as in the case of Ireland and Spain. On the other hand, 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) explain the case of Greece and Portugal 
pointing out domestic problems given by excessively high levels of con-
sumption and low saving, which in the Portuguese case add to a stag-
nant growth performance. 
The analysis of Croci Angelini and Farina (2012) leads to similar re-
sults. These two authors argue that financial and real interconnections 
among EMU countries have magnified and mutually reinforced imbal-
ances between surplus and deficit countries, with a consequent increase 
in the systemic risk of the whole euro area. In addition, by analysing def-
icit countries they distinguish the cases of Ireland and Spain, where im-
port booms were driven by bubbles and excessive domestic demand 
boomed imports (see also Diaz Sanchez and Varoudakis 2013), from 
that of Italy, Portugal and Greece where trade balances worsened be-
cause of exchange rate shocks. In the latter group, the main contribution 
to the systemic risk is connected to domestic factors, that is a strong in-
crease in public expenditure and a fragile link between savings and in-
vestments; additional concerns for Italy come from low growth, deterio-
rating competitiveness and reduced fiscal revenues. 
These results support the view that financial market imperfections 
can reinforce systemic risks. Hence, and on the basis of recent experi-
ence, we agree with Obstfeld (2012): the hypothesis that cross-border 
financial flows promote efficient risk sharing is implausible. Moreover, 
countries with large net financial inflows, necessary to finance large 
current account deficits, are subjected to “sudden stop”, as remarked by 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000). If foreign lenders suddenly become unwill-
ing to provide capital, and a country has few liquid foreign assets, a sud-
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den stop in financial inflows leads to a sharp and painful adjustment, 
mainly though a collapse in domestic demand. 
Vulnerabilities emerge on the asset side of the banking sectors as a 
consequence of the abrupt growth in nonperforming loans, due to the 
contraction of the economy and to the lower average loan quality be-
cause of too rapid credit growth in the previous years. This scenario 
happened in some of the southern euro area countries, with a sudden 
stop in private financial inflows and with only IMF, EU and ECB ready to 
finance them. Furthermore, it should be noted that, because of the effect 
of financial inflows on the NIIP, countries with large stock of net exter-
nal liabilities are always vulnerable to a financial crisis (Catão and Mile-
si-Ferretti 2013). 
3.4 DIVERGENCE IN UNIT LABOUR COSTS  
AND COMPETITIVENESS 
The second group of contributions on the causes of the widening of im-
balances points mainly to the role of unit labour costs (ULC) develop-
ment in the euro area, which is one of most common measures of cost 
competitiveness. The first contribution on the subject is the study of 
Dullien and Fritsche (2009), which already in 2006 analysed the devel-
opment of ULC among euro area members. They conclude that Portugal, 
and to a lesser extent Spain and Greece, have been characterised by ex-
cessive increasing in labour costs. At the same time, they warned about 
the strong fall in German ULCs, although they argue that this can be the 
result of initial misalignment of the euro conversion rate. The authors 
were the first to draw general attention to this problem, before imbal-
ances became a matter of concern. Other works followed on the subject 
(Belke and Dreger 2011, Stockhammer and Onaran 2013, Collignon 
2013). Generally speaking, all of these works share the conclusions 
reached by Dullien and Fritsche (2009). 
They argue that current account imbalances in the euro area are due 
to the development of unit labour costs, pointing in particular to the role 
of Germany where current accounts surpluses were associated with 
wage deflation. The argument of Collignon (2013) is in line with the 
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above contributions as it also points to the difference in development of 
ULC, but it claims that together with labour costs, capital efficiency 
should be taken into account in order to draw a clear picture of the 
competitive position of individual countries. In a following work Col-
lignon and Esposito (2014) built a ULC based measure of competitive-
ness embedding also capital efficiency. They provide evidence that this 
measure is much more effective in explaining the export performance of 
euro area countries, both in terms of market shares and trade balances. 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2013) analyse European imbalances from 
a post-Keynesian point of view and posit the role of wages in creating 
and reducing such imbalances. They find two explanations: first, as the 
euro area is a relatively closed wage-led economy, the competitiveness 
effect of wage reduction is more than compensated for by the negative 
impact on consumption; second, imbalances arise because some north-
ern countries (Austria, Germany and the Netherlands) are export led 
while a number of EMU peripheral countries are credit-led. 
The solutions proposed by this strand of literature are mainly two: on 
the one hand, Stockhammer and Onaran (2013) and Collignon (2013) 
stress the role of wage bargaining, while others stress the necessity of 
structural reforms and investments to restore competitiveness (Zema-
nek et al. 2010, Belke and Drager 2011). The first solution is advocated 
by Stockhammer and Onaran (2013) who propose to consider the bal-
ance of payment position in wage bargaining and the introduction of a 
coordinated system in which wages rise in line with productivity growth, 
and a substantially upwardly-revised inflation target. Collignon (2013) 
has also proposed a more coordinated wage bargaining process, which 
should also take into consideration the efficiency of the capital stock. 
Schelke (2013) is also in favour of more policy coordination. 
Among the proponents of structural reforms, Zemanek et al. (2010), 
find that ULC is not a significant determinant of the current account po-
sition. Nevertheless the authors stress the need for structural reforms 
aiming in particular to increase labour market flexibility, in order to 
prevent current account deterioration. Belke and Drager (2011) argue 
that ULC should be reduced in deficit countries as surplus countries 
cannot deteriorate their competitiveness. According with this point of 
view only asymmetric adjustments are feasible. 
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3.5 EXTERNAL TRADE AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 
Closely related to the analysis of domestic cost competitiveness is the 
literature exploring the role of external trade shocks and competition 
from emerging economies (Chen et al. 2013, Guerrieri and Esposito 
2012 and 2013). These papers stress the role of asymmetric trade de-
velopments with countries outside the euro area in addition to the tradi-
tional explanations referring to intra-European causes. In particular, 
they point to the role of integration with Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as import competition of Chinese products in worsening the posi-
tion of southern European countries. As deficits are financed mainly by 
financial flows from surplus members, which in turn are subject to in-
creasing claims from extra-euro area countries, the authors conclude 
that the peculiarity of the euro area allows for persistent external im-
balances. On a similar line, Guerrieri and Esposito (2012) point to the 
role of trade integration through outsourcing with the most advanced 
CEECs, together with the introduction of the common currency, to ex-
plain the positive performance of German net exports in comparison 
with Italy, France and Spain. In a following paper, Guerrieri and Esposito 
(2013) find that Germany has been less penalised by import competi-
tion and trade integration with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
and the group of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), while 
Italy, given its higher dependence on the external sector with respect to 
Spain and France, has been the most penalized. In terms of policy impli-
cations, Guerrieri and Esposito (2012) stress the role of a symmetric 
mechanism in designing adjustment policies at the European level, 
where surplus countries would implement expansionary policies in or-
der to favour the rebalancing of the area. In addition, the authors stress 
the importance of an industrial policy in fostering the penetration of 
emerging markets similarly to the German model. 
Finally, special attention should be paid to the study of the European 
Commission (2012a), containing a deep investigation on the anatomy of 
current account imbalances in the euro area. While pointing to the 
standard causes already addressed in the present work, (i.e. interest rate 
reductions, financial integration and increasing competitive pressures 
from the internal market and from emerging economies), the study 
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shows that only deficits are a matter of concern, as CA surpluses can be 
justified by fundamentals and do not pose problems of debt sustainabil-
ity. As the report find no causal relation between surplus and deficit 
countries, it argues that reducing surpluses would have no direct effects 
on deficit countries. A reduction of surpluses would be beneficial to 
strengthen domestic demand and contribute to rebalancing the CA only if 
they are related to market failures and to the lack of structural reforms. 
Hence, the Commission is basically confirming the view according to 
which most of the adjustment should take place in deficit countries. 
3.6 CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT AFTER  
THE EURO CRISES 
This section aims to assess whether the current account rebalancing ob-
served since 2009 is the effect of the self-equilibrating mechanism, 
which operates when CA imbalances emerge in a monetary union, as 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) predicted. 
Berger and Nitsch (2014) argue that trade imbalances among euro ar-
ea members considerably widened since the introduction of the common 
currency. The paper shows the relevance of the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) as a determinant of trade balance for a sample of 18 Europe-
an countries over the sample period 1948-2008. According to Sinn 
(2014) in order to structurally rebalance current accounts within the eu-
ro area what is required is a real devaluation in peripheral countries and 
a real revaluation in Germany. The author measures international com-
petitiveness of the euro area countries using REER as provided by Euro-
stat. The paper argues that in the period 2007-2012 Ireland represented 
an exception showing a significant devaluation in REER following the 
bubble burst in 2006. Thus Ireland seems to have been able to cut wages 
and prices. Countries like France, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain have 
not been able to achieve any substantial real devaluation. At the same 
time the necessary real revaluation of Germany did not take place.6 
                                                
6 The real exchange rate for countries belonging to the monetary union moved in a 
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The current scenario shows that peripheral countries are far from 
the real effective exchange rate realignment required to achieve debt 
sustainability and Italy, according to Sinn (2014), should leave the euro 
in order to restore its external competitiveness. By contrast Diaz-
Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013) find that until 2009, the increasing im-
balances in deficit countries were mainly driven by the raise in domestic 
demand due to the great financial integration in the euro area. Accord-
ing to this point of view, internal devaluation would have only a limited 
effect in absorbing macroeconomic imbalances of deficit countries. 
The increase in unit labour cost in the periphery cannot be consid-
ered a cause but a symptom of the demand shock triggered by large cap-
ital inflows in the 2000s (Gaulier and Vicard 2013). Auer (2014) argues 
that the increasing export performance of the southern euro area in the 
last years can be interpreted as a result of an improvement in competi-
tiveness. However, as Table 1.4 shows, there is no substantial increase 
in the export market share of peripheral economies sufficient to identify 
an increase in competitiveness. This means that the export performance 
reported by Auer (2014) have been driven by the global recovery after 
2009. At the same time, since 2011, the reduction in imports of goods 
and services has been driven by the recession brought about by the 
strong austerity measures. According to this evidence, we should con-
clude that the current adjustment is not structural and imbalances are 
likely to show up again once trade patterns normalise. We will provide 
more evidence in favour of this point of view in Chapter 4. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter analysed the existing literature on the imbalances inside 
the EU in order to provide explanations for the results of the descriptive 
analysis in the first two chapters. In general, useful explanations can be 
                                                
destabilizing direction between the pre-crisis period and 2010. The main source of ex-
ternal adjustment for deficit countries has been expenditure compression, rather than 
expenditure switching (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2012). 
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found both in the financial markets and in the development of competi-
tiveness and external trade. We have seen that financial flows generate 
imbalances without automatic rebalancing mechanisms: the adjustment 
after the crisis is the result of the recession hitting the euro area; such 
recession was brought about by the strong austerity measures, which 
transformed external into internal imbalances. The export performance 
of the southern countries since 2011 cannot be ascribed to increases in 
competitiveness but represents the result of global recovery after 2009. 
The literature on financial integration and financial flows help ex-
plaining the unsuccessful growth model of some peripheral countries, 
especially Spain and Ireland. The introduction of the euro and the elimi-
nation of currency risks generated massive capital flows from richer to 
poorer countries, which financed the CA deficit in southern Europe. Alt-
hough this result is in line with the prediction of mainstream economics, 
many factors were originally not taken into account with the result of 
increasing the systemic risk in the euro area: 
 
• the problem of credit booms in economies affected by massive 
capital inflows, which deteriorated their international invest-
ment position, making them more vulnerable to the financial cri-
sis and to a sudden stop in capital inflows; 
• the fact that financial flows, in many cases, were directed to the 
non-tradable sector, or to finance high levels of consumption. 
Again, this explains the problems of Spain and Ireland; 
• initial misalignments of the exchange rate could have increased 
the problems for southern Europe, especially Italy and Greece; 
• domestic factors, such as low growth and high budget deficit in 
Italy, high consumption and low savings in Greece and Portugal, 
put additional pressure on their CAs. 
 
The literature on competitiveness and external trade is particularly rel-
evant to explain the dichotomy between southern and northern coun-
tries. In particular, it explains why Germany increased its export per-
formance at the expense of other countries. The wage moderation in 
Germany coupled with a fixed exchange rate, improved its external 
competitiveness especially within the euro area, reducing relative com-
petitiveness of southern Europe and France. 
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In addition, asymmetric trade shocks further explain the deteriora-
tion of the position of Italy and France. These countries are suffering 
more from the competition from emerging economies, also because of 
the development of outsourcing relations. Deficits in these countries are 
then financed by Germany and other northern countries, leading to a vi-
cious circle of mutually reinforcing imbalances. 
Although some studies still show the view of the European Commis-
sion that imbalances (especially surpluses) may simply be the outcome 
of the proper functioning of the monetary union, there is increasing evi-
dence against this view, which points to the need to take policy actions, 
both at the individual and at the euro-wide level in order to rebalance 
the economy. In doing so, all factors must be taken into account (credit 
booms, investments in non-tradable, ULC development and external 
competitiveness).  
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4. 
In Search of the Determinants 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As Chapter 1 suggests, the recent rebalancing in the current accounts of 
peripheral Member States of the euro area can be explained by several 
factors. Let us just stress the main three. The first and most important fac-
tor has been the deep and long recession in the peripheral economies 
(2008-2013), which produced a reduction in consumption, investment 
and imports. The second factor can be identified in the substantial defla-
tion of various peripheral countries, which has improved their pri ce 
competition by keeping their rates of inflation below the very low Euro-
pean average. Finally the third factor has been the compression of real 
wages, eased by a rate of unemployment above the high European aver-
age and a rate of activity below the European average. In Chapter 3 we 
concluded that the standard explanation based on the existence of a mar-
ket equilibrating mechanism, which progressively adjusts current account 
imbalances inside a monetary union (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002), is 
not able to explain the evidence. Therefore, further investigations of the 
determinants of the European macroeconomic imbalances are in order. 
We start with an in-depth review of the report of the European 
Commission (2012a) on current account imbalances in the euro area. 
The European Commission’s findings and policy suggestions can be 
summarised in the following three points: (i) the need to avoid coordi-
nated policy actions that could compromise the competitiveness of the 
monetary union as a whole; (ii) the relevance of external factors in ex-
plaining intra-EU imbalances; (iii) the absence of causality between def-
icit and surpluses trade balances. These beliefs are based on the domi-
nant view in the European Union that only asymmetrical adjustments 
involving deficit countries are needed. 
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In this chapter, we provide evidence that are not in line with these 
conclusions and offer some alternative explanations. Competiveness in-
dicators show, on the one hand, that the monetary union produced im-
balances both before and after the global financial crisis and that a com-
petitive gap with the United States also affects the central European 
countries. On the other hand, the recent adjustment of the competitive 
positions of the deficit countries seems to be mainly driven by tempo-
rary factors. Trade imbalances by area show that external shocks con-
tributed to their widening, but that the dynamics of trade within the eu-
ro area also played an important role. The strict link between trade and 
financial flows allowed surplus countries to exert pressure on deficit 
countries that received cross-border capital. 
An econometric analysis, based on an augmented version of the grav-
ity equation for the period 1999-2007, is performed to better under-
stand the nature and evolution of trade imbalances within the euro area. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the report of 
the EC (2012a). In Section 4.3 we discuss the competitive performance 
of the euro area and the determinants of ULC changes; in Section 4.4 we 
take a deep look at the geographical composition of trade flows, while in 
Section 4.5 we discuss the linkages between trade and financial flows. 
Section 4.6 presents the econometric analysis we used for testing the 
different explanations advanced in the literature for the rise of external 
imbalances among EU countries. Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION 
In Section 4.1 we briefly described the study of the European Commis-
sion (2012a) on current account imbalances in the euro area. Here we 
go into more details and discuss the main implications of this report. 
The Commission report aims to analyse the persistent current ac-
count surplus in some euro area countries. Looking first at the bilateral 
trade relations among countries, the report does not find any causality 
between deficit and surplus countries. In other words, if the surplus 
countries represent the main exporters for the deficit countries, the re-
verse does not necessarily occur. This result has an important policy 
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implication: a demand increase in surplus countries implies a limited 
positive effect on imports from deficit countries. Based on this finding, 
the European Commission (2012a) believes that the symmetrical devel-
opment of surpluses and deficits is not a determinant of the current ac-
count imbalances. Hence, coordinated policy actions that reduce both 
large deficits and surpluses are not only unneeded but even harmful. 
According to European Commission (2012a:13, 112),  
 
the rebalancing inside the euro area (and the EU) cannot consist 
of policies which undermine the competitiveness of the EU, of the 
monetary union, or even of individual Member States in the global 
economy. […] In an economic and monetary union, the adjustment 
mechanism through relative costs and prices should operate 
symmetrically, helped by sufficiently flexible product and labour 
markets that allow the efficient reallocation of resources.  
 
Hence, the macro-prudential regulation is a key factor in preventing the 
imbalances. 
Focusing on financial linkages, EC (2012a) finds, in addition, that: in 
the pre-crisis period financial flows went mainly from the surplus to the 
deficit countries, which produced a strong euro bias: in fact, a small 
share of the euro area periphery’s deficit was financed by the rest of the 
world. The net flows to the deficit countries did not change in their 
overall size during the crisis period because the withdrawal of funds by 
surplus countries was replaced by financial flows through TARGET2.1 
EC (2012a) sees the convergence in the interest rates, after the in-
troduction of the euro, and developments in global financial markets as 
the main factors affecting imbalances. But external factors, including the 
increased competition from China and the other emerging countries, al-
                                                
1 TARGET2 is an interbank payment system for the real-time processing of cross-
border transfers throughout the European Union. It is mainly used to settle operations 
of monetary policy and monetary flows. It has to be used for all payments involving the 
Eurosystem, as well as for the settlement of operations of all large-value involving the 
euro. It follows that, if the imbalances in the current accounts of European countries are 
not compensated by financial and capital flows, TARGET2 has the function of cleaning 
room among central banks. 
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so appear to have a relevant impact on intra-EU imbalances. Therefore, 
to promote the recovery of peripheral countries what is required is to 
promote non-debt capital inflows from surplus countries, which could 
stimulate growth and reduce the burden of debts. Overall, we can sum-
marise the Commission report on the European current account imbal-
ances in the following points: 
 
1) external factors have a relevant impact on the intra-EU imbal-
ances; 
2) there is no causality between deficit and surplus trade balances; 
3) competitiveness of the monetary union should not be compro-
mised by coordinated policy actions aimed at reducing both 
large deficits and surpluses. 
 
The next section gives an alternative explanation of European macroe-
conomic imbalances. 
4.3 PRODUCTIVITY, COST COMPETITIVENESS  
AND IMBALANCES 
In this section we analyse the performance of the EMU after the intro-
duction of the euro in terms of productivity and cost competitiveness. 
More specifically, in Section 4.3.1 we first assess the competitive per-
formance of the euro area as a whole with respect to the United States; 
secondly, we consider the evolution of the relative position of each 
country with respect to both the US and the EMU average; this is done in 
order to identify the link between trade/current account imbalances 
and competitiveness. In Section 4.3.2, we focus on the nature of the re-
cent developments in the relative competitive position of some deficit 
countries with respect to Germany in order to assess whether the re-
covery is a structural phenomenon or simply the effect of a temporary 
reduction of nominal costs. 
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4.3.1 Imbalances and the competitive performance  
of the euro area with respect to US 
The analysis of the relative competitive performance of the euro area 
and US is done by using three standard indicators for productivity and 
cost competitiveness: 
 
1) GDP at constant market prices, adjusted for the impact of terms 
of trade, per person employed, which is an index of labour 
productivity; 
2) total factor productivity (TFP), an index of overall productivity 
in the total economy; 
3) unit labour costs (ULC) at constant market prices, which com-
bines the cost for using labour forces (total labour compensa-
tion) and their productivity. 
 
We also consider the real GDP growth, which could be viewed as the 
consequence of the different competitiveness levels. The sample period 
covers data from 1999 to 2015 since we also take into account the EC 
forecasts for 2014 and 2015. 
Figure 4.1a reports the percentage change in the real GDP per person 
employed in the euro area and in the US, adjusted for the impact of 
terms of trade in order to sterilise the effect of exchange rate variation 
and avoid biases in the indicator. Except for 2006 and 2007, we find that 
this productivity indicator in the euro area is always below that of the 
US. In the pre-crisis period, productivity grew on average at a rate of 1% 
in the euro area (EA), while in the US the increase was 1.9%; in the post-
crisis period the productivity gap enlarged, with an increase in the EMU 
of 0.2% and a rise of 1.5% in the US. 
Considering the difference between each EMU country and US, we 
find that only Spain and Portugal were able to improve their relative 
productivity from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period (Figure 4.1b), 
although at the cost of a strong increase in unemployment. By contrast, 
Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece are the countries that have lost 
the highest level of relative productivity. The differences based on the 
euro area average confirm these results (Figure 4.1c). 
Figure 4.2a displays the percentage change of TFP in the euro area 
and in the US. In the pre-crisis period (1999-2007), we see that the TFP 
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dynamics in the EMU was on average below that of the US. With the fi-
nancial crisis this scenario worsened: TFP dropped by 0.4 percentage 
points in the EMU, while in the US it increased by 0.8 per cent.2 
The relative position of each Member State with respect to the US al-
so shows a negative picture: only Slovakia was able to raise its TFP in 
the same proportion as the US, although it was lower than the pre-crisis 
period (Figure 4.2b). Spain and Portugal display a relative better posi-
tion in the transition between the pre- and post-crisis period, but show a 
productivity gap relative to the US. Finally, Greece, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Finland, Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands display the worst behav-
iour in terms of TFP dynamics: in the period 1999-2007 they had a rela-
tive advantage with respect to the US, in the post-crisis period they lost 
competitiveness. 
The difference in TFP dynamics of each Member State with respect to 
the EMU average are shown in Figure 4.2c. The figure points out that Es-
tonia, Greece, Slovenia and Finland recorded a loss in competitiveness in 
the post-crisis period. 
Finally, the real ULC indicator (Figure 4.3) reveals that in the 1999-
2007 period the EMU exhibited a negative variation, while the US had a 
peak in 2000 (Figure 4.3a). The performance of real ULC in the EMU be-
fore the global financial crisis (-0.5 on average), was better than that of 
the US (-0.3). However, after the financial crisis the situation changed. In 
fact, the EMU showed a severe increase in the period 2008-2009, while 
the US presented a quite modest rise just in 2008. As a result, in the peri-
od 2008-2012 the real ULC showed a positive change in EMU on average 
(+0.6), while in the US the average variation has been negative (-0.7%). 
Looking at Figure 4.4, it is clear that the boost in ULC in the EMU was 
due to the rise in real compensation per employee brought about by the 
decreasing path of inflation. The US also show an upsurge in the real 
compensation in the same period; however, the negative effect on com-
petitiveness has been fully balanced by the increase in productivity (see 
Figures 4.1a and 4.2a). 
More details on the ULC behaviour can be obtained from Figure 4.3b. 
                                                
2 See European Commission (2013) for a detailed analysis of the productivity gap of 
the euro area with respect to the US. 
4. IN SEARCH OF THE DETERMINANTS 
127 
In this Figure we represent, on the horizontal axis, the average differ-
ence in the percentage change of the real ULC between each EMU coun-
try and the US in the period before the financial crisis (1999-2007), 
while on the vertical axis we report the average difference after the fi-
nancial crisis (2008-2013). From Figure 4.3b we find that, with the ex-
ception of Greece and Cyprus, all euro area countries show a worsening 
relative position vis-à-vis the US, from the pre- to the post-crisis period. 
As to the remaining peripheral countries, the deterioration is limited in 
Spain and Portugal while it is more pronounced in Ireland and Italy. 
Among the European countries with sounder macroeconomic condi-
tions, Luxembourg, Finland, Austria and Germany show the highest de-
teriorating behaviour, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Taking into account the relative position of each member with re-
spect to the euro area average, we find that only Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, 
Greece, Estonia, Ireland and Spain were able to improve their competi-
tiveness in terms of real ULC (Figure 4.3c); Belgium and the Netherlands 
maintained their relative position; France and Italy were unable to re-
duce the competitiveness gap; whereas Luxembourg, Slovakia, Germany, 
Austria, Slovenia and Finland experienced the greater losses. 
The increasing gaps in productivity and labour costs show their effect 
on the economy by mainly reducing its growth rate. Figure 4.5a shows 
the real GDP growth in the EMU and in the US respectively: in the period 
after the launch of euro (1999-2013), the gap in terms of growth is equal, 
on average, to 80 basis points (+1.3% for the EMU; +2.1% for the US). 
The gap has remained substantially unchanged in the pre- and post-crisis 
period. But in the 1999-2007 period the euro area grew by 2.3 percent-
age points (2.8% in the US), whereas in the crisis period (2008-2013) 
the EMU growth rate fell dramatically to -0.3% (+1.0% in the US). This 
feature is common to several countries, not only to peripheral ones (see 
Figure 4.5b). In details, Greece, Ireland, Estonia, Slovenia, Spain, Luxem-
bourg, Finland and Cyprus, all show a path of a higher growth before the 
crisis and of a severe slump after the crisis. The differences based on the 
EMU average confirm these findings (see Figure 4.5c). 
The three main competitiveness indicators show two important piec-
es of evidence: first, an increasing competitive gap for the EMU with re-
spect to the US in terms of TFP and labour costs both in the pre- and 
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post-crisis period; second, a rebalancing of the competitive position of 
deficit countries and more intensively for the peripheral countries un-
der European aid programs (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). 
The loss in competitiveness involved not only the peripheral coun-
tries, but also the core countries and resulted in an overall reduction of 
the standards of living with respect to the US. Since the gaps are increas-
ing in the post-crisis period there is an urgent need for a change in the 
European policies. Coordinated policy actions are required in order to 
maximise the outcome for the euro area as a whole and enable it to keep 
the pace with the United States. 
As to the intra-EMU rebalancing of competitive positions, we have 
seen that most deficit countries in the period 2008-2013 reduced their 
real unit labour costs. On a first look, this might be seen as a positive re-
sult and as an indication of the effectiveness of the austerity measures 
implemented, but in most countries this is not associated with a similar 
gain in productivity. Only Portugal and Spain show signs of structural 
improvements while for the rest of the countries, most importantly the 
other peripheral ones, wage compression appears to be the main driver, 
casting doubts about the long-lasting nature of these improvements. 
4.3.2 Is the rebalancing of peripheral Europe a structural 
phenomenon? Evidence from the deconstruction  
of ULC growth 
In this section we take a deeper look at the determinants of the competi-
tive improvement of most peripheral countries by deconstructing the 
ULC growth into its main components.3 Through this method we can as-
sess whether the competitive gain is due to long-lasting structural 
changes in productivity or to temporary causes like wage compression 
or (the) various changes in employment protection mechanisms. The 
latter component is important in explaining the different adjustment 
                                                
3 In order to assess the international competitiveness of a country the Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER) might be a better indicator. Nevertheless, we prefer to use ULCs 
for two reasons: first, REERs do not allow to disentangle the effect of the different com-
ponents of the index; second, in terms of competitiveness gaps among countries the two 
indicators display a similar dynamics. 
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paths since 2008 because in some countries the employment reduction 
during the two crises has been strongly mitigated by wage guarantee 
funds, which allowed for employment adjustment by reducing the num-
ber of hours worked rather than that of persons employed. 
The average number of hours worked (k) is then an important de-
terminant in ULC adjustment at times of crisis. In order to explicitly take 
account of its effect on the ULC dynamics, as shown in Box 4.1, we de-
construct the growth rate of the latter into that of labour compensation, 
hourly labour productivity and average number of hours worked and 
assess their contribution for the main peripheral countries (Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain) vis à vis Germany. 
Figure 4.6 shows the ULC growth rate since 1999 and that of the three 
components. In the period 1999-2007 we can see that the German im-
provement in ULC with respect to peripheral countries is due to the 
combined effect of improvements in hourly labour productivity and 
moderate wage dynamics. In the years up to 2003, the effect of the Agen-
da 2010 reforms, which introduced forms of temporary employment 
with a lower load in terms of hours worked, is visible but this effect is of 
minor importance with respect to the combined effect of wages and 
productivity. Among the main peripheral countries, with the partial ex-
clusion of Greece, the loss of competitiveness was caused by a sustained 
wage growth coupled with substantially flat productivity dynamics. 
From 2008 on, as we have seen previously, there has been a partial 
catching up in cost competitiveness since Germany started to increase 
wages at a faster pace and ULC grew on average by 2% every year while 
in all troubled countries, except Italy, ULC growth has been on average 
negative. This result, which is particularly important for Greece and 
Spain, is, in any case, due mainly to the internal devaluation effect on 
wages. As we can see in Figure 4.6, the main change with respect to the 
pre-crisis dynamics is wage growth. The Greek case is the most striking 
one since the dynamics of ULC has been entirely driven by the wage 
compression effect in the last three years, while productivity growth 
was null or even slightly negative. In Ireland and Portugal, we find only 
weak signs of increases in productivity between 2008 and 2012 and ULC 
growth turned again positive in 2013 due, for the former, to a productiv-
ity reduction, and for the latter, to the return to a positive wage growth 
for the first time since 2010. 
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Spain is the only country where productivity improvements played a 
major role, together with the flat wage dynamics, in the ULC reduction. 
This is because in Spain the adjustment through the reduction in the av-
erage number of hours worked was of minor importance and unem-
ployment rose up to 26.2% in 2013, with a youth unemployment rate 
above 50%. In Italy, on the contrary, the reduction in the average num-
ber of hours worked contributed to the continuous deterioration in ULC 
in 2009 and 2012, the two negative peaks of the crises; however, the 
main contribution came from the wage growth, which, contrary to the 
other countries of the group, was positive in most of the recent years so 
that the expected reduction in ULC did not materialise. 
To sum up, in recent years the recovery in cost competitiveness of 
most of the peripheral countries is mainly due to the internal devalua-
tion effect since we do not observe, except for Spain, substantial changes 
in the productivity dynamics. The competitive gain is likely to be, by 
consequence, only temporary and ULC will rise again with the recovery 
of GDP and employment, as the Portuguese and Irish cases have already 
shown. Given the high level of unemployment in Spain, its performance 
might deteriorate in the coming years with the recovery of the economic 
cycle.4 The implied conclusion is that imbalances are likely to arise again 
in the coming years since restrictive fiscal policies and the related eco-
nomic dynamics caused only a recession-induced competitive gain, and 
the structural problems of peripheral countries remain still mostly un-
solved. Lacking resources for investments, due to the necessity to con-
solidate public finances, the countries’ potential output will deteriorate, 
and the divergence in the competitive positions within the euro area 
and with respect to the US, most likely, will continue for the years ahead. 
 
                                                
4 In the last months Spain, and to a lower extent Portugal, implemented deep re-
forms which might be effective in bringing about an improvement in their structural 
competitiveness. Positive signals come in particular from the reduction of unemploy-
ment during the second and third quarters of 2014. Nevertheless, since the unemploy-
ment rate is still very high and public finances are not yet in order, such positive signals 
must be taken with caution. Important improvements have also been implemented by 
the Irish economy. In the next future Ireland should probably not be considered a pe-
ripheral country anymore. 
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Box 4.1. Unit Labour Cost Decomposition 
 
Since the average number of hours worked k is the ratio of total hours 
worked (H) to total employment (E), we can express employment as: 
 
kHE /=        (1) 
 
and consequently, total labour productivity becomes: 
 
H
kGDPTLP *=
      (2) 
 
which represent the product between hourly labour productivity (HLP) 
and average hours worked. 
 
Since ULC is the ratio of the average compensation to labour productivi-
ty, by using equation (2) we get a formulation of unit labour costs that 
includes k: 
 
kHLP
onCompensatiULC
*
=
     (3) 
 
because this expression is multiplicative, ULC’s growth rate can be ex-
pressed as the difference between the growth rate of the numerator and 
that of the denominator of equation (3): 
 
plhkpmcoclu  −−=      (4) 
 
According to this formulation, ULC (competitiveness) rises (falls) when 
the wage growth is positive or when productivity growth is negative; in 
addition, an increase in k will improve competitiveness since a more in-
tensive use of labour resources boost total labour productivity. 
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4.4 THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRADE IMBALANCES 
In this section we discuss the geographical composition and evolution of 
euro area trade flows. This is an important piece of the story since the 
existing literature on the analysis of European trade imbalances (Chen 
et al. 2013, Guerrieri and Esposito 2012 and 2013, Etzel et al. 2013) 
finds a role both for the euro in favouring German export at the expense 
of the rest of the area (Guerrieri and Esposito 2012 and 2013, Etzel et al. 
2013) and for the asymmetrical external shocks caused by the rising 
importance of emerging markets – above all Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries (CEECs) and China-ASEAN region – in world trade. The-
se two explanations have different policy implications since the former 
deals mainly with the functioning of the euro area and the latter implies 
a focus on structural reforms at the country level. The following analysis 
of intra-euro area trade as well as intra- and extra EU trade is then a 
necessary step to clearly understand the forces driving the rise of exter-
nal imbalances. 
4.4.1 Trade balances within European countries 
Trade balances within the euro area, the EU and with extra-EU countries 
are shown in Table 4.1.5 Intra-euro area trade has contributed mostly to 
the increase in surplus countries, especially for the Netherlands and 
Germany. Between 1999 and 2007 these two countries extracted most 
of their surpluses from the euro area, and the Dutch case is particularly 
evident as its balance with extra EU countries is strongly negative. 
For deficit countries, the deterioration of the balance is mainly due to 
extra EU27 trade. Between 2003 and 2007, Spain lost 2.2% of GDP 
against this group; similarly, Italy lost 1.3%, which more than offset the 
improvement within the EU, especially vis-à-vis non EMU countries. The 
Greek negative balance outside the EU doubled, passing from -3.9% in 
1999 to -7.8% in 2007, while the imbalance within the EU and the EMU 
                                                
5 Due to the different data source for geographically disaggregated trade flows the 
sum of intra- and extra EU27 trade does not exactly match the total trade balance shown 
in Chapter 1. 
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kept basically stable although strongly negative. The Slovenian case is 
interesting, as the relative stability of its overall deficit is the result of a 
loss outside the EU and a strong gain against the European non-EMU 
countries. 
Exceptions to this pattern are represented by Portugal, which shows 
no geographical change in the composition of deficit, and France, where 
two thirds of the total loss between 1999 and 2007 are generated within 
the EU and mainly within the euro area. 
Among the remaining countries it is interesting to note that the re-
covery of Austrian net exports is entirely due to the extra EMU trade 
flows, especially with European countries. In fact, Austria together with 
Germany has been one of the countries most engaged in outsourcing ac-
tivities with CEECs (see Marin 2006). 
As shown in Chapter 1, there has been a general reduction in trade 
imbalances since the global financial crisis, due to both the collapse of 
domestic demand and investment and to a partial export recovery. In 
most of the deficit countries, the reduction is mainly due to the im-
provement of trade balances within the euro area, while Italy, similar to 
Germany, has gained from extra EU trade. 
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Box 4.2. Price Effects, Volumes Effects and Oil Price Dynamics:  
Do They Foster Imbalances? 
 
The evolution of trade prices is an important component in explaining 
changes in trade and current account imbalances. Nevertheless, little at-
tention has been paid by the European authorities to the development of 
the terms of trade in European countries, and no consideration of trade 
prices is included in the MIP. The dynamics of trade prices is strictly re-
lated to the evolution of exchange rates between the euro and the other 
main currencies, especially the US dollar, and to the dynamic of the oil 
price as European countries are, on average, still strongly dependent on 
the import of oil from outside the EU. 
 
This box aims to assess the importance of price dynamics on trade im-
balances among euro area members. We do so by deconstructing chang-
es in trade balances into price and volume effects and by assessing the 
contribution of trade flows of oil and oil-related products (in such ef-
fects). The methodological details of the deconstruction are described in 
the following section, whereas the discussion of the results is in Section 
B4.2. 
 
B4.1 Decomposition of trade balance changes 
 
We decompose the overall variation of net export of goods and services 
into the effect of trade prices (unit values) and volumes. As we are in-
terested in GDP ratios, we further include the effect of changes in both 
real GDP and GDP deflator. As a starting point, we can express the trade 
balance at current prices as: 
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where px and pm are export and import unit value indexes, p is the GDP 
deflator and the superscript k indicates constant prices. By dividing val-
ues into price and volume components and total differentiating6 the two 
sides of equation (1) we obtain the contribution of each factor on export 
and import flows as follow: 
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where the first two blocks on the right hand side of equations (2) and 
(3) represent the contribution of trade prices and volumes. The third 
and fourth blocks represent the impact of variations in the overall price 
level and real GDP(,) effects that are not null only when the trade bal-
ance is significantly different from zero. 
 
B4.2 Main evidence 
 
For the euro area as a whole, the dynamics of import and export prices, 
as well GDP deflator, is shown in Figure B4.1. GDP deflator evolved 
smoothly from 2000 to 2012 while the dynamics of trade prices shows a 
reduction of both import deflators during the period 2000-2003.7 As 
import prices are more dependent on and strictly correlated with the oil 
price (Figure B4.2), we observe an improvement in the terms of trade 
                                                
6 The total differential is defined as the sum of changes in each component, weighted 
by the partial derivative of the trade balance with respect to the given component. This 
is similar to the calculation of the contributions to GDP growth, the only difference being 
in the simple additive form of the GDP equation whereas partial derivatives are simply 
given by the initial value of the component. 
7 Data for 1999 are not available. 
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up to 2003 as import prices fell more. In the following period, and up to 
the global financial crisis, both indexes started to increase, but while the 
export price matches closely the pattern of GDP deflator, the import 
price experienced a faster dynamic because of the strong rise in the oil 
price. The greater reaction of import prices to the oil price continued al-
so during and after the global financial crisis. 
 
Focusing on the period 2000-2007, in Figures B4.3 and B4.4 we plot 
trade balance changes against price effects obtained from equations (2) 
and (3) for the two sub-periods 2000-2002 and 2003-2007. In the Fig-
ures the blue dots indicate variables calculated on total trade and the 
red triangles refer to changes excluding oil and oil related products 
(category SITC 3). As we already know from Chapter 1, the evolution of 
trade balances was positive in most of the countries, with the exception 
of Greece and Italy. Due to the greater fall of the import deflator, the 
price effect was positive almost everywhere over the same period and 
this is true also excluding oil products. 
 
The picture for the period 2003-2007 is reverted and more jeopardised. 
The north-south dichotomy in terms of total changes is broadly replicat-
ed also excluding oil products, but a substantial effect of oil products is 
clearly present in Finland, Spain and Ireland. Interestingly enough, the 
Italian trade balance turns positive when excluding oil products and the 
oil price plays a major role as the increase is almost entirely due to a 
volume effect. 
 
In conclusion, the dynamics of trade prices exerted a roughly balanced 
effect on the members of the euro area. Although, the dependence on ex-
tra EU imports for oil products had a negative effect on the trade bal-
ance, between 2003 and 2007, when imbalances experienced their 
greater increase, country differences were not exacerbated by the dy-
namics of trade prices. The only exception is Italy, for which the de-
pendence on oil imports account for most of the balance deterioration. 
For this country, policies aiming at reducing the dependence on oil im-
ports could prove effective in boosting the country’s export perfor-
mance. 
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Figure B4.1. Trade Prices and GDP Deflator for the Euro Area and Main Countries 
 
  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure B4.2. Change in Trade Balance Excluding Oil and Oil Related Products 
       (2010-2012) 
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Figure B4.3. Change in Trade Balance and Price Effect (2000-2002) 
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Source: Own elaboration on Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure B4.4. Change in Trade Balance and Price Effect (2003-2007) 
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4.4.2 Import and export intensities 
Let us now take a step forward by looking at the evolution of import and 
export flows, in order to understand whether deficits (surpluses) are the 
result of a deteriorating (improving) export performance or increasing 
(decreasing) import dependence. Such dynamics are shown in Table 4.2 
which reports the changes in import and export intensities since the in-
troduction of the euro by geographical area. Between 1999 and 2007 the 
export-to-GDP ratio increased almost everywhere except for Ireland (-
26.4%), Luxembourg (-4.7%), Malta (-2.8%), Cyprus (-0.9%), Spain (-
0.5%) and Greece (-0.2%). With the exception of Ireland, Cyprus and Mal-
ta, all countries increased the export intensity toward extra EU markets; 
however for Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as 
Slovenia and Slovakia, the export increase is largely due to the intra-EU 
component, which accounts for at least two-thirds of the total increase. 
Among the remaining countries, the increase in the export intensity of Ita-
ly and France comes mainly from the extra EMU markets, with a strong 
growth in Italy against the EU-non EMU countries in particular (mainly 
CEECs). Estonia compensates the deterioration of its export intensity to-
ward the euro area with an opposite movement in extra EU exports. 
Between 2007 and 2012 the export intensity increased everywhere 
but in Luxembourg. Again, the higher increases are recorded by surplus 
countries, together with the more recent Member States. In most of the 
cases the increase is mainly due to the performance outside the EU; 
nevertheless, in Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Portugal and the Nether-
lands the intra-EU export growth plays a dominant role. Finally, Italy 
and France show a more balanced export growth among the areas but, 
similarly to Slovakia and Estonia, a relevant portion of this increase is 
linked to exports toward Central and Eastern Europe. 
Turning to the import intensity, we observe a widespread increase 
between 1999 and 2007, which in many cases can be ascribed to the in-
crease in oil prices (see Box 4.2). Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Slo-
venia and Slovakia experienced the largest increase in import intensi-
ties. However, relevant differences among countries exist. For Belgium 
and the Netherlands the majority of import growth comes from euro ar-
ea countries, while in southern Europe as well as in Slovakia the import 
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growth is dominated by flows of goods from outside the EU. This is in 
line with the proposition that southern Europe is more affected by the 
competition of China and the other emerging economies, as shown by 
Chen et al. (2013) and Guerrieri and Esposito (2013). This result is also 
due to the higher dependency of southern European countries on the 
import of oil products and hence of its price changes. As we show in Box 
4.2, the price effect was strong everywhere during the 2003-2007 peri-
od, and in the case of Italy it even reverted the sign of the trade balance’s 
change. In Germany, Finland and France the growth of imports comes 
equally from within and outside the EU, but for the first two countries 
the intra-EU imports are driven by non-EMU countries; this latter evi-
dence suggests that the role of non EA countries can also be the result of 
the emergence of a European Production Network. 
In the years from 2007 to 2012 the import intensity increased in al-
most all countries (Cyprus being the only exception), and again the 
group of surplus countries experienced the higher growth. For the ma-
jority of countries the increase is mainly due to the rise in extra-EU im-
ports. This effect has been particularly strong for the main peripheral 
countries, as well as for Finland and the Netherlands. Among the most 
troubled countries, it is interesting to note the relative contraction in 
imports from the euro area in Portugal and Greece, which is a conse-
quence of the deep recession brought about by strong austerity 
measures. 
4.4.3 Polarization of intra-EMU trade 
In order to get a better picture, we now show in Table 4.3 the distribu-
tion of export and import flows within the euro area. The countries are 
classified in four groups: the first includes northern-surplus countries 
(Germany, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland); 
the second group includes Italy and France; the third group includes 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS); the last group is made up of 
the new Member States (Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia). 
At the bottom of each exporter’s panel we add the contribution of the 
group to the total intra-euro area flow. 
The main change in the geographical composition of intra-euro area 
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flows comes from the increased importance of northern countries’ ex-
ports, mainly at the expense of Italy and France and, to a lesser extent, 
the GIPS. On the import side, although changes are smaller, the pattern 
is similar, it is interesting to note that the increase of the import share of 
northern countries is mainly due to trade among theirselves while they 
actually reduced substantially imports from France, Italy and the other 
traditional peripheral countries. The importance of the latter in total ex-
port has declined, while its import share has remained stable; by con-
trast, the NMS have recorded a generalised increase in both flows. 
The resulting picture is that of a general increase of northern coun-
tries’ importance as a single trade block whereas the remaining coun-
tries, except for NMS, have lost weight in northern markets while keep-
ing stable their dependency on imports. After the crisis we do not see a 
radical change in this pattern. In most cases the pre-crisis dynamics con-
tinued or at best stabilised so that in the future we cannot preclude that 
the polarization between North and South will continue. 
4.4.4 A summary view on intra-EMU trade imbalances 
The main points that emerge from the above geographical analysis of 
trade flows are the following: 
 
• imbalances arise both from the growing importance of Germany 
and the Netherlands as exporter countries within the euro area 
and to the strong increase of imports from outside the EU27, es-
pecially from emerging economies (BRICs and ASEAN above 
all).8 The export dynamics in the surplus countries vis-à-vis the 
deficit countries strongly support this conclusion; 
• Spain and Greece reduced their intra-EMU export intensity; 
• the remaining countries experienced an export growth (as a per-
centage of GDP) below the average and more oriented to extra 
EU27 markets; 
                                                
8 The group of BRIC include Brazil, China, India and Russia. ASEAN countries are: 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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• exports in surplus countries kept on growing also in the 2008-
2012 period and, with the exception of the Netherlands, the 
growth is concentrated in extra EU markets; 
• the new Member States also increased their intra-EU exports, 
but mainly toward non EMU countries; 
• a rising competition on the import side emerged from non-EU 
countries, especially for peripheral countries up to the global fi-
nancial crisis, and this trend became more intense in the period 
2008-2012; 
• intra-euro area flows experience an increasing polarisation, with 
northern countries becoming the main trading block and the 
remaining countries being marginalised as exporters. 
 
The above facts indicate that the rise of trade imbalances might be ex-
plained by a relocation pattern within the EU, from less competitive to 
more competitive countries. Surplus countries, especially Germany, in-
creased their export intensity in the common market while southern 
countries did not keep pace with northern Europe and experienced a de-
terioration of their balances as a result. Italy, France and the group of 
GIPS, did not increase their penetration to the northern markets and in 
some cases their share declined, while their import from northern Eu-
rope increased substantially. Competition from outside the EU further 
exacerbated these dynamics, as it caused a higher growth of imports in 
southern Europe compared to the north. The final picture is that of a 
dual Europe, with northern countries becoming the main trading block 
of the euro area and southern countries being both dependent on north-
ern countries exports and more affected by external competition. 
4.5 TRADE AND FINANCIAL INTERLINKAGES:  
A STRICT RELATION 
In this section we discuss the role of financial interlinkages in the devel-
opment of trade and current account imbalances and question the Eu-
ropean Commission (2012a) finding of a lack of causality between sur-
pluses and deficits. In our view, the established non-causal relationship 
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between deficit and surplus countries in the Commission report seems 
to miss a key point: the strict relation between trade and financial ac-
counts (see Section 1.3.1). In fact, the European Commission (2012a:54-
55) recognises that “in the euro area, the surplus countries financed the 
periphery by more than their bilateral trade balances, and effectively in-
termediated flows coming from the rest of the world”; at the same time 
the EC does not consider the effect of financial cross-border flows on 
trade balances, which is generally negative. As remarked by Pettis 
(2013:137), “countries that export capital do not help the deficit coun-
tries that import capital – on the contrary, capital exports often have ad-
verse trade and growth impacts on the recipients.” 
In order to test for the effect of financial flows on trade balances, let 
us now consider: 
 
• the bilateral trade accounts, as a percentage of GDP, of EMU defi-
cit countries (Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia 
and Slovakia) with the EMU surplus partners (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) (source: 
CHELEM International Trade database); 
• the bilateral banking foreign liabilities, as a percentage of GDP, 
of the EMU deficit countries with respect to the EMU surplus 
partners (source: Bank for International Settlements). 
 
For these two variables we first calculate the Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient in the period between the launch of the euro and the global finan-
cial crisis (1999-2007). The restriction to the pre-crisis period is made 
in order to exclude the effects of capital “flight to quality” that followed 
the on-set of the crisis. Next, to assess the causal relation between the 
bilateral financial and trade links, we consider the level of bilateral 
banking foreign liabilities in previous year (t-1). 
Table 4.6 shows the main results. To limit the effects of outliers, we 
also computed the Pearson correlation obtained after the winsorisation 
of data.9 We find that bilateral banking foreign liabilities in a given year 
are highly correlated with the bilateral trade account in the following 
                                                
9 We transform data by limiting extreme values to 5th and 95th percentile. 
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year (36.7%, significant at 1%, in the case of winsorised data). This re-
sult implies that the EMU deficit countries were able to finance the in-
crease in their domestic demand, through increasing imports from EMU 
surplus partners, thanks to the higher level of banking foreign liabilities 
(see also Figure 4.7). In other words, financial flows from EMU surplus 
economies helped growth in deficit countries but implied a higher level 
of private debts in the EMU deficit partners. The funding of peripheral 
borrowers by core economies was a part of the deal, leading both to 
large surpluses in core countries and to debt problems in deficit coun-
tries (Pettis 2013). 
We also find a positive correlation between the bilateral trade ac-
count (at time t) and the overall position of the EMU deficit countries in 
terms of financial account (at time t-1), and between the bilateral trade 
account (at time t) and FDI (at time in t-1) (Table 4.6). The fact that the 
Pearson correlations with these financial variables are smaller (but al-
ways statistically significant), can be explained by the fact that these in-
dicators are not based on bilateral positions. 
The policy implication of these results is straightforward: forcing on-
ly the (EMU) deficit countries to adjust their imbalances is not the opti-
mal strategy. Allowing EMU surplus countries to have large surpluses, 
and hence high level of national savings, puts strong pressure on the 
deficit countries that receive cross-border capital. In this situation, Pet-
tis (2013) identifies only four options for deficit countries: 
 
1) matching the CA surplus of EMU core countries, by running a 
deficit through higher investment (mainly investment in infra-
structure), financed by core countries capital. This option im-
plies a rise in public debt of peripheral countries that is hard to 
sustain; 
2) increase their private consumption – which means, by definition, 
decrease their savings rate – through a higher level of banking 
indebtedness. This option implies an increase in private debt 
that is also unsustainable; 
3) cutting fiscal spending and raising taxes with an increase in do-
mestic unemployment and in savings rate; 
4) devaluing their currency or imposing trade barriers. 
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Excluding the first two options, which imply higher public or private 
debts, we are left with only the last two: accepting high unemployment 
for many years, which is actually the option followed in the EMU under 
the “austerity policy measures”, or abandoning the euro and the EU. 
Nonetheless, there exist other feasible solutions that could be imple-
mented by EU policy-makers to make both deficit and surplus countries 
better off. These options, which will be discussed in Section 5.4, are 
based on reforms to improve structural competitiveness. 
4.6 SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A GRAVITY 
MODEL OF BILATERAL TRADE 
In this section we empirically assess the relevance of the different fac-
tors proposed in the literature in order to explain external imbalances 
among euro area countries. More specifically, we focus on bilateral trade 
flows among countries belonging to the monetary union. The methodo-
logical approach is based on the well-known gravity model of bilateral 
trade (Anderson 1979, Bergstrand 1985), which we augment by includ-
ing variables related to the different causes of imbalances identified 
throughout the book, that is: financial integration and financial flows, 
differences in competitiveness, and the excessive development of the 
non-tradable sectors. 
4.6.1 The econometric strategy 
The basic formulation of the gravity equation relates the amount of bi-
lateral trade to the economic mass of the trading partners, proxied by 
GDP, to the bilateral exchange rate, and to spatial variables such as geo-
graphical distance, dummies for neighbouring countries, common lan-
guage and so on. 
The baseline model specification that we use in order to estimate the 
determinants of export and import flows among the EMU countries, is 
the following: 
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(1) 
 
where the log of export at constant prices of country i toward country j 
(Expi,j,t,) is regressed on: the log difference between importer’s and ex-
porter’s GDP (GDPreli,j,t); the inflation rate differential between the im-
porting and the exporting country (πreli,j,t); a set of pairs and time-
specific dummies (γi,j and θt); a vector of variables (Xi,j,t) representing 
the different determinants of European imbalances proposed in the lit-
erature completes the equation. The inclusion of pair-specific fixed ef-
fects (i.e. importer-exporter combination) allows us to neglect other ge-
ographical and time-invariant variables normally required in gravity 
models. GDPreli,j,t captures both relative demand and catching-up effects 
so that conclusions about the growth process of European countries are 
not univocal. The relative inflation (πreli,j,t) captures the impact of the 
standard price competitiveness: a higher relative inflation of the export-
ing country reduces its export competitiveness. Hence, we expect a posi-
tive impact of these variables, independently of the surplus or deficit 
position of the considered country. Finally, the vector Xi,j includes the 
following variables: 
 
• changes in the net international investment position of import-
ing and exporting country (∆NIIPj and ∆NIIPi); 
• absolute difference between the interest rates of importing and 
exporting country (AbsDifIntij); 
• relative real unit labour costs of the importing and exporting 
country (RULCrelj,i); 
• gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio of the importer coun-
try (GFCFj); 
• share of construction and real estate activities in total capital 
formation (NTshj). 
 
On average, the NIIP deteriorated in the deficit countries and improved 
in surplus countries. The deterioration of the net position in the deficit 
countries implies a net inflow with the rest of the world and a rise in 
imports, hence, it should show a negative sign. If external financing is 
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used to improve the productive structure, then exports should also ben-
efit from the increased deficit (negative sign of exporter’s ∆NIIP). By 
contrast, if foreign capital is used to finance domestic consumption or 
investment in non-productive sectors, the impact on exports is expected 
to be zero or even negative and the expected sign is positive (i.e. a dete-
rioration of the net position reduces export). 
Surplus countries, on the other hand, are net lenders to the rest of the 
world, and to the rest of the euro area in particular. This means that we 
should expect a positive impact of improvements in NIIP on export, and 
a zero or positive impact on imports as the financial integration raises 
the overall intra-area trade. In this case too, the expected sign of the im-
porter’s ∆NIIP is positive. 
Interest rates are important indicators of financial integration. The 
introduction of the euro and the resulting reduction of the exchange rate 
risk level in peripheral members brought about a convergence in the in-
terest rates of peripheral countries to the lower levels of surplus coun-
tries. Such convergence, associated with the still positive differential en-
joyed by southern Member States, stimulated cross-country capital 
flows especially from core to peripheral Europe.10 In order to seize the 
convergence of interest rates, we used the absolute value of the differ-
ence between partners’ interest rates. 
As we stressed in Chapter 3, the divergence of unit labour costs is a 
key issue in the alternative explanations of macroeconomic imbalances. 
The more competitive countries should find it easier to export their 
products to the less competitive economies which, at the same time, in-
crease their demand for imports from the more competitive ones. We 
define the relative real unit labour cost (RULC) as the ratio of importer’s 
to exporter’s real ULC. This means that its effect, if significant, should 
have a positive sign since an increase in this ratio signals a relative loss 
of competitiveness of the importing country. Note that even though this 
effect is present in all countries, we expect the RULC differences to have 
a higher impact on deficit countries’ import flows. If this holds true, it 
                                                
10 Differences in returns on capital are roughly captured by financial flows. The in-
clusion of simple difference between the interest rates was never significant. 
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will follow that competitiveness losses played a significant role in in-
creasing European imbalances. 
The last two groups of variables (GFCFj and NTshj) are introduced to 
better qualify the growth process of European countries. Fixed invest-
ment has a positive effect on the amount of imports as long as imported 
capital goods are used in the production process; however, the net ef-
fect on imbalances depends on the nature of investments. In order to 
distinguish between productive and non-productive investment, we 
added the share of construction and real estate activities in total in-
vestment. This variable captures the effect of both speculative bubbles, 
as in the case of Spain and Ireland, and of the excessive development of 
the non-tradable sector. Relatively high shares of such kind of invest-
ments are also present in other deficit countries like Italy and Slovenia; 
therefore this variable can capture the general process that strongly af-
fected not only Spain and Ireland but also the whole group of non-core 
countries. 
Equation (1) is estimated on a panel of bilateral export of 14 euro ar-
ea countries over the sample period 1999-2007.11 To better identify the 
role of the different factors, we estimated six specifications which alter-
natively restricted the sample of export and import flows for the GIPS, 
the deficit and the surplus countries, respectively. We further divided 
the sample into two sub-periods, that is, the years 1999-2002 and 2003-
2007. This is done in order to take account of the strong increase in im-
balances since 2003. As a matter of fact, trade and current account bal-
ances experienced small changes before 2003, which suggests the pres-
ence of structural breaks between the two sub-periods. 
4.6.2 Results 
The results of the econometric analysis are shown in Tables 4.7-9. In 
each table, the first three columns show the estimated relation for ex-
port flows of GIPS, deficit, and surplus countries, respectively; whereas 
columns 4-6 show the estimated relation for import flows. Results for 
                                                
11 The presence of missing data forced us to exclude Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. 
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the whole sample are reported in Table 4.7, whereas Tables 4.8 and 4.9 
report the outcomes for the two sub-periods. 
The estimates for the whole period (Table 4.7) provide interesting 
insights and appear to be consistent with the estimates on the two sub-
periods. As shown in Chapter 1, imbalances started to increase in 2003, 
while the first years of the euro were characterised by small divergenc-
es. This pattern is confirmed by the estimation results since real and fi-
nancial variables exert different impacts in the two sub-periods. Relative 
growth is relevant in explaining the export performance and its impact 
is stronger in the first sub-period (columns 1-3 in Table 4.8). Relative 
inflation seems to affect both import and export flows, but while in the 
first period it acted mainly by stimulating import flows, since 2003 it al-
so affected the export performance.12 Given that the GIPS and the deficit 
countries experienced on average a higher inflation dynamics compared 
to surplus ones, we can conclude that the price dynamics acted so as to 
reduce the exports of GIPS and the other deficit countries while foster-
ing the exports of surplus countries. 
Let’s now consider financial variables. Exporter’s NIIP has a positive 
impact on exports of both GIPS and surplus countries. Nevertheless, the 
NIIP actually deteriorated for the former, and the final effect was an in-
crease in the exports of surplus countries and a widening of imbalances. 
On the import side, we find evidence of a negative impact of a rise in the 
NIIP on deficit countries. Since this variable actually worsened in deficit 
countries, the final effect is an increase in imports and, by consequence, 
a widening of imbalances. 
The dynamics over the whole period 1999-2007 hide different evolu-
tions in the two sub-periods. In particular, we see that, while the benefi-
cial effect of exporter’s NIIP on the export of surplus countries is con-
centrated in the first period (column 3 in Table 4.8), the effect on GIPS is 
not significant.13 We also find that in the first period the deterioration of 
                                                
12 Relative inflation is defined as the difference between importer and exporter infla-
tion; hence, in most cases a positive sign is expected because an increase in the variable 
implies cheaper imports and more expensive exports. 
13 This outcome can be ascribed to the concentration of the positive effect around the 
period 2002-2003, so that each subsample captures only a part of the whole effect. 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
150 
the net position for the whole group of deficit countries improved their 
export performance. This suggests that increasing financial imbalances, 
at least in the initial years of the euro, stimulated intra-area trade flows 
for all countries, with a higher intensity for the group of deficit coun-
tries. This prevented the development of excessive trade imbalances. 
The convergence of interest rates stimulated both import and export 
flows of deficit countries on average. This result is robust throughout 
the whole period, but since 2003 it acted by stimulating import flows of 
all countries and, more intensively, for the group of GIPS (see column 4 
in Table 4.9). Importer’s gross investment over the whole period stimu-
lated the imports of surplus countries but this result comes mainly from 
the 1999-2002 period while in the following period it raised the demand 
for imports of deficit countries. 
Relative RULCs are significant in explaining intra-euro area trade 
flows. According to the estimated coefficients, they acted mainly by re-
ducing the export capacity of deficit countries and by increasing import 
flows of GIPS and surplus countries. For the latter, the impact is the 
highest, since relative RULC in surplus countries actually decreased, the 
final effect over the period was a reduction of imports from most of their 
partners. As we can see in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, real competitive differ-
ences started to be relevant since 2003 and acted so as to foster imbal-
ances by reducing the exports of GIPS and of the whole group of deficit 
countries, increasing the imports of GIPS, and reducing the imports of 
surplus countries. 
The last piece of evidence regards the share of importers’ investment 
in non-tradable sectors as an indicator of investment bubbles or in gen-
eral of an excessive development of non-productive investment. The re-
sults are straightforward. The investment in non-tradables significantly 
increased the import flows of GIPS. This comes mainly from the period 
2003-2007, when the excessive development in construction and real 
estate activities increased the import of the whole group of deficit coun-
tries. The positive coefficient for the export of deficit countries, associ-
ated with the insignificant one for the export of GIPS indicates that in-
vestment in non-tradables stimulated the export of Italy and France 
(compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.9). By contrast, in the first part of 
the sample we find an opposite process, suggesting that import flows 
were stimulated, in deficit countries, by productive investment. 
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Summing up, our results suggest that financial integration, competitive 
differences and over-development of the non-tradable sector represent 
the main forces behind the evolution of intra-euro area trade imbalances 
between 1999 and 2007. Nevertheless, in the first sub-period, we find 
that: (i) up to 2002 financial integration and domestic investment led to a 
relatively balanced process where all countries increased exports, in spite 
of diverging financial positions; and (ii) the convergence of interest rates 
fostered both import and export of deficit countries, where investment 
was strongly turned on imported tradable goods. Since 2003 and up to 
the global financial crises, financial variables played no direct role, except 
for the interest rate convergence, whereas trade flows were mainly driv-
en by nominal and real competitive differences as well as by the demand 
for non-tradable investment goods. Competitive differences also played a 
role by reducing the export performance of deficit countries and the im-
ports of surplus ones, whereas the development of non-tradables in-
creased the import of deficit countries especially in the group of GIPS. 
This is an indirect consequence of financial integration, as the massive 
capital inflows into the deficit countries fuelled the investment bubbles 
and the development of the non-tradable sector. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we analysed the main factors affecting the European cur-
rent account imbalances. Starting with European Commission (2012a) 
report on EMU imbalances, the investigation allowed us to refine and re-
vise the main conclusions that form the mainstream in Europe. 
We found that the EMU shows a competitive gap with the US during 
the whole period and that the loss in competitiveness affected both pe-
ripheral and core countries. The partial recovery of cost competitive-
ness in most of the peripheral countries is driven mainly by the wage 
moderation effect and it’s not likely to last long since the most recent 
data show that ULC started to increase again in Ireland and Portugal. 
This signals that the monetary union produced imbalances that, contra-
ry to European Commission (2012a) policy recommendations, require a 
coordinated action. 
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In accordance with the EC’s findings, we found that external shocks 
contributed to the widening of trade imbalances; however, in contrast to 
the EC, we found the dynamics of trade within the EMU also played a 
key role. Italy, France and the GIPS, on average reduced their export ori-
entation toward northern markets, whereas their imports from north-
ern Europe were basically stable. At the same time, competition from 
outside the EU further exacerbated this dynamic, as it caused a higher 
growth of imports in southern Europe compared to the north. In addi-
tion, northern countries traded more intensively with each other, con-
tributing to the marginalisation of southern Europe, and this pattern did 
not change in the years after the global financial crisis. 
We further found that trade and financial flows are strictly inter-
linked. In particular, the surplus countries financed the periphery by 
more than what their bilateral trade balances can explain, thanks to 
their role of capital intermediation with the rest of world. Peripheral 
countries used these financial flows to increase their internal demand, 
thus worsening their external position. 
In this scenario, the deficit countries seem to be left with only two 
options (Pettis 2013): accepting a high unemployment for many years, 
which is the option actually followed in the EMU by implementing re-
strictive fiscal policies and by introducing more severe adjustment 
measures, or abandoning the euro and the EU. Nonetheless, other feasi-
ble options exist that can yield better outcomes for both the deficit and 
surplus countries since, as we found in Section 4.4, the competitiveness 
of troubled countries improved mainly due to an internal devaluation 
effect on wages while productivity hardly changed. These will be dis-
cussed in the Section 5.4. 
An econometric investigation that is better able go into the nature 
and evolution of trade imbalances within the euro area confirmed that 
three causes of imbalances (financial integration, competitive differ-
ences and development on the non-tradable sector) were at work be-
tween 1999 and 2007. The comparison of the estimated coefficients 
over the two sub-periods 1999-2002 and 2003-2007 indicates that in 
the first period the diverging net external financial position of surplus 
and deficit countries helped to improve exports in both groups. The pic-
ture changed dramatically in the second period when financial variables 
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reduced their impact and real ULC divergences, inflation differentials 
and non-productive investment played a key role. The imports of deficit 
countries were mainly financed through the increase in foreign-owned 
assets and capital inflows were used to a large extent for investment in 
non-tradable sectors, which in turn fuelled an investment bubble. In this 
scenario, competitive differences worked by reducing the export capaci-
ty of deficit countries and increasing the imports of GIPS, thus adding to 
the effect of investment bubbles. 
Comparing our results with those in the existing literature, we do not 
find evidence of any self-re-equilibrating mechanisms in the euro area 
as advanced by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) on intra-area trade. As a 
matter of fact, if financial integration improved the export performance 
of all countries in the first years of the euro, in subsequent years the ex-
isting imbalances widened considerably (see, e.g., Dullien and Fritsche 
2009, Zemanek et al. 2010, Belke and Drager 2011, Collignon 2013, 
Stockhammer and Onaran 2013) since competitive differences, which 
are confirmed to be a crucial determinant of imbalances along with an 
excessive development of the non-tradable sector, became the main de-
terminants of trade flows (Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010). Such a pattern 
hit more severely the group of GIPS, but in general all the deficit coun-
tries were damaged. 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
154 
APPENDIX 
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Figure 4.1b 
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Figure 4.1c 
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Figure 4.2a 
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Figure 4.2b 
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Figure 4.2c 
 
AUTBEL
CYP
DEU
ESP
FRA
FIN
GRC
IRL
ITA
LUX
MLT
NLD
PRT
SVN
EST
SVK
-2
-1
0
1
2
20
08
-2
01
3
-2 -1 0 1 2
1999-2007
Source: our elaborations on Ameco data.
% change - difference with respect to the EA average
Total factor productivity - total economy
 
 
Figure 4.3a 
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Figure 4.3b 
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Figure 4.3c 
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Figure 4.4 
 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Euro area (17 countries) US
Real Compensation per Employee - total economy
% change
fin.crisis
Notes: Shadow area = expected values.
Source: AMECO.
 
 
Figure 4.5a 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Euro area (17 countries) US
Real GDP
% change
fin.crisis
Notes: Shadow area = expected values.
Source: AMECO.
 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
160 
Figure 4.5b 
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Figure 4.5c 
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Figure 4.6. Unit Labour Cost Decomposition 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on AMECO. 
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Figure 4.7 
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5. 
European Policies and Possible 
Improvements 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters showed that the Blanchard-Giavazzi (2002) 
model is unable to explain both the rise of current account imbalances 
up to 2008 and their subsequent adjustments. As to the latter, the main 
driver has been a recessionary trend brought about by the severe re-
strictive fiscal policies, which were imposed by the European institu-
tions and carried out by a number of peripheral Member States of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). These policies were 
centred on adjustment processes based on strong internal devaluation, 
rather than on structural long-term improvements in the different forms 
of productivity (labour productivity as well as total factors productivity) 
characterising the economies of the peripheral countries. The internal 
devaluations were usually obtained through high levels of unemploy-
ment and wage compression, while increases in productivity would 
have required organisational and process innovations. With this inter-
pretation in mind, which continues to apply to the current European 
economic situation, in spite of the progress recently made by a number 
of peripheral countries, our conclusion is that the rebalances observed 
in the current accounts of the whole set of these countries during the 
period 2010-13 are likely to be short-lived: as soon as there is a recov-
ery of the euro area and in particular of peripheral Member States, the 
demand for imports will increase and consequently the trade and cur-
rent account imbalances should re-appear. 
However, in the current economic phase it is more important to take 
into account the deterioration of the recovery prospects than the stability 
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of the re-adjustments in the current account imbalances. In fact, after pos-
itive figures in the first quarter of 2014, a downturn followed even in the 
German economy. Southern European economies were differently affect-
ed by this new negative trend; for instance, as distinct from Spain or Ire-
land, Italy is still struggling with negative GDP growth, that is, with its 
third recession during the last six years. The current forecasts indicate 
that the entire 2014 risks being a year of recession or stagnation for some 
of the weakest Member States of EMU, if not for the euro area as a whole. 
The main message arising from the evidence collected in the previous 
chapters is that EMU has a structural problem of competitiveness. Mar-
ket forces, so far, have not been able to provide the efficient productive 
investments that are required to replace the old stock of capital equip-
ment and to stimulate the different forms of productivity. In particular, 
the European financial integration has not boosted productivity in the 
peripheral Member States since foreign capital has mainly gone into 
non-tradable good sectors, creating asset bubbles which reproduced a 
model of dependence on foreign capital without fostering a virtuous 
structural change. We believe that such mechanisms are at the root of 
the persistence of negative trade and current account imbalances. In ad-
dition, as shown in Chapter 4, the euro area as a whole is accumulating 
an increasing competitiveness gap with respect to the United States; and 
this negative gap also affects the EMU’s surplus countries. 
In the first part of this chapter we look closely at the policy responses 
of the European institutions to the problem of macroeconomic imbal-
ances and to that of the increasing competitiveness gaps; then we will 
analyse some of the alternative proposals to finance the competitive-
ness-enhancing investments. After the strong increase in the interest 
rates on long-term sovereign bonds of southern European countries and 
– in particular – of Italy and Spain after June 2011, the ECB implemented 
the LTRO initiatives (December 2011 and February 2012) whereas the 
European Council and the European Commission suggested and intro-
duced new regulations aimed at addressing the adverse consequences of 
the debt crisis and strengthening the power of surveillance of the Euro-
pean institutions. 
The first innovation comes from the so-called Six-Pack, which was 
approved by the EU Council in October 2011 and adopted two months 
5. EUROPEAN POLICIES AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
171 
later. The Six-Pack is composed of a set of legislative measures (five 
Regulations and one Directive) aimed at reforming the new Stability and 
Growth Pact that entered into force in June 2011 and at putting macroe-
conomic imbalances under stronger control. In particular, two of the 
regulations are devoted to the prevention and correction of macroeco-
nomic imbalances by means of the surveillance of macroeconomic 
trends and the building up of a scoreboard based on eleven quantitative 
indicators. The Six-Pack was complemented by two other legislative ini-
tiatives: the so-called Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact. In November 
2011 the European Commission launched two additional regulations to 
strengthen budgetary and economic surveillance. In December 2011 it 
started the preparation of a “fiscal” treaty, which became an interna-
tional treaty (Treaty on stability, coordination and governance, TSCG) 
and was agreed by the EU countries (with the exception of the United 
Kingdom and Czech Republic) one month later. 
We maintain that the European sovereign debt crisis and the policy 
responses played an important role in the adjustment of the current ac-
count imbalances. However, at least in the short term, both Six-Pack and 
Two-Pack exacerbated the economic recession of the peripheral Mem-
ber States and contributed to its extension to the euro area as a whole. 
On the other hand, our previous analysis showed that the adjustment 
process can be explained by at least three factors: (i) the severe reces-
sion affecting peripheral countries which dramatically reduced the value 
of imports in these economies; (ii) the real wage compression which can 
be interpreted, in a monetary union, as an internal devaluation; (iii) an 
internal inflation rate below the already low euro-area average. 
It is apparent that our interpretation is not in agreement with that 
proposed by the European Commission. In several studies (for instance: 
European Commission 2012a and 2014a), the latter shares the state-
ment that most of the rebalancing in the euro area can be ascribed to 
significant adjustments in current accounts imbalances of the most vul-
nerable countries; but the European Commission adds that these ad-
justments are mainly based on a structural recovery in the competitive-
ness of these same countries.1 It follows that the differences between 
                                                
1 The Commission’s point of view can find support in the results reached by some 
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the interpretation of the European Commission and ours depend on the 
definition of structural competitiveness. 
The European Commission maintains that the adjustments of coun-
tries such as Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal, and Slovenia have 
been non-cyclical in the light of two crucial factors: (i) these adjustments 
were supported by increasing price competitiveness due to lower unit la-
bour costs, and (ii) the reduction in the unit labour costs is permanent 
due to a significant slowdown in the potential output growth of these 
same countries, which implies a long-term compression of their real wag-
es.2 Hence, according to the European Commission, the structural compet-
itiveness of a number of peripheral Member States improved due to the 
fact that their output gap became much lower and their “natural” rate of 
unemployment became much higher with respect to the pre-crisis period. 
However, this is equivalent to saying that the competitiveness of the EMU 
peripheral economies is based on a structural decrease in their rate of 
growth; that is, in a decrease of their levels of permanent consumption 
and productive investments and in the reduction of their productive ca-
pacity. It is not surprising that, under these conditions, the value of im-
ports should contract and the amount of export should partly increase. 
Our interpretation rejects these conclusions for two analytical rea-
sons. First, we are not ready to define a structural reduction in the rate of 
growth of a given economic system as a condition for the improvement 
of its structural competitiveness. According to the most seminal growth 
and development models in the history of economic analysis (see for in-
stance: Schumpeter 1911, Aghion and Howitt 1992), the opposite holds 
true: there is a positive correlation between competitiveness of a given 
economic system and its rate of growth. Second, we maintain that the 
                                                
theoretical models. For example, Vogel (2011) elaborates a micro-founded model, which 
analyses a small open economy belonging to the EMU, the rest of the Euro area, and the 
rest of the world. The model assesses the effect of structural reforms in the open econ-
omy on its external imbalances. According to the author, reforms in product market, 
wage moderation and fiscal consolidation accelerate current account rebalancing by 
strengthening price competitiveness. 
2 As the recent reaction of the Italian Minister of the Economy shows, the European 
Commission dramatically reduced the potential output of various EMU countries includ-
ing Italy. 
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dramatic decrease in the potential outputs of the European peripheral 
Member States is not the consequence of the unavoidable exit from the 
international and European crises, but depends instead on the peculiar 
working of the EMU, and particularly on the absence of mechanisms to 
stabilise asymmetric shocks affecting the countries of this area. Chapter 
4 supports this approach since it shows that the relative loss in interna-
tional competitiveness concerns not only peripheral countries, but also a 
large portion of the central countries of the EMU. 
As has been detailed already in this book, during the first period of life 
of the euro area the actual working of the markets did not prime the ex-
pected catching-up process. Between 1999 and 2007, peripheral Member 
States did not allocate a sufficient portion of their financial inflows to 
productive and innovative investments. Then, the following period (2008-
2012) has been characterised by a flight to quality, which inverted the di-
rection of the financial flows and worsened the sustainability of the nega-
tive imbalances of peripheral Member States. This means that these im-
balances were no longer compensated for by foreign capital and financial 
flows, so that the European peripheral countries had to rapidly and ac-
tively adjust their disequilibria. These stylised facts can be interpreted as 
market failures. Hence, it becomes crucial to design policy mechanisms 
implying the removal of the structural determinants of imbalances in the 
European countries in order to avoid a widening in negative imbalances 
during the recovery and the expansionary phases. At the same time, it is 
also crucial to conceive policy measures aimed at fuelling this recovery. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we describe the 
new macroeconomic surveillance framework based on the so-called Six-
Pack, focusing on the early warning system and on the excessive imbal-
ance procedures; we also describe the so-called Two-Pack discipline. In 
Section 5.3 we then discuss the effectiveness and weaknesses of these 
new procedures in terms of European imbalances and economic growth. 
In Section 5.4 we present some of the policy proposals elaborated by 
European institutions and leading academics, and we point out their 
main limitations. In Section 5.5 we sketch our own proposals for defin-
ing, financing, and implementing investments able to fuel an economic 
recovery in the euro area and to fill the main gaps in competitiveness 
between Member States. Section 5.6 concludes. 
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5.2 MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE 
In September 2010 the European Commission presented six legislative 
proposals (five regulations and one directive: the so-called Six-Pack) to 
strengthen the European institutions of economic governance. Two of 
these proposals were introduced to reduce macroeconomic imbalances 
and promote competitiveness through preventive and corrective ac-
tions. One year later, under the pressure of the euro area crisis, this 
macroeconomic surveillance framework was specified in terms of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and was approved by the 
EU Council and by the European Parliament on behalf of the EU Member 
States (see European Commission 2011). This mechanism is based on 
two factors: (i) an early warning system, based on a scoreboard consist-
ing of a set of macroeconomic indicators (Regulation EU No 1176/ 2011 
of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeco-
nomic imbalances); (ii) a new Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), 
based on Article 121.6 of the Treaty, which allows the Commission and 
the EU Council to adopt preventive recommendations under Article 
121.2 of the Treaty at an early stage, that is, before the imbalances be-
come too large to be managed (Regulation EU No 1174/2011 of 16 No-
vember 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeco-
nomic imbalances in the euro area). 
5.2.1 The early warning system: the MIP scoreboard 
The set of indicators, which are at the basis of the Macroeconomic Im-
balances Procedure (MIP), specifies both internal and external imbal-
ances and sets threshold values acting as an early warning device. 
Thresholds have not been set at very stringent levels in order to avoid a 
large number of “false alarms” (that is, signals of macroeconomic imbal-
ances which – ex post – clearly reveal themselves as non-excessive). At 
the same time, threshold levels have been set at prudential levels in or-
der to be able to identify problems before they became too hard to solve 
(European Commission 2012b). The objective is to ensure that appro-
priate policy responses are promptly adopted by EU countries with 
macroeconomic disequilibria, but also that these same countries do not 
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lose their heads. Hence, the European Commission defined eleven early 
warning indicators and identified lower and upper thresholds for each 
of them. It is understood that the composition of the scoreboard can 
evolve over time, according to new possible threats for macroeconomic 
stability and improvements in data availability. 
The current scoreboard includes two external imbalance indicators, 
three competitiveness indicators and six internal imbalance indicators. 
The external imbalance indicators are: (i) three-year rolling average cur-
rent account (CA) imbalance in percentage of GDP, with lower and upper 
thresholds equal to -4% (in case of negative imbalances) and +6% (in 
case of positive imbalances); and (ii) net international investment posi-
tion (NIIP) in terms of GDP, which should not fall below -35%. The three 
competitiveness indicators are: (iii) three-year percentage change in the 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER), which refers to thirty-five industrial 
countries, with lower and upper thresholds equal to -/+5% for the euro 
area countries and -/+11% for the rest of the EU; (iv) five-year percent-
age change in export market share, with a threshold of -6%; (v) three-
year percentage change in nominal Unit Labour Costs (ULC), with a 
threshold of +9% for the euro area countries and +11% for the rest of 
the EU. Finally, the six internal imbalance indicators are: (vi) the amount 
of private sector (consolidated) debt in percentage of GDP with an upper 
threshold of 160%; (vii) the credit flow to the private sector in percent-
age of GDP (15% threshold); (viii) the annual changes in the house price 
index relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, with an upper thresh-
old of 6%; (ix) the total amount of government debt in percentage of GDP 
(upper threshold of 60%); (x) three-year rolling average of the unem-
ployment rate (threshold of 10%); (xi) annual percentage change in total 
financial sector liabilities (upper threshold of 16.5%). 
The MIP Scoreboard for euro area countries in 2012 is reported in 
the appendix (see Table 5.1). 
5.2.2 The Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) 
If a significant subset of the eleven indicators included in the scoreboard 
has figures incompatible with their specific thresholds, there is the acti-
vation of an Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) for the country involved. 
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The AMR is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to put a given 
Member State under in-depth review, in the sense that the decision to 
start this review is not mechanically based on the scoreboard results but 
also refers to other information. If the European Commission decides to 
start an in-depth review, this will imply a more detailed country-study 
based on a wider set of indicators and analytical tools (Figure 5.1). 
There are three possible outcomes of each in-depth review: (a) the 
signalled imbalances of the country under review are not significant or 
have been already re-absorbed, so that the procedure stops; (b) these 
imbalances are still operative but not immediately harmful for the rest 
of the euro area, so that the European Commission and the EU Council 
limit themselves to release recommendations under Article 121.2 of the 
Treaty; (c) these same imbalances are excessive in the sense that they 
threaten the stability of the euro area, so that the Commission and the 
EU Council ask the given Member State to present a corrective action 
plan. In principle, the latter recommendation (taken under Article 121.4 
of the Treaty) is equivalent to the opening of a procedure for excessive 
macroeconomic imbalance. In fact, the formal procedure (EIP) would 
start only if a euro area country failed twice to submit an adequate cor-
rective action plan. In this case, a fine of up to 0.1% of GDP can be im-
posed. Sanctions are decided by reverse qualified majority voting 
(RQMV).3 
In 2014, fourteen European countries have been involved in an in-
depth review. Three of them (that is, Croatia, Italy, and Slovenia) have 
been considered as affected by excessive macroeconomic imbalances, 
and were hence asked to undertake strong policy actions. On the other 
hand, the imbalances of Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Hungary, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and the United King-
dom were not found to be excessive. 
The case of Italy is crucial for the problems under discussion, since its 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances are due to the possible incompati-
bility between a very high level of public debt and a too weak external 
                                                
3 This means that the recommendation of the European Commission is adopted un-
less the Council decides by qualified majority to reject it. 
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competitiveness. In the coming weeks Italy will possibly be able to im-
plement the policy actions required by the European institutions. How-
ever, we are not confident that these actions will be sufficient to over-
come the competitiveness gap of this important peripheral country and 
to stimulate a process of growth. This means that the MIP and the EIP are 
useful tools to improve the European control on the disequilibria inside 
the euro area and on the internal market; however, these tools are not 
adequate to design effective incentives to change the inertia of peripheral 
Member States and to structurally improve their competitiveness. 
5.2.3 The new procedures for the prevention 
of imbalances 
A similar conclusion applies to a related policy initiative: the so-called 
Two-Pack. In November 2011 the European Commission introduced 
two new regulations to strengthen budgetary and macroeconomic sur-
veillance in the euro area. These two regulations (the Two-Pack) came 
into force in May 2013 for all the Eurozone countries. They are built on 
the Six-Pack reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and are 
aimed at integrating these reforms by strengthening the ex ante moni-
toring mechanisms. 
The main novelties of the Two-Pack concern the management of the 
public balance sheet of euro area Member States, with special rules ap-
plying to those in the corrective arm of the new SGP, that is under the 
Excessive Deficit or Debt Procedures. Moreover, the new regulations 
provide rules designed to improve the ex ante surveillance on the budg-
etary plans of the euro area Member States (presentation to the Euro-
pean Commission by mid-October of each year), with strengthened rules 
applying to those under – or just exiting from – financial assistance pro-
grammes or affected by serious problems of financial stability. It follows 
that troubled Member States are asked to do whatever is identified as 
needed to improve their short-, medium-, and long-term economic and 
financial situation. The basis of the new procedures is the Article 136 of 
the Treaty allowing the Eurozone countries to strengthen the coordina-
tion and surveillance of budgetary discipline in order to ensure the func-
tionality of the EMU. 
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Here we are not specifically interested in analysing these new mecha-
nisms devoted to the ex ante control of the European fiscal aspects. This 
also explains why we neglect any specific reference to the so-called Fiscal 
Compact which, from the point of view of the contents, does not intro-
duce significant novelties with respect to the Six-Pack and does not refer 
to the control of the current accounts imbalances. We are instead inter-
ested to stress that the Two-Pack also strengthens the ex ante monitor-
ing of the euro area countries with macroeconomic imbalances, and in 
particular of those under Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). 
5.3 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW PROCEDURES 
The previous analysis clarifies that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack 
would have to be exclusively aimed at adjusting expected or actual mac-
roeconomic disequilibria in the euro area. To reach their objective, these 
two legislative tools introduce a number of constraints, which can be-
come binding, so that they tend to have a recessionary impact on the 
weakest economies of the European Member States. Hence the Six-Pack 
and the Two-Pack cannot be directly utilised to improve the structural 
competitiveness of the peripheral countries, at least according to our 
previous definition. Moreover, due to their potential recessionary im-
pact, they cannot even offer a long-term solution to the imbalances in 
the euro area. Finally, if – despite these observations – we try to mix up 
the objective of the adjustment of European imbalances in the short 
term and the different objective of filling the gaps in competitiveness be-
tween the peripheral and the central Member States, the Six-Pack and 
the Two-Pack can lead to ambiguous and contradictory results. 
In this section we focus our attention on the competitiveness prob-
lem. The ambiguity means that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack denounce 
a number of specific weaknesses in their adjustment mechanisms even 
in the short term. In particular, the examination of the weak points of 
the Six-Pack shows that the related policy actions risk being ineffective 
in correcting European imbalances and useless in filling the competitive 
gaps between peripheral and central Member States. 
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5.3.1 Relative or absolute measures? 
Many of the MIP scoreboard indicators are characterised by thresholds 
expressed in absolute terms, in the sense that these thresholds are unre-
lated to the average performances in the euro area. As an example, let us 
consider the ULCs. If the whole set of euro area countries were losing 
competitiveness due to the dynamics of this indicator, an increase above 
6% of the ULC in a given peripheral country could have a very negative 
impact on the competitiveness of the area as a whole in the internation-
al market but may be not so relevant as a determinant of increasing im-
balances of the specific country under examination. Moreover, the ad-
justment of ULC dynamics to the threshold in a given country could be 
insufficient to avoid the decrease in its structural competitiveness, since 
it could be exceeded by the negative performance of the area as a whole 
and it could have a negative impact on the internal demand. The oppo-
site would be true, if the whole area gained competitiveness; in this 
case, a ULC dynamic above the threshold in a given country could be 
compatible with the reproduction of the competitiveness of the whole 
area but it would usually determine or increase imbalances between 
Member States. Hence, if the threshold of this indicator were normalised 
with respect either to the average European increase of the ULC or to 
the average variation of the ULC in the three best Europeans perform-
ers, the MIP scoreboard would become more effective in detecting one 
of the possible causes of the imbalances. 
A similar methodological problem applies to the export market 
shares. Table 5.1 shows that the evolution of these shares in 2012 were 
below the negative threshold in almost all the European countries. 
However, if most of the countries fall out of the general threshold, the 
problem will be a systemic and not a country-specific one. Hence, the 
negative trend of this indicator cannot be considered a determinant of 
internal European imbalances but, at most, a signal of decrease in the 
competitiveness of the whole area. This means that the consequent poli-
cy actions must be taken at the European level and not only at the coun-
try level; moreover, their aim cannot be the direct re-absorption of the 
European imbalances of a specific country. A normalised version of this 
indicator (see above) could provide a more convincing microeconomic 
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analysis of the composition of European imbalances. On the other hand, 
different and more effective indicators can be used to assess the overall 
competitive deficit of the EMU area. 
The same arguments can be applied to a large number of the other 
indicators included in the MIP scoreboard. Our conclusion is that, by us-
ing normalised indices, it will become possible to isolate the problem of 
rebalancing the macroeconomic disequilibria inside the euro area and to 
implement adequate policy actions. Conversely, the systemic problems 
of competitiveness, which affect the euro area a whole, must be man-
aged by having recourse to different policy actions. 
5.3.2 Trade and global value chains 
The growing importance of the regional and global value chains reduces 
the informative significance of some of the indicators included in the 
Alert Mechanism. The fragmentation of production among many EU and 
non-EU Member States implies that intermediate products pass through 
different countries before being transformed into the final outputs in 
the last phase of the production processes. As Altomonte et al. (2011) 
specify, this fragmentation in the production processes implies that 
trade statistics incorporate the value of each of the different intermedi-
ate products in each of the outputs of subsequent productive phases, 
and hence they improperly calculate this value many and varying times. 
This generates an arbitrary and heterogeneous multiplication of the to-
tal amount and the total value of trade with respect to the actual value 
added of import and export flows of the different countries involved in 
the chain. One of the consequences of this overvaluation is a distortion-
ary assessment of the trade and current account imbalances of the dif-
ferent countries. Another consequence is the record of strong and dis-
tortionary fluctuations in import and export values of intermediate 
products; and this is especially true during the crisis and the recovery 
phases (Alessandria et al. 2011). 
Among the indicators included in the MIP scoreboard, the market 
shares of each of the Member States are particularly affected by the dis-
tortions due to the global and regional value chains. Export flows are 
calculated using standard trade statistics, which report the total value of 
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goods and services and not the domestic value added to them. This can 
imply some paradox. For instance, the reduction in the market share of a 
given country could be the signal of an improvement in its competitive-
ness at the international level. This apparent paradox is due to the fact 
that the reduction in the market share of the country under examination 
could be the effect of an increase in the value added of its exports which 
do not compensate the decrease in the total value of its imported inter-
mediate products. Hence, to utilise the dynamics of the market shares of 
each European country as an indicator of its trade imbalances, it would 
be necessary to build value-added statistics. Unfortunately, these kind of 
data are not so widely available yet as to become a world standard of 
measurement.4 As a rough proxy, the MIP scoreboard could at least refer 
to the value of the net exports in the different sectors of production. 
In addition to the statistical problem of measurement, the global and 
regional value chains can affect trade measures by propagating shocks 
among countries. A reduction in the market share or in the current ac-
count balance can be the effect of negative shocks in other countries of 
the chain; moreover, it is obvious that the magnitude of the reduction is 
higher for upstream countries than for downstream ones (Zavacka 
2012). In this context, even the national imbalances cannot be adjusted 
by means of country-specific actions. The latter can be ineffective in 
bringing the indicators above the negative threshold. 
5.3.3 The drawbacks of an asymmetric approach 
As we pointed out in the previous chapters, one of the main negative 
features of the European adjustment mechanisms lies in the fact that ad-
justments are asymmetric, in the sense that the relative costs must be 
borne in the main by deficit countries. It is also clearly evident that this 
applies to the MIP scoreboard as well. If we exclude the indicator on the 
current account imbalances and a few others, this scoreboard is only 
based on negative thresholds; moreover, even in the case of the current 
                                                
4 The OECD is the only institution collecting data on trade value added by means of 
the OECD-WTO TiVA database. In this respect, see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? Da-
taSetCode=TIVA_OECD_WTO. 
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accounts, the threshold for surplus countries is less binding (6%) than 
that for deficit countries (4%) and it was never utilised to start a proce-
dure for excessive macroeconomic imbalance. In this respect it is well 
known that, during the last three years as well as in the pre-crisis peri-
od, Germany recorded current account surpluses above the maximum 
threshold of 6%; however, according to the European Commission, the-
se disequilibria were never threatening to compromise the stability of 
the euro area. 
The German case is important since the asymmetry in the treatment 
of surplus and deficit countries is not only unfair, but it reproduces and 
strengthens the imbalances. The lack of monitoring and the absence of 
sanctions towards the evolution of the German trade surpluses allowed 
the country to make stronger its export-led growth model, based on 
wage moderation and structural competitiveness. However, such a 
model is not suitable for the dominant country in a currency union since 
it ends up in beggar-thy-neighbour style dynamics (Dullien 2014).5 
This result corroborates the evidence provided in Chapter 4 of this 
book. Surpluses in some countries of the euro area very often corre-
spond to equivalent deficits in other countries of the same area, mean-
ing that both are crucial to understand spillovers of the macroeconomic 
imbalances across countries (Codogno 2013). Hence, negative current 
account imbalances in a number of European Member States are largely 
due to the poor functioning of the European institutions in putting un-
der control the corresponding positive imbalances of Germany and a 
few other EMU countries. It follows that the asymmetric adjustments 
have detrimental and general effects. Let us elaborate further the case. 
As we showed in Chapters 1 and 4, the recent rebalancing processes in 
various peripheral Member States required deflation and deep reces-
sions in these countries, which spread to the whole euro area.6 A sym-
                                                
5 In this perspective, it is not so crucial to distinguish between intra-EMU and extra-
EU positive trade imbalances since, in both case, the surpluses of the leading countries 
have a negative impact on the potential growth of the rest of Europe. 
6 Another argument against the asymmetry in adjustments can be found in Col-
lignon (2013). He argues that this approach is not consistent with the cooperation be-
tween the European Member States since policies are driven by the preferences of 
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metrical adjustment of the positive and negative current account imbal-
ances instead, with surplus countries increasing their expenditure and 
reducing the relevance of the external sector in favor of domestic de-
mand, could have partially avoided these negative and general results 
(see Guerrieri and Esposito 2012). Moreover, rules aimed to increase 
the contribution to the EU budget in proportion to the surpluses could 
help to reduce imbalances. 
5.4 THE CURRENT POLICIES FOR GROWTH 
The previous analysis showed that the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack are 
suitable for implementing neither policies aimed at filling the gaps of 
competitiveness between central and peripheral Member States nor pol-
icies aimed at supporting an equilibrated, sustainable growth path for 
the euro area. It follows that it would be necessary to re-design im-
portant aspects of the new European governance built by the European 
Council and the European Commission in the last four years. However, 
this is not a duty workable in the short term or even in the medium 
term. The question thus becomes: do the existing European economic 
institutions have in place policy measures able to achieve improvements 
in the competitiveness of the peripheral countries and to support a 
growth process in the area? And if the answer is negative, will it be pos-
sible to design new and effective policy tools for equilibrated growth? 
Different proposals for the implementation of competitiveness and 
growth-enhancing policies have been put forward since May/June 2012. 
However, the implementation of these policies was hindered or limited 
by three main elements: (i) the binding fiscal constraints that each of 
the EMU Member States had to meet at national level to be compliant 
with the new Stability and Growth Pact and with the Six-Pack (or the 
Fiscal Compact) requirements; (ii) the rejection of the EMU central 
countries to undertake any systematic initiative which could imply a 
                                                
stronger members. This undermines the social cohesion of the countries and the stabil-
ity of the whole area. 
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transfer (even indirect) from the public and private national debts to 
the EU balance sheet; and (iii) the deleveraging of the European banking 
system, particularly in the peripheral Member States, due to the large 
stock of bad loans and troubled assets still stored on banks’ balance 
sheets. These three elements prevented the actual launch of the various 
designs of the Industrial Compact or Growth Compact, proposed by the 
European Commission and approved by the European Council. Howev-
er, they also made clear which are the two essential ingredients that 
would have to characterise any effective expansionary monetary policy 
in the euro area: a positive shock to the aggregate demand in the very 
short term, and the strengthening of the productive efficiency (in par-
ticular, in the peripheral Member States) by means of reforms enhanc-
ing the structural competitiveness in the medium term. 
The last statement implies that growth-enhancing and competitive-
ness-enhancing policies in the euro area require as a necessary condi-
tion a virtuous combination between fiscal policy, reform initiatives, and 
monetary policy (see Draghi 2014). Here we do not analyse the reasons 
why the ECB has been unable to pursue an expansionary policy in the 
last two and a half years and is now facing severe constraints to imple-
ment a quantitative easing programme.7 Moreover, we do not examine 
the main economic and institutional reforms which would have to be 
implemented in the different Member States to improve efficiency and 
social welfare in the euro area. We just focus our attention on the short- 
and medium-term initiatives which can stimulate the aggregate demand 
                                                
7 The LUISS School of European Political Economy (see Bastasin et al. 2014) has sug-
gested a financial tool to ease the purchase of public bonds by the ECB in the secondary 
market (EQUIP). This tool is an asset-backed security (ABS) issued by financial interme-
diaries. The underlying components of the new ABS are the EMU Member States’ sover-
eign bonds, combined in a proportion which has to be ex-ante determined by the ECB 
and which roughly reflects the national shares in the ECB capital. If the ECB committed 
itself to purchase the new ABS to implement its quantitative easing programme, the cre-
ation and supply of this new financial asset would become convenient for the private 
intermediaries; moreover, the mix of risk and return of this same asset would be appeal-
ing for a number of institutional investors and wealth owners. Hence, the European 
quantitative easing intermediated programme (EQUIP) could flow into the construction 
of a large and unified market for European public bonds. 
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and supply without affecting the fiscal equilibria or adjustments in the 
national balance sheets. 
In this respect, the crucial reference is to a systematic project of pub-
lic and private investments at the European level, since these compo-
nents of the aggregate demand are the most effective bridge between 
short- and medium-term objectives and both can improve competitive-
ness and create the conditions for the reforms. The European Commis-
sion would have to identify the broad economic activities that enjoy a 
strategic priority, while leaving it to market decisions to translate these 
priorities into specific productive innovations and investments. Moreo-
ver, the European Commission would have to identify the public finan-
cial resources necessary to finance the public component of the invest-
ment project and to complement flows of private financing. Finally, it 
would have to implement an asymmetric allocation of the financial 
funds and the actual investments in order to grant an economic ad-
vantage to the peripheral Member States, and thus to reduce the gaps in 
competiveness inside the euro area. 
Apparently, the European Commission has different tools at its dis-
posal for financing and implementing these kind of investment pro-
grammes. One of the most promising seems to be the Europe 2020 Pro-
ject Bond Initiative (EPBI, Regulation No. 670/2012). This initiative, 
which is based on the joint participation of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), provides for the purchase of project bonds issued by public 
and private partners to finance eligible infrastructure investments. In 
particular, the EIB takes the responsibility to purchase the riskiest 
tranche of the bond in order to improve its rating and to lower the mar-
ket cost of the other tranches. Thanks to this initial financing, it becomes 
feasible to build public-private partnerships (PPP) which can attract 
additional private finance from institutional investors; that is, according 
to the Commission’s idea, “the aim is to attract institutional investors to 
the capital market financing of projects with stable and predictable cash 
flow generation potential by enhancing the credit quality of project 
bonds issued by private companies.”8 
                                                
8 European Commission, Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, updated 12 September 
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It must be noted that the EPBI is interesting from the methodological 
point of view and succeeded in financing a number of infrastructure 
programmes; however, the original objective of this project was not to 
implement a massive European investment plan but rather “to support 
capital market financing of projects as a form of finance to complement 
loans, not to replace other sources of financing.”9 Hence, the size and the 
institutional frame of the EPBI are largely insufficient to boost the low 
investment to GDP ratio in the EU, and thus to launch a growth-
enhancing policy. 
A more systemic initiative has been taken up by the newly appointed 
president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. In present-
ing his programme to the European Parliament, the new president 
acknowledged the need for a European investment project aimed at 
fuelling a growth process in the area. Investments should be focused on 
four main fields: energy, transport, broadband networks, and industry 
clusters. The financial resources devoted to this project would have to 
amount to more than 300bn euros over a 3-year horizon. According to 
Mr. Juncker, part of these resources would have to derive from the utili-
sation of the EU budget, which approximately amounts to 1% of the EU 
GDP. Additional sources of financing should come from the European 
Investment Bank and from the private sector. 
At the end of November 2014 the European Commission elaborated a 
more detailed scheme of Juncker’s investment project to be approved by 
the EU Council on December 9th (see Passacantando 2014). The original 
liquidity amounts to 13bn euros: 5bn come from the EIB, and a 8bn guar-
antee comes from the reallocation of existing EU budget resources (3.3bn 
from the Connecting Europe facility, 2.7bn from Europe’s research pro-
gram Horizon 2020 and 2bn from unused founds); the latter would se-
cure a first-loss guarantee of 16bn euros, even if it was not necessary to 
prefund the additional 8bn. This original endowment of 21bn euros feeds 
a new fund (the European Fund for Strategic Investments, EFSI), which is 
simply an account of different projects and is bound to the EIB. 
                                                
2014, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_ 
2020/index_en.htm. 
9 Ibidem. 
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The EFSI would have to allow an EIB funding of 63bn euros in three 
years, with an internal leverage of 3, and a consequent total amount of 
investment valued at 315bn euros, with an external leverage of five. 
More than 75% of the expected total financing (that is, about 240bn eu-
ros) should be allocated in the infrastructure sectors, the remaining part 
(about 75bn euros) in the financing of small and medium firms. Moreo-
ver, the EMU Member States are expected to freely contribute to the 
EFSI by paying in capital but without affecting the deficits of their bal-
ance sheets.10 
The German government did not openly support the launch of the 
European investment projects. However, at mid-September 2014, Ger-
many’s and France’s Finance Ministers maintained that the EIB would 
have to play a more active role by increasing its balance sheet and by 
improving its willingness to take risks; and at the end of November, the 
German government did not exclude giving a contribution to the EFSI. 
The point is that, to succeed, the core of Juncker’s investment project 
cannot be based on a new fund of 21bn euros with just 2bn or 5bn of 
additional liquidity (see also Gros 2014:2).11 As stated by many com-
mentators, even if it was taken for granted a total leverage of fifteen 
which in fact appears to be too high, 315bn of new investments would 
be insufficient to reach the ambitious objectives of Juncker plan. Hence, 
the probabilities of Juncker’s investment project to be implemented in 
the future are not so high; moreover, as in the case of the EPBI, this pro-
ject has not the net size to change the negative inertia of the European 
economy. 
It is thus not surprising that alternative proposals have been put 
forward by a number of Member States. Some of them follow the line of 
                                                
10 This is our provisional interpretation of the following statement: “the Commission 
will take a favourable position towards such capital contributions to the Fund”. As far as 
we know, today (end of November 2014) it is impossible to enter into more details on 
the possible national contributions to the EFSI. The Juncker’s investment programme 
has not been approved yet by Member States which – a fortiori – did not commit them-
selves to finance the new EFSI. 
11 It must be noted that the 5bn of capital, transferred by the EIB, would probably 
have been invested even outside the EFSI; on the other hand, at least 6bn out of the 8bn 
of prefunded guarantee come from the reallocation of the EU budget resources. 
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Juncker’s programme, but at least double the financial effort over a 
longer horizon. In particular, the investment proposal from the Polish 
government (Szczurek 2014) is based on a financial flow of 700bn euros 
over five years and it is centred on a European Fund for Investment 
(EFI).12 This fund, which probably inspired the EFSI, would have to be 
set up in the EIB’s structure and would offer a risk-sharing tool or a 
guarantee to additional public and private investments. Hence, in the 
Polish proposal too, the financial flows are based on a leverage. Never-
theless, the organisation and the working of the EFI are different with 
respect to those of the EFSI: in spite of its link with the EIB, the former 
has to be a separate legal entity 
The financing of the EFI is based on a mechanism similar to that de-
signed for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM): all EU Member 
States inject gradually a paid-in capital and guarantee for the possible 
remaining capital. The financing of each European country does not di-
rectly increase its public deficit but just its public debt; in any case it is 
not a duplication of the EU budget financing. Thanks to its paid-in capi-
tal, the EFI can issue bonds in the international financial markets; and 
the consequent takings can leverage the liquidity transferred from the 
EU Member States. One of the possible features of EFI’s financing is the 
asymmetric allocation of the new investments, which could be concen-
trated in countries where output lags behind output potential estimates 
(i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain). 
A different plan centred on tax cuts rather than on public and private 
investments, has been recently proposed by Giavazzi and Tabellini 
(2014). The latter start from a common analytical ground. They argue 
that EMU needs a coordinated plan instead of national isolated actions 
due to the fact that all Member States share a common problem, that is 
the well-known lack of aggregate demand in the short term. From this 
point of view, tax cuts are more effective than investments to boost de-
mand level and thus the rate of growth, due to the long lag time in the 
implementation of public and private investments and to the frequent 
                                                
12 As we will emphasise below, various aspects of the Polish investment programme 
seem to be included in the draft of Juncker’s plan at the end of November 2014. Howev-
er, the differences between the two plans are more important than their analogies. 
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misallocation of resources in the case of the public ones. Hence, Giavazzi 
and Tabellini (2014) propose a 5% tax cut combined with a five-year 
suspension of the SGP rules, which should allow the EMU countries to 
exploit the growth stimulus and to carry out a severe reduction in their 
public expenditures. The latter would have to allow the re-equilibration 
of public balance sheets. However, this rebalancing process could be 
coupled with an expansionary monetary policy, if the EMU countries fi-
nanced the temporary public deficit in excess by issuing bonds with a 
thirty-year maturity to be purchased by the ECB through a radical quan-
titative easing programme. Moreover, in order to further strengthen the 
expansionary fiscal policy, the ECB could distribute the interests on the-
se long-term bonds to its shareholders (that is, the same EMU Member 
States) in the form of seignorage. 
This plan has several institutional and analytical shortcomings. From 
the first point of view, it violates the Treaties since the ECB would be-
come a purchaser of public bonds in the primary market, the SGP would 
be programmatically broken, and the separation between monetary and 
fiscal policies would be systematically cancelled. However, the analytical 
shortcomings are still more significant since they propose a mild ver-
sion of the misunderstandings characterising Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002). The main underlying assumption of that older paper is the per-
fect efficiency of the markets in the short and long term; the main un-
derlying assumption of the new paper is that markets have some fail-
ures in the short term but are perfectly efficient in the medium and long 
term. Hence, according to Giavazzi and Tabellini (2014), it is necessary 
to stimulate the demand in the short term due to market failures; how-
ever, these monetary and fiscal stimuli will be sufficient to get an equili-
brated path of growth due to long-term market efficiency. 
In the light of the evidence collected throughout this book, we main-
tain that one of the lessons to be taken from the recent crises is that mar-
kets can fail in the short as well as in the long term; and a further lesson 
is that breaking the rules increases instability, so that the weakest Mem-
ber States would face growing costs if they neglected the EMU’s main 
constraints on the management of the public balance sheets. It follows 
that the solution to the problem of macroeconomic imbalances comes 
from the solution of the following puzzle: how to restore a path of 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM. ECONOMIC IMBALANCES IN THE EUROZONE 
 
190 
growth and to improve the structural competitiveness of countries in 
deficits, given the binding constraints imposed by the EMU’s rules. To an-
swer the second question raised at the beginning of this section (that is, 
will it be possible to design new and effective policy tools for equilibrat-
ed growth?), we have to sketch policy measures able to solve this puzzle. 
5.5 GROWTH-ENHANCING POLICIES:  
SOME PROPOSALS 
These measures are aimed at reaching various results and at facing dif-
ferent constraints. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2014) are right in stating that 
it takes too much time to design and implement a European investment 
project quantitatively adequate to restart a growth process in the euro 
area. Hence, the first policy measures have to support the aggregate 
demand in the very short term by stimulating consumption or invest-
ment in circulating capital either at the European level or at the national 
levels. Due to the severe fiscal constraints faced by governments of pe-
ripheral countries, the initiatives at the national levels mainly rely on 
unlikely expansionary decisions taken autonomously by the policy mak-
ers of the EMU central countries, as well as on some specific tax cuts and 
spending reallocation in a few peripheral countries (such as Italy). On 
the other hand, the initiatives at the European level have a wider range 
of possibilities. They can rely on the short-term effects of an expansion-
ary monetary policy, on the positive impact of increasing European pub-
lic spending, and on the combined effects of these two monetary and fis-
cal policies.13 
In any case, the main solution would be the implementation of sym-
metric adjustments between central and peripheral countries. For in-
stance: if the European institutions forced German policy makers to 
compensate the excessive positive imbalances in the current accounts 
                                                
13 In this respect, the main role can be played by unconventional monetary policies 
aimed at determining a positive exogenous demand shock in the European market. As 
stated above, we do not analyse monetary policies in details. 
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by means of an increase in the internal demand, there would be a posi-
tive short-term shock for the European aggregate demand. 
Let us assume that these short-term stimuli to the aggregate demand 
were successful. As we have already shown, this would be insufficient to 
restart a process of European growth and to fill the competitiveness gaps 
inside the euro area in the medium term due to the fact that peripheral 
countries, and partly central countries, did not yet carry out reforms and 
did not recover their potential outputs. To achieve these last two results 
in the medium term, it would be necessary to implement a widespread 
European investment project as well as to introduce specific reforms to 
improve the structural competitiveness of different Member States. 
Let us first refer to the European investment project. As previously 
stated, the European Commission would have to identify the broad eco-
nomic activities that represent the strategic priorities, while leaving it to 
market decisions to translate these priorities into specific productive 
innovations and investments. Moreover, the Commission would have to 
identify the public financial resources necessary to finance the public 
component of the investment project and to complement flows of pri-
vate financing. Finally, it would have to implement an asymmetric allo-
cation of the financial funds and the actual investments in order to grant 
an economic advantage to the peripheral Member States, thus reducing 
the gaps in competitiveness inside the euro area. 
Here we cannot enter into details with respect to the strategic priori-
ties to be covered by the European investment project and with respect 
to the possible asymmetric allocation of the actual investments. In the 
first place, the four fields indicated by Mr. Juncker in his programme fol-
low the direction suggested by a number of papers produced by the Eu-
ropean institutions in recent years and by the agreed conclusions of 
several recent European Councils. In the second place, it is evident that 
the degree of asymmetry is determined by the need to reduce the com-
petitiveness gaps between Member States. However, in order to really 
discuss the investment priorities, the relations between these priorities 
and the market decisions, the relative weight of public and private in-
vestments, and the efficient corrections of the competitive gaps between 
different countries, we would have to build a more specific framework 
and to have additional information. We can instead go a step forward 
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with respect to the public financial resources required to finance the Eu-
ropean investment project.14 
As we already pointed out, the EIB can play an important role as a 
purchaser of project bonds, but it cannot be the main source of financing 
for a European investment project quantitatively appropriate to re-start 
a growth process in the euro area. On the other hand, the financial sup-
port of public institutions with adequate information offers a kind of 
market guarantee to private and institutional investors, and it can thus 
strengthen the role played by the latter;15 conversely, this also explains 
why private and institutional investors cannot fully replace the European 
public funds in financing the European investment project. Hence, if we 
want to avoid having the financial coverage of this project reduced to a 
mere clearing transaction, unable to actually finance the implementation 
of new initiatives, it will be necessary to identify a credible source of 
public funds. In principle, the most logical solution would be to have re-
course to the European permanent institution with the highest amount 
of paid-in capital, that is the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
A possible objection is that the ESM is asked to play an excessive 
number of roles on the scene. The ESM was born as a mechanism to 
manage the EMU sovereign debt crisis (December 2010); then, it has 
been proposed as one of the possible public backstops in the resolution 
mechanism designed by the banking union process (December 2013); 
and now it could become the main public financial support for the im-
plementation of the European investment project. However, this objec-
                                                
14 It must be noted that, according to many commentators, the definition of the in-
vestment priorities is more important than the identification of the public financial re-
sources. The latter could be limited if the former were so appealing to mobilise the huge 
amount of liquidity hoarded by the private financial intermediaries and by the institu-
tional investors. We partially share this point of view. However, we also believe that the 
long and severe European recession requires an important amount of public financing 
and investment in order to offer a kind of guarantee to the private financial resources: 
the public guarantee that the EMU is not condemned to be trapped in a long-term eco-
nomic stagnation. 
15 The selection of a given borrower by a public institution with a rich set of infor-
mation signals to the market players that this borrower is creditworthy. In this sense, 
the public institution offers an implicit market guarantee to the private investors. 
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tion would not matter if we made reference to the official scope of activ-
ity of the ESM. This scope explicitly lists the possibility to purchase debt 
instruments in the primary and secondary financial markets. Moreover, 
in specifying the purpose of this institution, Article 3 of the ESM Treaty 
acknowledges that the ESM itself aims at providing “stability support” to 
its members which “are threatened by severe financial problems”; and it 
is obvious that, without the implementation of a European investment 
plan to relaunch a growth process, EMU’s peripheral Member States will 
be unable to manage their public deficits and debts in the near future. 
An additional and more serious objection is that the ESM cannot face 
this new duty either without increasing its amount of paid-in capital or 
without exposing its other possible commitments. To overcome this 
problem, it would be sufficient to agree that the ECB can buy on the sec-
ondary market: (i) the project bonds issued by public and private insti-
tutions to finance parts of the European investment project and bought 
by the ESM on the primary market; (ii) the new bonds issued by the 
ESM to finance its purchase of the project bonds sub (i). Moreover, this 
possibility would offer a solution to the current dilemma of the ECB: its 
strong will to start a credible European quantitative easing programme 
to counter the risk of deflation in the euro area, and the lack of an ade-
quate market supply of financial assets with a proper rating and without 
a direct link to the public debt issued by the different Member States.16 
The project bonds and the ESM’s bonds could fill the lack of an adequate 
market supply of financial assets without involving the direct sale of 
sovereign debt bonds in the European secondary market. On the other 
hand, the expected purchase of the project bonds by the ECB would 
prime a virtuous circle: it would make these project bonds quite desira-
ble for private and institutional investors, and it would thus lower their 
riskiness; as a consequence, the ECB and the EIB would have the stimu-
lus to increase their purchases of these same assets. 
                                                
16 The ECB’s possible choice to systematically buy public bonds of different Member 
States in the secondary market would not be a novelty (cf. the so called Securities Mar-
kets Programme, SMP) and – at least in our opinion – would not violate the spirit of the 
Treaty. However, this possible choice is opposed by Germany since it is conceived as a 
socialisation of the public debt accumulated by the peripheral countries. 
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The problem is that this possible source of financing of the European 
investment project, which could also help the implementation of the Eu-
ropean quantitative easing by the ECB, crashes into the political opposi-
tion from most of the EMU Member States. Northern and surplus coun-
tries tend to read this kind of solution as a complex construction to hide 
the use of common financial resources to finance countries in deficits. 
On the contrary, the latter countries read this same kind of solution as a 
“Trojan Horse” to impose restrictive and binding measures, with an im-
plicit loss of sovereignty for troubled countries. 
In order to overcome this mistrust between EMU Member States, 
which is one of the main causes of the loss of legitimacy of the European 
institutions and of their representatives, it would be necessary to build 
an open and accountable “exchange” between the financing and the allo-
cation of the European investment project, on the one hand, and the re-
moval of the main weaknesses of the peripheral Member States by 
means of a set of reforms aimed at strengthening their structural com-
petitiveness, on the other hand. This step would complete the medium-
term policy measures aimed at restarting a European path of growth 
and at absorbing the competitive gaps inside the euro area. 
It must be noted that the European institutions already elaborated a 
policy tool able to build the bridge to an accountable exchange. The tool 
is represented by the so-called “contractual arrangements” to be bilat-
erally signed between the European Commission and each of the EMU’s 
Member States.17 The latter, which have been discussed in the European 
Council of December 2013 but eliminated a few months later from the 
European institutional tables, were conceived to be part of the conver-
gence and competitiveness tools, since they were a way to introduce an 
ex ante coordination to implement country-specific reforms in all the 
EMU Member States in order to boost their structural competitiveness. 
                                                
17 It must be emphasised that contractual arrangements also apply to each of the 
central Member States of the euro area. There are two reasons maintaining the point. 
First, if contractual arrangements just applied to the weakest European countries, the 
latter would refuse to sign in order to avoid the consequent stigma. Second, the lack of 
competitiveness also involves specific sectors of the EMU’s core countries (for instance 
the German service sector). 
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In the view of the European Commission, the ex ante coordination 
would have had to imply that the structural reforms, initially elaborated 
by each of the Member States and voluntarily included in their specific 
contractual arrangement, were to be assessed and agreed by the Com-
mission itself before their possible implementation at the national level. 
In this process, the European Commission was entitled to suggest im-
portant changes to the reform plan, and then had the responsibility to 
monitor the progress in the actual implementation of each of the agreed 
reforms. Our suggestion is that the successful implementation of the 
agreed reforms by a specific Member State could be tied up the alloca-
tion of a part of the European investments in this same State. 
In this framework the contractual arrangements would offer an effi-
cient answer to the fears of the central countries that the implementa-
tion of the European investment project risks giving an incentive to the 
peripheral countries to neglect the necessary reforms: the latter coun-
tries would not benefit from the European investment without carrying 
out the agreed reforms. On the other hand, this same tool would limit 
the extent of the external and binding constraints for the peripheral 
countries: the latter would not risk suffering an unexpected loss of sov-
ereignty since they would just be committed to carry out the decided re-
form. As a consequence, the contractual arrangements could design a 
strong stimulus to the implementation of both the European investment 
project and the country-specific structural reforms. 
The process just described mimics the results that the standard mod-
els attributed to the perfect functioning of the market. The difference is 
that, here, markets are partially replaced with active European institu-
tions. The financial and capital inflows, actually recorded by the periph-
eral countries through the markets in the first years of the euro life, are 
here partially replaced with the allocation of the project bonds through 
institutional channels. Moreover, these inflows are not utilised by the 
peripheral countries to feed short-term speculative investments but 
they allow the implementation of the European investment project.18 On 
                                                
18 An obvious objection is that our proposal just replaces the possibility of “market 
failures” with that of “government failures”. However, our sketchy design of a European 
investment project is based on a strict interaction between the strategic decisions, taken 
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the other hand, the transfer of financial flows from Germany and other 
central Member States to peripheral countries is not just a market op-
portunity to improve trade and an accounting compensation for the re-
lated positive imbalances in the current accounts; this transfer also re-
sponds to the institutional design of stimulating the production of capi-
tal goods in the central countries and the related export of innovative 
organisational models to peripheral countries in order to structurally 
improve their competitiveness. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical evidence collected in the previous chapters shows that 
EMU has a structural problem of competitiveness. Differently from the 
standard forecast, this problem has been exacerbated by the monetary 
and financial integration. This integration firstly fostered the dependence 
of EMU peripheral countries on the capital flows originating from the 
central Member States without enhancing the productivity and the struc-
tural competitiveness of the former. Then, it imposed severe readjust-
ments in the peripheral Member States, when the crises started and the 
allocation of financial flows became determined by the “flight to quality”, 
thus going back to the central Member States. This means that the cur-
rent account imbalances inside the euro area were not absorbed by 
means of a “catching-up” process: they continued to increase during the 
expansion, and were adjusted during the international and European cri-
ses by means of a dramatic economic recession in the deficit countries. 
In order to improve the mechanisms devoted to an early monitoring 
and an orderly reabsorption of macroeconomic imbalances, the Europe-
an institutions since 2010 introduced new measures and rules. In this 
chapter we showed that these initiatives suffer from several shortcom-
ings related both to their general approach and to the selection of the 
                                                
by the European institutions, and the implementation of these guidelines devoted to the 
working of the market. Our rational belief is that this interaction can be virtuous and can 
thus minimise the joint possibility of “government failures” and “market failures”. 
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indicators. Let us just recall here the most general problem. The new 
procedures continue to be based on the assumption that the costs of the 
adjustment have to be largely borne by the deficit countries instead of 
being shared with the surplus countries. The negative impact of this 
asymmetry is worsened by the fact that the growing disequilibria in the 
euro area imposed a dramatic increase in the adjustment costs without 
a corresponding additional amount of European resources. 
In any case, the long European recession, from the last quarter of 
2011 to the first quarter of 2013, and the threat of a substantial stagna-
tion in the current year (2014) made it clear that these initiatives were 
inadequate to solve the structural problems of the euro area. Hence, 
since 2012 several proposals have been put forward to design and fi-
nance European strategic investments and to fill the gaps in competi-
tiveness between different Member States. The European Commission 
introduced the convergence and competitiveness instrument, based on 
the project bond initiative of the Europe 2020 growth strategy. More re-
cently, the newly-elected president of the European Commission, Jean-
Claude Juncker, announced an investment plan of 300bn euros over a 
three-year horizon. One of the main weaknesses of this plan is that the 
new financial resources are limited. As other investment plans show 
(for instance, the Polish proposal), the amount of 300bn euros would be 
insufficient to finance a project adequate to restart a long-term growth 
process in the euro area; moreover, a large part of the 300bn euros of 
the Juncker plan does not appear to be an actual additional finance but it 
derives from an excessive leverage based on a too-fragile original capital 
already available from the EU budget. Hence, in order to build an effec-
tive European investment project, the crucial problem to be solved is the 
identification of an adequate source of finance; and the solution cannot 
lead to a direct transfer from the central to the peripheral countries. 
This is the reason why we focused our attention on new policy 
measures financed by project bonds and linked to the contractual ar-
rangements. In order to bring back the European investment-GDP ratio 
to the level reached in 2007, the issue of project bonds to finance the 
European investment project would have to be even larger than the 
Polish proposal (700bn euros over five-years). The recourse to the ESM 
(and possibly to the EIB) as the purchaser(s) of a large part of project 
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bonds on the primary market, and to the ECB as the purchaser of these 
same bonds on the secondary market would easily cover these amounts 
on the demand side. Moreover, to restart a process of growth in the euro 
area without excessive macroeconomic imbalances, it would be neces-
sary to reduce the competiveness gaps between EMU countries; hence, 
we have to support peripheral Member States by means of an asymmet-
rical allocation of the new innovative investments. Contractual ar-
rangements, which bind all the euro countries to implement the agreed 
reforms under the supervision of the European Commission, could be 
the tool to avoid that the financing of project bonds and the asymmetric 
allocation of investments were conceived as undesirable transfer devic-
es by Germany and other central Member States. In this way, it would 
become possible to reach three important and related objectives in the 
euro area: to reduce the competitiveness gaps between Member States, 
to cut the link between economic expansion and macroeconomic imbal-
ances, and to restart an equilibrated process of growth. 
It is difficult to say whether our suggestions have a fair probability of 
implementation. It is well known that the “contractual arrangements” 
did not survive the scrutiny of the European Council in December 2013. 
Moreover, the ECB refused several times (for instance, in November 
2011 and in July 2012) to build a preferential relationship with the ESM, 
and the latter is unwilling to be involved in initiatives which are not in 
its original purview of activity. Finally, several European institutions 
and the EMU central Member States are not ready to expand the ECB du-
ties and to strengthen the overlapping between monetary and fiscal pol-
icies. On the other hand, it must be considered that the EMU is facing its 
third crisis in the last seven years. If the European institutions are not 
willing to find a solution to this negative situation in the next two or 
three months, the monetary union will be at risk of survival again. At 
this time, the main threat would probably be due to the break-up of so-
cial cohesion in the large part of the peripheral countries and to the sub-
sequent dramatic impact on their macroeconomic fundamentals. 
In order to avoid this perspective, the European institutions are 
asked to design an initiative comparable to the Financial Stability Plan, 
which was launched by Timothy Geithner in March 2009 and marked 
the exit from the financial crisis in the United States (see Messori 2009), 
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and to the “Outright Monetary Transactions”, which was announced by 
Mario Draghi in September 2012 and froze the dramatic crisis of the Eu-
ropean sovereign bonds (see Messori 2013). Obviously, our sketchy 
suggestions cannot be regarded as a fully-designed programme. Our 
hope is that these suggestions can offer some stimuli to the Italian pres-
idency in order to prepare a proposal for the European Council in De-
cember 2014.  
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